Legacy

Legis Actiones

The principal legacy of the legis actiones is the modern law of unjust enrichment.⁷³ Claims of debt were apparently too cumbersome to pros­ecute under the earliest legis actiones, and in the late third century BC two leges simplified these claims considerably by introducing the legis actio per condictionem - a simple claim that something was owing.

Formulary Procedure

The principal legacy of the formulary procedure is the institutional scheme as reflected in the modern civil law. The formulary procedure required the differentiation of actions, and each action, in turn, was triggered by a certain event: winning the right to bring a particular action required a litigant to allege the occurrence of the corresponding event.⁷⁴ To the extent that the institutional scheme differentiates among persons, delicts, contracts, and property, it is built upon these separate events.

Cognitio

The principal legacy of the cognitio procedure is the romano-canonical procedure and the modern systems that derive from it.⁷⁵ Roman proce­dure was studied, systematized, and written upon from the twelfth cen­tury onwards as part of the broader revival of interest in Roman law.

Notes

³. The leading reference work on civil procedure is M. Kaser, Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, 2nd edn. by K. Hackl (Munich, 1996). Other general reference works: J. L. Murga, Derecho romano clasico. 2. Elproceso (Zaragoza, 1980); G. Pugliese, Il processo civile romano [1. Le legis actiones. 2. Il processo formulare] (Milan, 1962/63). Reference works on narrower topics: B. Albanese, Il processo privato romano delle ‘legis actiones' (Palermo, 1987); F. Bertoldi, La lex lulia iudiciorum privatorum (Turin, 2003); G. Cervenca, Il processo privato romano: le fonti (Bologna, 1983); A.H.J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (Oxford, 1901); K. Hackl, ‘Der Zivilprozeß des frühen Prinzipats in den Provinzen’, ZSS 114 (1997): 141—59; K. Hackl, ‘Il processo civile nelle province’, in Gli ordinamenti giudiziari di Roma imperiale. Princepseprocedura dalle leggi Giulie ad Adriano, ed. F. Milazzo (Naples, 1999), 299—318; M. Indra, Status Quaestio. Studien zum Freiheitsprozess im klassischen römischen Recht (Berlin, 2011); W. Litewski, Der römisch-kanonische Zivilprozess nach den älteren ordines iudiciarii (Krakow, 1999); D. Mantovani, Le formule del processo privato romano. Per la didattica delle istituzioni di diritto romano, 2nd edn. (Padua, 1999); K. W. Nörr, Romanisch-kanonisches Prozessrecht: Erkenntnisverfahren erster Instanz in civilibus (Heidelberg, 2012); N. Palazzolo, Processo civile e politica giudiziaria nel princi­pato, 2nd edn. (Turin, 1991); G. Provera, Lezioni sulprocesso civile Giustinianeo (Turin, 1989); D. Simon, Untersuchungen zum justinianischen Zivilprozess (Munich, 1969); W.

2.      Schiller (n.

3.      ‘Rules of procedure could be found in many parts of the Corpus iuris but the Romans had never gathered them systematically or studied procedure as an auton­omous subject.’ R. Feenstra, ‘Law’, in The Legacy of Rome: A New Appraisal, ed. R. Jenkyns (Oxford, 1992), 410.

