H-traits and myside bias
Myside bias is a manifestation of a broader phenomenon referred to as confirmation bias (McKenzie 2004). It is tempered in social contexts when the group is decentralized and contains a diversity of opinions (Surowiecki 2004; see also Masterton et al.
2016, 2017, 2018 and Zollman 2013). In such groups, each individual’s myside bias is harnessed in a way that leads to a better overall outcome. In particular, Mercier and Sperber (2019) argue that that the people who are sympathetic to p will tend to find and emphasize all the relevant evidence and arguments in favor ofp, while those who are unsympathetic to p will tend to find and emphasize all the relevant evidence and arguments against p.Together, then, they manage to take into account all the evidence and arguments both in favor of and against p. Such a division of cognitive labor seems to be essential to many human cognitive successes. Social scientists have institutionalized it in the form of adversarial collaborations (Mellers et al. 2001). If one is good enough at roleplaying, one can even form an adversarial collaboration with oneself (Alfano 2018).The h-traits plausibly assist in these processes. For example, Baron (2008) argues that actively open-minded thinking opposes myside bias. Presumably, people high in open-mindedness are more disposed to engage in actively open-minded thinking (else, the construct lacks what social scientists call face validity).1 If this is right, then open-mindedness can be expected to undercut the disposition to myside bias.
Likewise, someone high in modesty would presumably engage more effectively with people with whom she disagrees than someone low in modesty. According to Bommarito (2013), modesty is a virtue of attention: it involves actively attending to things other than oneself and one’s own qualities and excellences. Doing so should obscure what my side of an argument or dispute even is, making it less likely that I manifest myside bias.
Next, consider humility. In the HEXACO personality inventory (Lee and Ashton 2018), humility is measured by agreement with the following two items:“I am an ordinary person who is no better than others,” and “I wouldn’t want people to treat me as though I were superior to them.” It is also indicated by disagreement with the following two items: “I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is,” and “I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.”The division of cognitive labor mentioned above only works when people are able to take seriously those with whom they disagree, and to continue engaging with them over a period of time. Someone who scores high on the humility scale would, presumably, do just that. For these reasons, humility should also help someone overcome myside bias.
Finally, intellectual humility seems especially suited to helping its bearer overcome myside bias. Theorists characterize intellectual humility in terms of very low concern for one’s intellectual reputation and entitlements (Roberts and Wood 2007), openness to others’ views and engagement with those who disagree (Alfano et al. 2017), and owning one’s intellectual limitations (Whitcomb et al. 2017). All of these dispositions make one more likely to take seriously evidence that runs contrary to one’s beliefs and expectations, and thus to overcome or forestall myside bias.
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