Sophyrosyne and deliberative democracy
Skeptics of deliberative conceptions of democracy often point to the rather demanding expectations imposed on citizens in the deliberative account. With some justice, critics argue that it is utopian to believe that sufficient numbers of citizens in mass democracy will dramatically improve their knowledge about politics and sophistication in reasoning about policy.We argue that the key characteristic required of deliberative democratic citizens is not so much political knowledge, sophistication in reasoning, or, in their absence, humility as it is narrowly understood.
Rather, the key trait to develop is something akin to what the ancients called sophrosγne, a conceptual cousin to humility, but whose broader connotations are remarkably apt for fostering good democratic—and especially deliberative democratic—citizenship (Neblo, 2011).The Greek word has an unusually wide range of translations, but it is often rendered as temperance, moderation, sobriety, self-control, and sound-mindedness. Sophrosyne is alone among the ancient cardinal virtues in lacking a clear modern referent, and it has been relatively neglected in updated accounts of politics and the virtues.Yet, we argue that sophrosyne is a particularly needful virtue in the citizenry if a deliberative conception of democracy is to fulfill its purpose of allowing us to steer between technocratic elitism, vulgar populism, and an anomic politics-as-market. Unlike producing vast increases in information and political sophistication, fostering sophrosyne in the context of democratic deliberation is a plausible goal.Thus, it should be regarded as a kind of low-hanging fruit for hopes of democratic reform.
In his underappreciated dialogue Charmides, Plato runs through four definitions of sophrosyne (quietness, modesty, minding one's own business, and knowledge of what one knows and does not know).
Despite the aporetic ending of the dialogue, these definitions, taken together, sketch a syndrome of deliberative habits that is remarkably well tailored to ameliorating the main vulnerabilities of deliberative politics in an imperfect world. The main barriers to deliberation are not rooted in individuals being ignorant or naive, but rather in mobilizing the knowledge and judgment latent in varying sectors of the public appropriately.Each of the definitions bear some connection to our broad notion of humility as it relates to democratic politics. Quietness is necessary for listening to others, a precondition for cognitive humility, and an enactment of conative humility insofar as one is not trying to win the debate by any means. Obviously one must not be too quiet, which is one of the reasons that Socrates rejects quietness as an adequate definition.That said, even if humility is a bi-valent concept, most people are, as a general matter, more apt to both cognitive and conative assertiveness than their opposites (though, in a political context, this may be less true of women and under-represented minorities).Thus urging a bit more quietness is wise counsel for most of us, most of the time. Plato's second definition, modesty, seems to be almost constitutive of humility (again, on the presumption that more people tend toward assertiveness than self-effacement more often than not). The dialogue's third definition, “minding one's own business,” is crucial for finding the virtuous mean: we should be more assertive when we are relative experts and our well-being is most at stake, and less so when the reverse is true (Minozzi et al., 2012). FinallyQknowledge of what one knows and does not know,” is a kind of second-order knowledge that is again necessary for properly sorting cases where we should be deferent versus those where assertiveness would be appropriate.
Thus, if we want to correct the vulnerabilities of deliberation, we have a duty as citizens to foster reasoned discourse about public matters in a manner congruent with sophrosyne.
Many people, however, treat political choices like impulsive consumer choices and political discourse like a call-in show on sports radio. If we are going to use our political power to pass laws affecting our fellow citizens, though, we owe each other reasoned explanations in a way that we do not about what sports teams we support or what toothpaste we buy. Political choices are different from consumer choices and sports loyalties because laws are enforced by people with guns.That said, discourse governed by sophrosyne is not the same as polite, unemotional discourse. Democracies sometimes need passionate protest, and civil disobedience can actually be a duty in extreme cases (Neblo, 2003).The tricky part is knowing the difference between gross injustices that cry out for redress, and deep but reasonable disagreements that people in a diverse society cannot avoid.Who is to decide which is which? The first amendment to the U.S. constitution, wisely, says that it cannot be the government itself—the people with guns. So the only ones left to decide are you and me and our fellow citizens.That is one of the main reasons why sophrosyne is so important to good deliberative citizenship, and usefully augments standard accounts of the role of humility in democratic politics. As a sibling virtue to humility, sophrosyne adds needed dimensions to our understanding of democratic virtues, but cannot replace humility. We can certainly argue, then, that humility understood this way not only relates to how citizens epis- temically evaluate conclusions and prioritize goals, but also to whether or not they are confident in their societal goals and can reasonably expect them to be accomplished.
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