4.      Additional portions of book 4 were uncovered in the last century, the first (‘Oxford fragments’) among the Oxyrhynchus papyri, published in 1927, and the second (‘Florentine [or Antinoite] fragments’) on parchment fragments discovered in Cairo and first published in 1935. The earlier known portions of the Institutes, preserved in the Digest and in the Epitome of Gaius, do not contain any of book 4. A full account of the sources for the Institutes is given in H. L. W. Nelson, Überlieferung, Aufbau und Stil von Gai Institutiones (Leiden, 1981), and a full account of the Veronese palimpsest - the main source - is given in F. Briguglio, Il Codice Veronese in trasparenza. Genesi e formazione del testo delle Istituzioni di Gaio (Bologna, 2012), who reports also on new efforts to read the manuscript (new photographs are in F. Briguglio, Gai codex rescriptus in Bibliotheca Capitulari Ecclesiae Cathedralis Veronensis (Florence, 2012)). The principal editions in English are W. M. Gordon and O. F. Robinson, eds., The Institutes of Gaius (London, 1988), and F. de Zulueta, ed., The Institutes of Gaius, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1946-53). A new critical edition, published by Duncker and Humblot, is in preparation; recent volumes are edited by H. L. W. Nelson and U. Manthe. A volume treating book 4 has not yet appeared. How this new critical text might be asize=1 face=Arial>ffected by the work of Briguglio, cited above, is unclear.

5.      Two authors with practical information on procedure are: Marcus Valerius Probus (latter 1st century AD), who lists abbreviations used in statutes, edicts, and other sources affecting procedure and their meanings (De notis iuris fragmenta in FIRA 2.451-60), and Sextus Pompeius Festus (latter 2nd century AD), whose abridgment of Marcus Verrius Flaccus’ De verborum significatu preserves many terms used in litigation (Sexti Pompei Festi de verborum significatu, ed.

6.      For the procedure in Cicero, Greenidge (n. 1) is old but still valuable. See also A. Lintott, ‘Legal Procedure in Cicero’s Time’, in Cicero the Advocate, ed. J. Powell et al. (Oxford, 2004), 61-78; B. Frier, The Rise of the Roman Jurists: Studies in Cicero's Pro Caecina (Princeton, 1985); J. Platschek, Studien zu Ciceros Rede für P. Quinctius (Munich, 2005); J. Harries, Cicero and the Jurists: From Citizens' Law to the Lawful State (London, 2006), ch. 7; E. Metzger, Litigation in Roman Law (Oxford, 2005), 19—44, 163—66 (pro Quinctio); J. G. Wolf, ‘ Vadimonium in Ciceros Rede pro Quinctio’, SDHI 74 (2008): 79-97.

7.      See, e.g., A. Scafuro, The Forensic Stage: Settling Disputes in Graeco-Roman New Comedy (Cambridge, 1997); L. Pellecchi, Per una lettura giuridica della Rudens' di Plauto (Faenza, 2012).

8.      On the use of Quintilian, see O. Tellegen-Couperus, ‘Introduction’, in Quintilian and the Law: The Art of Persuasion and Politics, ed. O. Tellegen-Couperus (Leuven, 2003), 12—17. On the role of advocacy and its relation to law, see J.A. Crook, Legal Advocacy in the Roman World (Ithaca, 1995), ch. 1; B. Frier, ‘Finding a Place for Law in the High Empire: Tacitus, Dialogus 39.1—4’, in Spaces ofJustice in the Roman World, ed. W. Harris and F. de Angelis (Leiden, 2010), 67—87. For a study of Roman advocacy using Quintilian generously, see L. Bablitz, Actors and Audience in the Roman Courtroom (New York, 2007), 141—204.

9.      The standard reference for statutes is M. H. Crawford, ed., Roman Statutes, 2 vols. (London, 1996). Many records of private affairs are collected in FIRA 3 (‘Negotia’), though this does not include the great majority ofrecords discovered in the twentieth century, on which see below (274).

10.    This group of sources divides into ‘model formulae’ (essentially templates that litigants would complete) and ‘completed formulae’ prepared for specific litigation.

Ofthe former type: (1) the lex de Gallia Cisalpina (ist century BC), ch.

