Conclusions
What will be the future of these three approaches to the Roman legal sources? The first will retain its importance, perhaps not as a part of legal history in the strict sense, but as a theoretical method of constructing the concepts of a common European private law.
The second approach too will have a future, albeit only within the framework of legal studies. Not all the implications of the casuistic texts of the Roman legal tradition have yet been exhausted, even after a millennium of advancing different interpretations, starting with the early days of the University of Bologna. The individuality of the Roman jurists could still be studied in further detail. The same applies to study of the controversies between the jurists and their schools. Palingenetic research could also be refined.71 The third, contextual approach to the Roman legal sources is perhaps the most promising for the future. It implies intensive interdisciplinary collaboration within the various fields of study of antiquity. The third — most difficult — example of the notion of volition in antiquity illustrates that the problems here do not differ from those encountered in the study of the history of ideas in general. One is the old problem of nominalism versus realism, already known in the Middle Ages: continuity in the use of words does not necessarily imply the continuity of an idea.72What can be illustrated with the three examples of this third approach is that, beyond the strict legal analysis of Roman juristic texts, there remain enormous numbers of intriguing problems and questions open for generations of scholars willing to study Roman law in its intellectual context.73
Notes
1. H.
Coing, Handbuch der Quellen zur neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, vol. I: Mittelalter (Munich, 1973), 25.2. Koschaker called it the ‘political idea of Rome’: see P. Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht (4th edn., Munich, Berlin, 1966), 38.
3. For exceptions, see J. Chorus, ‘Romeins recht op de Zuidpool en elders’, in Coniectanea iuris Romani, ed. J.E. Spruit (Zwolle, 1974), 139—49.
4. This is also a reason why so many Romanists and legal historians are involved in the various projects to generate a unified European private law; for example, the Accademia dei Giusprivatisti Europei founded by Giuseppe Gandolfi, which has produced a series of proposals regarding the unification of European private law.
5. E. M. Meijers, ‘Het feilloze deel van ons Burgerlijk Wetboek [The Infallible part of the Civil Code] ’, Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie 3031 (1928); also in E.M. Meijers, Verzamelde Privaatrechtelijke Opstellen I (Leiden, 1954), 93—98. There was undoubtedly an irony in the title of the article: Meijers was challenging the idea that the codification of private law was coherent, without serious mistakes, and adequate to cope with juridical situations that might arise in the future. He advocated here for the first time a recodification of Dutch private law. That eventually came about only in the second half of the last century; in 2015 it is still not complete.
6. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Cape Town, 1990).
7. W. J. Zwalve, Hoofdstukken uit de geschiedenis van het Europees Privaatrecht I: Inleiding en zakenrecht (Deventer, 2006), reviewed by L. Winkel in Zeitschrift für europäisches Privatrecht 16 (2008): 435—37.
German edition: W.J. Zwalve and A.J.B. Sirks, Grundzüge der europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, Einführung und Sachenrecht (Cologne — Weimar — Vienna, 2012).8. Foran interesting polemic between the first and second school, especially concerning the teaching of Roman law, see W.J. Zwalve, ‘De toekomst van het Romeinse recht’, Ars Aequi 42 (1993): 455—59; J. A. Ankum, ‘Stenen voor brood’, Ars Aequi 42 (1993): 459—63; R. Zimmermann, ‘Rechtsvergelijking, rechtsgeschiedenis en ius commune’, Ars Aequi 43 (1994): 276—83.
9. A. Wacke, ‘LotharAnton Alfred Pernice’, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 20 (Berlin, 2001), 194—95 (also available online: http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz94665 .html). Pernice wrote an unfinished series of books on Roman law in the time of Marcus Antistius Labeo, a contemporary of the first Emperor, Augustus.
10. E. Bund, ‘Otto Lenel’, in Deutsche Biographie, vol. 14 (Munich, 1985), 204—5 (also available online: http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz50210.html).
