The limits of intellectual humility
We have reached, then, our second question. Should one strive to always be intellectually humble about one's convictions—especially one's particular convictions?5
Even so roughly framed, there are at least two reasons to think the answer is no.
First, there are straightforward epistemic reasons as we've already noted, intellectual humility is not the only value that informs being a responsible believer and knower. Responsible epistemic agents are not so open-minded that their brains just fall out.They are not simply ambivalent nor are they outright skeptics. And thus, in a particular situation, with regard to a particular commitment/ conviction, the extent to which one should be intellectually humble about that commitment will depend on factors such as the following:(i) whether the target commitments are justified by the evidence or the product of reliable faculties, or both;
(ii) whether one has reason to think they are;
(iii) whether one has reason to think that there is little chance that further testimony or investigation will present any defeaters to one's justification for those commitments.
To the degree that these epistemic considerations are in place, to that degree it may be all things considered better, from the epistemic point of view, for her to be less intellectually humble about particular commitments. Thus, for example, a climate scientist with overwhelming evidence for her belief that climate change has been accelerated by human activity can be epistemically responsible without being motivated to respond to every objection—no matter how strange— to this belief.And the same holds if the scientist holds this belief with the force of conviction.6
Moreover, one's epistemic agency has a social aspect. It is partly a product of the community that one is within. How one is situated within that community, and in particular, the degree to which one is the victim of marginalization and testimonial injustice may affect whether one is being responsible epistemically.7 Consider, for example, a black woman who is frequently told by white people that she is exaggerating racist incidents or seeing bias where it doesn't exist, when in fact her experiences in this regard are perfectly veridical.
In such a context, it is more valuable, all things considered, that she stick to her convictions, not only because seeing them as possibly flawed would undermine her self-identity as a possible knower, but because they also provide vital evidence from which others may learn. In such a case, being less intellectually humble may indeed be the most responsible attitude from the social-epistemic perspective. And the reverse also seems true: the more one's worldview reflects that of the politically and culturally advantaged within a given context, the more intellectually humble one should be. Here, at least, it is with intellectual humility as it is with humility proper: it is most appropriately a demand on the powerful. The meek may inherit the earth, but they will need the courage of their convictions to do so.What these points demonstrate is that intellectual humility, while valuable, is a pro tanto value. All other things being equal, it is good. But things are not always equal.This does not distinguish intellectual humility from most values.Your mom no doubt taught you that honesty is the best policy. But policies have exceptions.When the Nazis are at the door looking for the Jews hidden in your attic, deceit is your only real option. Likewise with the case just outlined above; sometimes it may not be the best overall outcome to be intellectually humble in situations where, for both moral and epistemic reasons, it is crucial to have one's voice heard.
In other cases, intellectual humility itself may demand not being open to certain types of testimony. You don't need to thoughtfully reconsider your views about racism when talking to the white supremacists on your doorstep. And one reason you don't has to do with the core meaning of intellectual humility. It means, in part, being open to the evidence supplied by the experience and testimony of others. But “evidence” here is key; just because someone comes up to you and says the Earth is flat doesn't mean you have to take that statement seriously.
So intellectual humility's value is pro tanto.Nonetheless, it must be admitted that these points, while correct, are of limited practical value. Suggesting that you forego humility whenever “your convictions are justified” seems less than helpful. Indeed, adopting an attitude of intellectual humility is important precisely because we can be, and often are, wrong about when we are justified. We are often wrong, in other words, about whether we are meeting conditions (i)-(iii). The evidence for this is both scientific and personal. Even when we aren't completely wrong that we have a good evidential base for some belief or commitment, we very often overestimate the level of credence we should assign to the commitment or belief given that base. And because of bias and other cognitive limitations, humans are notoriously bad about knowing whether they can learn something new about a topic they think they know something about. Of course, that is, one might think, just why intellectual humility is important for us as individual epistemic agents. To the extent that individual citizens adopt the attitude of intellectual humility, then, other things being equal, they are, to that extent, more epistemically responsible.