Of the latter type: (5) A formula in an action on a debt from Puteoli (1st century AD), preserved on a waxed tablet: TPSulp 31, in Camodeca, Tabulae pompeianae Sulpiciorum (n. 11); (6) three formulae in papyri (P. Yadin. 28, 29, 30) from the province of Arabia (ca. AD 124), partly prepared in anticipation of a suit on guard­ianship to be tried before a panel of judges in Judaea: N. Lewis, ed., The Documents from the Bar Kokhba Period in the Cave of Letters: Greek Papyri (Jerusalem, 1989), 118—20; H. Cotton, ‘The Guardianship ofJesus Son of Babatha: Roman and Local Law in the Province of Arabia’, JRS 83 (1993): 94-108; D. Nörr, ‘The Xenokritai in Babatha’s Archive (Pap. Yadin 28-30)’, Israel Law Review 29 (1995): 83—94; D. Nörr, ‘Prozessuales aus dem Babatha-Archiv’, in Mélanges de droit romain et d’histoire ancienne. Hommage à la mémoire de André Magdelain (Paris, 1998), 317—41.

11.    The Herculaneum tablets were discovered in the 1930s and texts were published in succeeding decades by G. Pugliese Carratelli and V. Arangio-Ruiz. See further the chapter by Wolf, 61—84. In the last two decades G. Camodeca has re-edited many of these texts, and a new edition is forthcoming. The Puteoli tablets were discovered in 1959 near Pompeii. Many of them relate to a family, the Sulpicii, that engaged in banking activities. The critical edition is Giuseppe Camodeca, ed., Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum (TPSulp). Edizione critica dell’archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii (Rome, 1999). The two collections are introduced and discussed in P. Gröschler, Die tabellae-Urkunden aus den pompejanischen und herkulanensischen Urkundenfunden (Berlin, 1997). The Puteoli tablets are discussed in their economic context in J. Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World, trans. by J. Lloyd (Cambridge, 1999), 71—79, and there is a popular account in D. Jones, The Bankers of Puteoli: Finance, Trade, and Industry in the Roman World (Stroud, 2006). For a fascinating and provocative treatment of Roman tablets generally, see E.A. Meyer, Legitimacy and Law in the Roman World: Tabulae in Roman Belief and Practice (Cambridge, 2004).

12.    The critical texts are:Julian Gonzalez, ‘The Lex Irnitana: A New Copy of the Flavian Municipal Law‘, JRS 76 (1986): 147—243 (with English translation); F. Lamberti, Tabulae Irnitanae: municipalità e ‘ius Romanorum’ (Naples, 1993) (with Italian trans­lation). Some new readings and supplements are given in M. H. Crawford, ‘The Text of the Lex Irnitana‘, JRS 98 (2008): 182. A brief description is given in E. Metzger, ‘Agree to Disagree: Local Jurisdiction in the lex Irnitana", in Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, ed. A. Burrows, et al. (Oxford, 2013), 213—15.

13.                  See Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 8—11; Seidl (n. 1), 162—67.

14.    For more on this subject, and literature, see E. Metzger, ‘Roman Judges, Case Law, and Principles of Procedure’, Law and History Review 22 (2004): 243—75.

15.     For the sake of exposition this chapter uses ‘magistrate’ as a shorthand for the various office holders with authority to administer justice. This includes, e.g., consuls, praetors, aediles, local duumviri or praefecti iure dicundo, governors, praefecti praetorio, vicarii, and, of course, the emperor.

16.     See K. Tuori, ‘A Place for Jurists in the Spaces of Justice?’ in Spaces of Justice in the Roman World (n. 8), 45—48; J. Powell and J. Paterson, ‘Introduction’, in Cicero the Advocate (n. 6), 10—18; Crook (n. 8); J.-M. David, Le patronat judiciaire au dernier siècle de la république romaine (Rome, 1992); A. A. Schiller, Roman Law: Mechanisms of Development (The Hague, 1978), 569—77.