11. O. Lenel, Palingenesia iuris Civilis: Juris consultorum reliquae quae Justiniani Digestis continentur ceteraque juris prudentiae civilis fragmenta minora secundum auctores et libros (Leipzig, 1889, repr. Graz 1955).
12. Cf Chapter 8 by Kaiser in this volume, 130—1.
13. O. Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum, Ein Versuch zu seiner Wiederherstellung (3rd edn., Leipzig, 1927).
14. Cf. Chapter 8 by Kaiser, 128-30.
15. O. Gradenwitz, Interpolationen in den Pandekten (Berlin, 1887). In legal humanism there was an earlier attempt at this kind of textual criticism: see L. Palazzini Finetti, Storia della ricerca delle interpolazioni nel Corpus Iuris Giustinianeo (Milan, 1953).
For a comparison between these two periods, see M. Kaser ‘Gradenwitz, Otto’, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 6 (1964), 702—lang=EN-US>3 and http://www.deutsche-biographie .de/pnd116807229.html.16. One of the most radical representatives of this tendency was Gerhard von Beseler, professor in Kiel. See K.S. Bader, ‘Beseler, Gerhard Friedrich von’, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 2 (1955), 175 and http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/ pnd116154012.html.
17. J. H. A. Lokin, ‘The End of an Epoch, Epilegomena to a Century of Interpolation Criticism’, in Collatio Iuris Romani: Etudes dediees a Hans Ankum, ed. R. Feenstra et al. (Amsterdam, 1995), 261-73.
18. Later published separately with the title Zur Methodologie der römischen Rechtsquellenforschung (Vienna, 1972), and sometimes criticized on the grounds that Kaser puts (too?) much emphasis on the intuition of the Roman jurists. See also M. Kaser, ‘Ein Jahrhundert Interpolationenforschung an den römischen Rechtsquellen’, in M. Kaser, Römische Rechtsquellen und angewandte Juristenmethode (Vienna - Cologne, 1986), 112-54.
19. K.-H. Schindler, Justinians Haltung zur Klassik: Versuch einer Darstellung an Hand seiner Kontroversen entscheidenden Konstitutionen (Cologne, Graz, 1966). See also Lokin, ‘The End of an Epoch’, (n 17).
20. Wieacker initially argued for the need to distinguish different textual layers in the transmission of the texts of the classical jurists: F. Wieacker, Textstufen klassischer Juristen (Göttingen, 1959, repr. 1975). This depended on comparing different versions of the same fragment of the Roman jurists in pre-Justinianic and Justinianic sources and postulating that the differences were due to postclassical changes in the texts. In Römische Rechtsgeschichte vol. I (Munich, 1988), 88, Wieacker also dealt with Roman law in non-legal Roman texts - without, however, mentioning the methodological difficulties discussed in this chapter.
21. See R.
Knütel, ‘“Nicht leichter, aber um so reizvoller”: Zum methodologischen Vermächtnis von Max Kaser’, ZSS 115 (1998): 52; 64—65. Knütel clearly assumes — with Kaser — a specific dogmatic structure, even in classical Roman law.J. A. Ankum, in his review of M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht I (2nd edn. Munich, 1971) in Nederlands Juristenblad (1972): 138, suggests that Kaser still presents classical Roman law according to a dogmatic structure derived from nineteenth-century Pandectism.22. J. C. van Oven, Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (3rd edn., Leiden, 1948).
23. See the debate following publication ofJ. Stroux, Summum ius summa iniuria (Leipzig, 1926). Stroux’s opinion on the considerable influence of rhetorical theory was followed by the Italian Romanist Salvatore Riccobono but strenuously contested by nearly all other Romanists at the time. See also F. Lanfranchi, Il diritto nei retori romani (Milan, 1938); and, for a recent survey of the relation between law and rhetoric, O. Tellegen-Couperus, ed., Quintilian and the Law (Leuven, 2003).