Yet focusing just on the individual epistemic agent would be a mistake.That’s because intellectual humility’s highest impact on our convictions—may emerge not at the individual level but at the social level. In particular it may emerge at the connection point between our epis- temic and democratic norms.
One reason to think so is that the social-epistemic practices that help to sustain democracy arguably embody intellectual humility as a regulative norm. Naturally, which practices do so is a question that goes beyond what can be said here (nonetheless, see Lynch, 2018a). But the practices I see as most relevant for the present discussion are explicitly what Goldman called social- epistemic—they are those crucial for the acquisition and distribution of knowledge and hence for epistemic trust (Goldman, 1999).
Without such trust, the ideals of democracy are difficult to meet (Lynch, 2019). The social practices that seem most relevant include those embedded in historical and scientific inquiry (archival techniques, experimental replication, peer review); journalistic standards (using more than one source); dialogue techniques (having empathy, giving everyone a chance to speak, listening) and legal investigation (appealing to reliable evidential techniques, examining the motivation of witnesses).These sorts of practices exist partly because we recognize that our individual epistemic assessments are so often flawed (Allen and Lynch, 2020). Biases are hard to spot—that is why they are biases, and appeal to informational checks and balances is a way to compensate for that fact (Lynch, 2019). In following practices like these, and in forming beliefs and reasons by doing so, we are encouraged to see ourselves as capable of knowing more than we do now, capable of responding to reasons.
Arguably, therefore, certain social epistemic practices can be understood as embodying intellectual humility as a key regulative norm. A social practice embodies an attitudinal orientation as a regulative norm just when the activities constitutive of that practice are guided by the idea that participants ought to adopt that attitude (Lynch, 2019). Consider, for example, the practice of peer review. Participants within the practice ought to be willing to improve their beliefs based on the open-minded assessment of new evidence from others. They may often fail to do so—just as a firefighter may fail to have grit or courage—but the practice is guided by the norm that they should. Indeed, the guidance is arguably essential: if you aren’t willing, either as an author or as a reviewer, to learn and improve your opinions as a result of the process of the review, you aren’t participating in the practice but just going through the motions. Similarly, with the institutions of grant assessment, experimental replication, journalistic inquiry, and basic civil and criminal legal inquiry—elements of each practice are aimed at improving participants’ beliefs via responsiveness to evidence, as opposed to prestige, wealth, or power.That aim is not often met, but the practice embodies the norm just the same.
By engaging in social practices that embody intellectual humility, we are, to some extent, like the inspector at the widget factory. We are abiding by rules meant to correct for our own fallibility. And like the inspector, we should follow such rules, even if, and especially when, we passionately believe that our convictions are unimpeachable. For such procedures exist to compensate for our biases, to force us to be responsive to reasons, and thus implicitly encourage us to take a more reflective view, to improve our worldview from the evidence and experience of others. By giving and asking for reasons that emerge from such practices, we sustain and participate in the democratic space of reasons itself—a space that remains open to dialogue, even when we are not.8
Notes
1 For more on convictions and their nature, see (Pianalto, 2011) (Skitka, et al., 2005), (Williams, 1985).
2 See, e.g. chapters by Alfano, Battaly,Whitcomb, et al. Greco and Church.
3 For further discussion of intellectual humility, see Alfano et. al (2017); Lynch (2018b, 2019) Hazlett (2012), Christen et al. (2019),Whitcomb et al. (2015), Church (2016), Kidd (2016), and Tanesini (2016).
4 My thinking on this matter was greatly aided by comments by Mark Alfano.
5 Note, however, that both intellectual humility and conviction are psychological states which come in degrees. One can be more or less humble and one can be more of less committed in one's convictions. Keeping this in mind as we proceed is wise.
6 This is not to deny that the same scientist should remain willing to improve her view about all manner of other more specific and particular beliefs about climate change—its rate of increase, how it exactly effects particular aspects of the climate, and so on.
7 For more on these issues see Fricker (2007) and Medinda (2012).
8 Thanks to conversations and comments from A. Tanesini, P. Bloomfield, T. Allen, H. Gunn, T. Napoleatano, and most especially Mark Alfano.
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