17.    For what is given below (275—6), see A. Bürge, ‘Zum Edikt De edendo’, ZSS 112 (1995): 1—50; Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 29—30, 79; M. Kaser, ‘Nuovi studi sul processo civile Romano’, Labeo 15 (1969): 190—98; M. Kaser, ‘Prätor und Judex im römischen Zivilprozess’, TR 32 (1964): 329—62 (modifying the views expressed in ‘Zum Ursprung des geteilten römischen Zivilprozessverfahrens’, in Ausgewählten Schriften (Naples, 1976), vol. 2, 385—409); M. Kaser, ‘Römische Gerichtsbarkeit im Wechsel derZeiten’, in Ausgewählten Schriften (Naples, 1976),vol. 2, 419—49 (= ‘The Changing Face of Roman Jurisdiction’ (n. 1)); H.R. Hoetink, face=Arial>‘The Origin of the Dual Mode in Roman Procedure’, Seminar 5 (1947): 16—3o;JolowiczandNicholas (n. 1), 176—78; G. MacCormack, ‘Roman and African Litigation’, TR 39 (1971): 221—55; J.M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford, 1966), ch. 1; J.M. Kelly, Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1976), 125—29; H.F. Jolowicz, ‘The judex and the arbitral principle’, RIDA 2 (1949): 477-92.

18.    This is the view set out in Kaser, ‘Prätor und Iudex’ (n. 17) and ‘Römische Gerichtsbarkeit’ (n. 17). It was promptly criticized by Jolowicz and Nicholas (n. 1), 177 n. 2, as ‘too rational’.

19.    See, esp., Jolowicz (n. 17), 488—91. His views are reflected in his Historical Introduction (with Barry Nicholas, cited in n. 1), at 176—78. Cf. Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 30: ‘Das in dieser Unterwerfung, die notfalls vom Staat erzwungen wird, liegende Element der Gemeinsamkeit im Verhalten der Parteien reicht für die Annahme eines Schiedsvertrages nicht aus.’

20.    For what is given below (276—8), see A. H. M. Jones, ‘Imperial and Senatorial Jurisdiction in the Early Principate’, in Studies in Roman Government and Law (Oxford, 1968), 67—98; Jolowicz and Nicholas (n. 1), 216, 229—30, 400; Thomas (n. 1), 109, 113—14; P. Stein, ‘“Equitable” Remedies for the Protection of Property’, in New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property: Essays for Barry Nicholas, ed. P. Birks (Oxford, 1989), 191—92; Metzger (n. 6), 117—20.

21.                See Cic. Quinct. 65, 69.

22.                O. Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum, 3rd edn. (Leipzig, 1927), 109—30.

23.    The literature on this subject is enormous. The newer literature should be favoured, because the lex Irnitana discovered in 1981 has added a great deal to our under­standing. See, most recently, E. Metzger, ‘Remedy of Prohibition against Roman Judges in Civil Trials’, in Judges and Judging in the History of the Common Law and Civil Law from Antiquity to Modern Times, ed. P. Brand and J. Getzler (Cambridge, 2012), 177—91; E. Metzger, ‘Absent Parties and Bloody-Minded Judges’, in Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks, ed. A. Burrows and A. Rodger (Oxford, 2006), 455—73; A. Gomez-Iglesias, ‘Lex Irnitana cap. 91: lis iudici damni sit’, SDHI72 (2006): 465—505; R. Scevola, La responsibilita del iudex privatus (Milan, 2004); D. Mantovani, ‘La “diei diffissio” nella “lex Irnitana”’, in Iuris Vincula: Studi in onore di Mario Talamanca (Naples, 2001), vol. 5, 13—72. O. F. Robinson has written a series of articles on the uses of judges’ liability in Justinian: ‘Justinian’s Institutional Classification and the Class of Quasi-Delict’, Journal of Legal History 19 (1998): 245—50; ‘The “iudex qui litemsuamfecerit” explained’, ZSS 116 (1999): 195—99; ‘Justinianandthe Compilers’ View of the iudex qui litem suam fecerit’, in Status Familiae, ed. H.-G. Knothe and J. Kohler (Munich, 2001), 389—96; ‘Gaius and the Class of Quasi-Delict’, in Iuris Vincula: Studi in onore di Mario Talamanca (Naples, 2001), vol. 7, 120—28.