24. D. Nörr, Historiae Iuris Antiqui: Gesammelte Schriften, ed. T.J. Chiusi, W. Kaiser, and H.-D. Spengler, 3 vols., (Goldbach, 2003). D. Nörr, Schriften 2001—2010 (Madrid, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, 2012).
25. See Ars boni et aequi: Festschrift für Wolfgang Waldstein, ed. M.J. Schermaier and Z. Vegh (Stuttgart, 1993), xi—xiv, with a bibliography of Waldstein’s publications to that date.
26. O. Behrends, Institut und Prinzip: Siedlungsgeschichtliche Grundlagen, philosophische Einflüsse und das Fortwirken der beiden republikanischen Konzeptionen in den kaiserzeitlichen Rechtsschulen. Ausgewählte Aufsätze, ed. Μ. Avenarius et al., 2 vols. (Göttingen, 2004).
27. See especially M.
Talamanca, ‘Lo schema genus - species nelle sistematiche dei giuristi romani’, in Lafilosofiagreca e il diritto romano, vol. 2, (Rome, 1977), 1—319.28. A. Schiavone, Nascita della giurisprudenza: cultura aristocratica e pensiero giuridico nella Roma tardo-repubblicana (Rome, 1976); A. Schiavone, The Invention of Law in the West (Cambridge, Mass., 2012).
29. A. Mantello, ‘De iurisconsultorum philosophia, spunti e riflessioni sulla giurisprudenza nel primo principato’, SDHI67 (2001): 1—57.
30. A. Bürge, Römisches Privatrecht, Rechtsdenken und gesellschaftliche Verankerung (Darmstadt, 1999); A. Bürge, ‘Der Text als Problem des Kontextes’, ZSS 105 (1998): 150-60.
31. See n. 42, this chapter.
32. D. Johnston, Roman Law in Context (Cambridge, 1999).
33. U. Babusiaux, Papinians Quaestiones, Zur rhetorischen Methode eines spätklassischen Juristen (Munich, 2011).
34. See, in general, Die Textüberlieferung der antiken Literatur und der Bibel, ed. H. Hunger et al., 2nd edn. (Munich, 1988).
style='font-size:9.0pt;line-height:107%'>35. See L. Winkel, ‘Le droit romain et la philosophie grecque, quelques problemes de methode’, TR 65 (1997): 373-84.
36. L. Pfister, ‘Doneau (Donellus), Hugues’, in Dictionnaire historique des juristes fran^ais, XIIs—XX6 siecle, ed. P. Arabeyre et al. (Paris, 2007), 256-58.
37. L. Pfister, ‘Connan (Connanus), Francois’, in Dictionnaire historique des juristes fran^ais, 199-200.
38. L. Winkel, ‘Cujas (Cujacius), Jacques’, in Dictionnaire historique des juristes fran^ais, 220-22.
39. For a survey of Legal Humanism, see H. E. Troje, Graeca leguntur, Die Aneignung des byzantinischen Rechts und die Entstehung eines humanistischen Corpus Iuris Civilis in der Jurisprudenz des 16. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt, 1970), concentrating on humanistic textual criticism. See X. Prevost, Jacques Cujas (Paris - Geneva, 2014). Elsewhere I have tried to explain why the historical approach and the systematic approach necessarily go together: ‘Rechtsgeschiedenis en integratie van de rechtswetenschap’, in Gelntegreerde rechtswetenschap, ed. R. Foque et al. (Arnhem, 1994), 211.
40. E.g. on the exceptio doli: Cic. Off. 3.69-71, quotedalreadyby Cujas in his commentary on D. 4.3 De dolo malo (see Cujas, Opera Omnia (Frankfurt, 1623), vol. 2, 148).
41. See P. Leitner, ‘Die plautinischen Komödien als Quellen des römischen Rechts’, in Diritto e teatro in Grecia e a Roma, ed. E. Cantarella and L. Gagliardi (Milan, 2007), 69-92 with further references.
