SUMMARY

It is clear that many of the problems confronting law firms and the Law Society in England and Wales are also proving difficult for lawyers and regulators in other countries. Yet it is apparent that other jurisdictions have responded dif­ferently to the problems posed.

In the United States and the Commonwealth this is most notable in the regu­lations governing a situation where lawyers are acting for two clients whose interests may on some occasions be in conflict. All the countries examined above allow, in some form or another, clients to consent to lawyers acting in these cir­cumstances. Admittedly the rules are stricter in some countries than others, with the United States being unique in allowing lawyers to act without the consent of the clients if the conflict relates solely to competing commercial interests. The broad principle which has been adopted is, however, the same: the lawyer needs the consent of both clients if he is to represent them both in the one transaction. The European approach, however, denies clients the right to consent to a lawyer acting for both sides in the same matter.

As far as successive representation is concerned, the United States and Western Australia adopt a similar approach to the Law Society in England and Wales in that they prohibit lawyers from acting against former clients where confidential information has been imparted to the lawyer. The maintenance of justice and principles of loyalty to one’s client override commercial considera­tions.

Canada and New Zealand, on the other hand, have allowed themselves to be more influenced by commercial developments within law firms. The Federation of Canadian Law Societies has drawn up detailed rules which allow firms to use Chinese walls so that they can continue to act when lawyers move between firms. New Zealand has not formerly accepted such devices, but Russell McVeagh allowed scope for such regulations to be introduced.

Although restrictive in its approach to same matter conflicts, the CCBE Code offers lawyers remarkable latitude when it comes to successive representation. It allows lawyers the freedom to act against former clients without providing any notes of guidance on when such behaviour is appropriate.

It would appear somewhat paradoxical, therefore, that the concern over con­flicts of interest in the UK has to some extent been prompted by overseas law firms and companies, as it would appear that the regulations adopted by the UK Law Society are considerably stricter than those laid down by its counterparts in other jurisdictions. If the UK rules are stricter than those adopted by other nations, what has prompted such concern by foreign clients with regard to con­flicts in England and Wales? Secondly, how are UK law firms to compete on a global scale with their overseas rivals if they are bound by stricter rules?

The answers to both of these questions may lie in the way firms manage con­flicts in practice. Concerns may have been raised because, although there are strict rules in place in the UK, firms do not abide by them. This might also account for the fact that, although subject to a highly restrictive regime govern­ing the management of conflicts, the United Kingdom remains one of the world’s leading providers of legal services in respect of company and commer­cial matters.^[324] In order to find answers to these questions, the chapters which follow analyse how law firms in England and Wales manage conflicts of interest in practice.