24.    See S. Randazzo, ‘Doppio grado di giurisdizione e potere politico nel primo secolo dell’impero’, in Roman Law as Formative of Modern Legal Systems. Studies in Honour of Wiestaw Litewski, ed. J. Sondel et al. (Krakow, 2003), vol. 2, 75—94; Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 501—10; D. Liebs, ‘Roman Law’, in CAH vol. 14, 2nd edn. by A. Cameron et al. (2000), 240—41; I. Buti, ‘La “cognitio extra ordinem”: da Augusto a Diocleziano’, ANRW II.14, 54—58; L. Fanizza, Llang=EN-US style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;font-style: italic'>'amministrazione della giustizia nel principato (Rome, 1999), 11—60.

25.    Textbooks commonly refer to cognitio in various forms: cognitio extra ordinem, cognitio extraordinaria, iudicia extraordinaria. From at least the middle empire one could refer to this new, now common, mode of procedure as extraordinaria or extra ordinem (Paul 1 sent. D. 3.5.46.1; Inst. 4.15.8). It is widely accepted that the term was coined to distinguish this form of procedure from the ordo iudiciorum (or iudiciaria) — that is, the formulary procedure. See Randazzo (n. 24), 79 and n. 15. Compare W. Turpin, ‘Formula, cognitio, and Proceedings extra ordinem’, RIDA (3rd ser.) 46 (1999): 544-62.

26.    For what is given below, see Platschek (n. 6); Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 222—23, 427—29; Thomas (n. 1), 112—13; Jolowicz and Nicholas (n. 1), 217, 228—29.

27.    Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 222, outline the common opinion (with literature). It rests substantially on events recounted in Cicero, pro Quinctio, where Cicero’s client has been subjected to missio and where, according to a widely held view, the client’s absence took place before proceedings had been initiated. To the contrary, new evidence from Puteoli and Herculaneum (above, n. 11) suggests that Cicero’s client was ignoring the praetor’s compulsory order to reappear. See Metzger (n. 6), 30—38, 163—66.

28.    Metzger (n. 6), 37—38, 161—63; E. Metzger, ‘Lawsuits in Context’, in Beyond Dogmatics: Law and Society in the Roman World, ed. J. Cairns and P. du Plessis (Edinburgh, 2007), 204—5; E. Jakab, Praedicere und cavere beim Marktkauf (Munich, 1997), 223—29; Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 429—32; A.M. Giomaro, ‘Ulpiano e le stipulationes praetoriae’, in Studi in onore di Arnaldo Biscardi (Milan, 1983), vol. 4, 413—40; A. M. Giomaro, Cautiones iudiciales e officium iudicis (Milan, 1982).

29.                  See TH 14 (n. 11) with Indra (n. 1), 106—9; TPSulp 27 (n. 11).

30.    For what is given below (279—81), see Gaius 4.138—70; Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 408— 21; Buckland (n. 1), 729—44; Frier (n. 6); A. Watson, The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford, 1968), 86—89; A. Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford, 1974), 41—42; Jolowicz and Nicholas (n. 1), 230—32, 259—63; Stein (n. 20), 188—89.

31.    The form of the interdict is given in D. 43.26.2 pr.: Quod precario ab illo habes aut dolo malo fecisti ut desineres habere, qua de re agitur, id illi restituas.

32.    The form of the interdict, as reconstructed, is: Quod vi aut clam factum est qua de re agitur id, si non plus quam annus est cum experiundi potestas est, restituas. See D. 43.24.1 pr.; Mantovani (n. 1), 88.

33.    Obtaining a ‘new possession’ is a more aggressive use of possessory interdicts; examples are interdicts to assist bonorum possessio and possession of a tenant’s property by a landlord under the interdictum Salvianum (see M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, 2nd edn. (Munich, 1971), vol. 1, 472—73).