42. The expression ‘Law and Literature’ was coined by US Supreme Court judge Benjamin Cardozo (1870-1938) and further developed by James Boyd White. For an echo in Italy, see G. Crifö, ‘Isolierung e valutazione giuridica’, in Diritto e letteratura, ed. F. Spantigati (Milan, 2006), 30-36. Cf. U. Mölk (ed.), Literatur und Recht: Literarische Rechtsfälle von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart (Göttingen, 1996).
43. See, e.g., L. Wenger, ‘Um die Zukunft des römischen Rechtsstyle='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>’, in Festschrift Fritz Schulz (Weimar, 1951), vol. 2, 364-86.
44. P. B. M. Blaas, Henk Hoetink 1900—1963, een intellectuele bibliografie (Hilversum, 2010), 66-70.
45. H.R. Hoetink, De achtergrond van het Romeinse recht (Haarlem, 1935); French translation: ‘L’arriere-plan du droit romain’, in: H.R. Hoetink, Opera Selecta (Zutphen, 1986), 73-108.
46. Marcello Gigante, Νόμος Βασιλεύς (Naples, 1993).
47. L. Winkel, ‘Einige Bemerkungen über ius naturale und iusgentium’, in Ars boni et aequi: Festschrift für Wolfgang Waldstein, ed. M.J. Schermaier and Z. Vegh, (Stuttgart, 1993), 443-49.
48. L. Winkel, ‘Die stoische οίκείωσις-Lehre und Ulpians Definition der Gerechtigkeit’, ZSS 105 (1988): 669-79.
49. Although in his later days a scholar such as Max Kaser was more impressed by the contribution of philosophy to Roman law: cf. R. Knütel (n. 21), 61, with references to the second edition ofKaser’s famous ‘Handbuch’, Das römische Privatrecht (Munich, 1971-75), vol. I, 179, 182, 194; vol. 2, 7-8.
50. G.F.M. de Caqueray, Explications des passages de droit privé contenus dans l’^uvre de Cicéron (Paris, I857; repr. Aalen, I969).
51. E. Costa, Cicerone giureconsulto (Bologna, I927; repr. Rome, I964).
52. Il diritto privato romano nelle comedie di Plauto (Turin, I890; repr. Rome, I968); for Plautus, cf. P. Romeijn, Specimen juridicum inaugurale exhibens loca nonnulla ex Plautii comoediis jure civili illustrata (Deventer, 1836); C. Tomulescu, ‘Observations sur la terminologie juridique de Plaute’, in Sodalitas: Scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino, ed. V. Giuffrè (Naples, 1984), vol. 6, 2771—81; E. Costa, Il diritto privato romano nelle comedie di Terenzio (Turin, 1890; repr. Rome, 1970); E. Henriot, Les poètes juristes (Paris, 1858; repr. Aalen, 1970); A. F. Murison, ‘The Law in the Latin poets’, in Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Diritto Romano Roma (Pavia, 1935), vol. 2, 609-39.
53. Plautus, Mostellaria 126: Liberos parentes expoliunt, docent litteras, iura et leges.
54. Cic. Leg. 2.59; cf. J. Triantaphyllopoulos, ‘Cantar le leggi’, Atti dell’Accademia Mediterranea delle Scienze, Anno I, Vol. I, Supplemento I (Catania, 1983), 27-34.
55. Satire 2.80. For further studies of legal aspects in Horace, see O. Diliberto, ‘La satira e il diritto, una nuova lettura di Horat., sat. 1.3.115—117’, in Annali del Seminario Giuridico dell’Università di Palermo 55 (2012): 385-402.
56. D. 1.2.2.43: turpe est patricio et nobili, ius in quo versatur ignorare. See L. Wenger, Die Quellen des römischen Rechts (Vienna, 1953), 483, n. 100, with further references.