34.    For what is given below (281—2), see Gaius 4.10—31; Jolowicz and Nicholas (n. 1), 175—90; Tellegen-Couperus (n. 1), 21—24; de Zulueta (n. 4), vol. 2, 230—50; Crook (n. 1, CAH), 544—46; Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 25—148, esp. 44—60, 64—81; Greenidge (n. 1), 49—75.

35.                  Gaius 4.30; Gell. NA 16.10.8.

36.    The newest view, and among the most engaging, is that of Talamanca, who follows Wlassak to some degree. Talamanca looks back to the time before the lex Aebutia but after the creation of the peregrine praetorship, suggesting the urban praetor founded on his own imperium the authority to grant civil actions, as well as developing his own ‘honorary actions’ for use by Roman citizens: these would exist side-by-side with the legis actiones. The lex Aebutia would then have ‘legalized’ the formulary procedure for civil actions, giving those actions the civil effects they would have lacked when based only on the praetor’s imperium. Talamanca (n. 1, ‘Il riordinamento Augusteo’), esp. 74—76, 199—203. For other views see M. Kaser, ‘Die lex Aebutia’, in Studi in memoria di Emilio Albertario (Milan, 1953), 25—59 (the statute permitted formulae for actions formerly brought by legis actio per condictionem); P. Birks, ‘From Legis Actio to Formula’, Irish Jurist (n.s.) 4 (1969): 356—67 (the statute limited whatever tactical advantages a plaintiff enjoyed in selecting between the two forms of procedure); Crook (n. 1, CAH), 146 (similar to Talamanca: the statute ensured that actions sued by formulae could not be sued upon again).

37.     Gaius 4.30; lex Irn. ch. 91 (n. 12, this chapter); Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 153—57.

38.     For what isgiven below(282—3), seeKaser and Hackl(n. 1), 64-69;Pugliese (n. 1, Le legis actiones), 253—63; Kelly (n. 17, Roman Litigation), ch. 1; MacCormack (n. 17); Buckland (n. 1), 609-30.

39.                XII Tables 1.1-4, 6-10; see also Paul 1 ed. D. 50.17.103.

40.    Kelly(n. 17, Roman Litigation),ch. 1; cf. Kaserand Hackl (n. 1), 222.Theuseofmissio in this context is doubtful, as noted above (n. 27). Paul says that a fine (multa) will be imposed against those who do not come when summoned before a municipal magistrate, but that rustics will be spared, and that for others some sort of prejudice must be shown: Paul 1 ed. D. 2.5.2.1.

41.    See Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 66, 224 and the literature cited in R. Domingo, Estudios sobre el primer titulo del edicto pretorio (Santiago de Compostela, 1993), 56 n. 140. The awkward text is Gaius 1 leg. duo. tab D. 2.4.22.1, which suggests that the vindex undertook to defend his principal.

42.    Varr. LL. 6.74; Gell. NA 16.10.8; Livy 3.13.8; Kaser andHackl (n. 1), 68-69. Gellius speaks of subvades; Livy speaks of multiple vades, each liable to a specific sum. One hypothesis is that a defendant ‘cumulated’ vades until he reached a satisfactory level of assurance.

43.    Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 75-77, 79-81. Cf. A. Watson, International Law in Archaic Rome: War and Religion (Baltimore, 1993), 10-19 (on ‘testes estote’).

44.                Kelly (n. 17, Studies), 117-19; Talamanca (n. 1, Istituzioni), 289-90.

45.    On the composition and jurisdiction of the centumviral court, see Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 52-56; Kelly (n. 17, Studies), ch. 1. On the physical space it may have occupied, see Bablitz (n. 8), 61-70.

46.    Our main source for the details of the formulary procedure is Gaius 4.30-187. See Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 220-382; Johnston (n. 1), 112-18; E. Metzger, ‘Formula’, in Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, ed. S.N. Katz (New York, 2009); E. Metzger, A New Outline of the Roman Civil Trial (Oxford, 1997), ch. 5; Jolowicz and Nicholas (n. 1), 199-225; Crook (n. 1, Law and Life of Rome), 73-87; Talamanca (n. 1, Istituzioni), 298-360.