57. E. Henriot, Moeurs juridiques et judiciaires de l’ancienne Rome d’après les poètes latins (Paris, 1858 ; repr. Aalen, 1970), 2.
58. D. Nörr, ‘Der Jurist im Kreis der Intellektuellen: Mitspieler oder Außenseiter?’ in Festschrift Max Kaser, ed. D. Medicus and H. H. Seiler (Munich, 1976), 57—90; also in D. Nörr, Historiae Iuris Antiqui (Goldbach, 2003), 951—84.
59. F. de Visscher, ‘Les fantaisies formulaires de Verres’, Revue d’Etudes Latines, 33 (1956): 136—39, reprinted in F. de Visscher, Etudes de Droit romain (Milan, 1966), vol. 3, 425—28.
60.New Roman"> L. Winkel, ‘Some thoughts on the formulaeficticiae ofcitizenship in Gaius, 4,37: aform of reception?’ in Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, ed. A Burrows et al. (Oxford, 2013), 299—308.
61. C. St. Tomulescu, ‘La valeur juridique de l’Histoire de Tite-Live’, Labeo 21 (1975): 295—321.
62. J. W. Tellegen, The Roman Law of Succession in the Letters of Pliny the Younger (Zutphen, 1982).
63. N. Donadio, ‘Iudicium domesticum — riprovazione sociale e persecuzione pubblica di atti commessi da sottoposti alla patria potestas’, Index 40 (2012): 175—95.
64. For an introduction to the wide range of problems of volition, cf. V. Aucouturier, Qu’est-ce que l’intentionalité? (Paris, 2012), who rightly distinguishes between ontological and epistemological aspects of volition.
65. Knütel, ‘Nicht leichter, aber um so reizvoller’ (n. 21), 37; cf. also D. Simon, ‘Die animusbesessene Spätzeit’, Rechtshistorisches Journal 14 (1995): 253—80.
66. Cf. D. Daube, Roman Law, Linguistic, Social and Philosophical Aspects (Edinburgh, 1969), 131;L. Winkel, ‘Inst. Iust. 4,4 pr.: KübleretDaube surles mots αδικία (adikia) et αδίκημα (adikèma), αμαρτία (hamartia) et αμαρτήμα (hamartèma)’, in Fides, humanitas, ius: Studi in onore di Luigi Labruna (Naples, 2007), vol. 8, 5927—34.
67. A. Dihle, style='font-style:italic'>The Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley, 1981), 135.
68. A. Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will (Oxford, 1980), 2: ‘It is a commonplace that there is no theory of the will in Aristotle.’ The difficulty is that the notion of volition in Aristotle is based on lack of knowledge; the psychological element in our modern notion of the will is still lacking. This has to do with so-called ethical intellectualism in antiquity; see F.J.C.J. Nuyens, Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles (Nijmegen, Utrecht, 1939); French version: L'evolution de la psychologie d'Aristote (Louvain, 1948); cf. L. Winkel, ‘Das sokratische Paradoxon “obbsi^ sxtbv e^apapTOVSt” und strafrechtliche Zurechnung im Lichte der neueren Literatur’, in Symposion VI: Beiträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Vienna, Cologne, 1989), 109-17.
69. R. Gauthier, ‘Introduction’, inR.A. Gauthier and J.Y.Jolif, L'Ethique a Nicomaque. 2nd edn., (Louvain, Paris, 1970), vol. I-1, 266.
70. See M. Frede, ‘John ofDamascus on Human Action, the Will and Human Freedom’, in Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed. K. lerodiakonou (Oxford, 2006), 63-96.
71. A project to improve and correct details in Lenel’s Palingenesia is being coordinated in the University of Oxford.
72. Cf M.M. Adams, ‘Universals in the early fourteenth century’, in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge, 1982), 411-39.
73. I thank Javier Rodriguez Diez for his help and for critical remarks on an earlier version.
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