47.    See, e.g., Gaius 3.180: Nam tuncobligatio quidemprincipalis dissolvitur, indpitautem teneri reus litis contestatione: sed, si condemnatus sit, sublata litis contestatione, incipit ex causa iudicati teneri.

48.    Stein (n. 20), 187. In certain cases, performance could be encouraged by including a special clause in the formula (clausula arbitraria) threatening condemnation if a per­formance was not tendered.

49.    Gaius 4.171. On its praetorian origins, see D. Liebs, ‘The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian’, in The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honoré, ed. N. MacCormick and P. Birks (Oxford, 1986), 165 n. 9 (with literature).

50.    Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 266—69; E. Metzger, ‘Having an Audience with the Magistrate’, in Spaces of Justice in the Roman World (n. 8), 37—41.

51.                  Described briefly in Gaius 4.184-187. See Metzger (n. 6), 8-10, 65-94.

52.    Gaius 4.46. The remedy is criticized for giving the plaintiff a second action with, perhaps, no greater promise of victory than the first: I. Buti, Il ‘praetor' e le formalità introduttive del processo formulare (Naples, 1984), 296—98. However, the remedy very effectively thwarts a defendant who makes himself scarce until the plaintiff s right of action expires; the clock begins to run anew under the penal action.

53.    Bürge (n. 17). A vadimonium was not used at this stage of proceedings. See Metzger (n. 28, ‘Lawsuits in Context’); cf. Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 231.

54.    The postponements to the day-after-the-next are described with the words intertium dare in the lex Irnitana, our main source for this institution. See Metzger (n. 28, ‘Lawsuits in Context') and in more detail, Metzger (n. 6), chs. 5, 6, and 7. The details are contested; full discussion of all views is given in Metzger (n. 6), 123-32. The contrary view is set out most thoroughly in J. G. Wolf, ‘Intertium — und kein Ende?’ BIDR 39 (2001): 1-36.

55.                  See, e.g., Ulpian 6 ed. D. 3.1.1.2.

56.                  Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 209-17.

57.    As evidenced in a recently uncovered inscription, TPSulp 27 (n. 11). The evidence is discussed in Metzger (n. 28, ‘Lawsuits in Context’), 190—92, 204—5. Gaius describes the two permissible formulae for appointing a cognitor: Gaius 4.83. The second formula omits any mention of the action being brought, which seems curious until we recall that this is precisely the right formula to use when two cognitores are being sent to prosecute the case away from home, as in TPSulp 27, and the ultimate form of the action is therefore unknown to the litigants.

58.                  Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 289-90.

59.    Our knowledge of the judicial selection procedures relies a good deal on the lex Irn. chs. 86, 87, 88. There may be subtle discrepancies from the practice at Rome, but the two obvious ones are (1) the number of decuriae (three in Irni; five in Rome after Caligula) and (2) the qualifications for selection for the album (the property threshold was modest in Irni). Forwhat is given below, see P. Birks, ‘New Light on the Roman Legal System: The Appointment of Judges', Cambridge Law Journal, 47 (1988): 36-60; Kelly (n. 17, Studies), 125-29; Bablitz (n. 8), 93-103; Kaser andHackl (n. 1), 192—96; Metzger (n. 46, New Outline), ch. 5.

color=black face=Garamond>60.    For what is given below, see lex Irn. (n. 12) chs. 88, 89; P. Yadin (n. 10) 28, 29, 30; Birks (n. 59); Frier (n. 6), ch. 5; Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 197-201. The most thorough recent research on recuperatores is by Nörr: see, above all, D. Nörr, ‘Zu den Xenokriten (Rekuperatoren) in der römischen Provinzialgerichtsbarkeit‘, in Lokale Autonomie und römische Ordnungsmacht in den kaiserzeitlichen Provinzen vom 1. bis 3. Jahrhundert, ed. W. Eck (Munich, 1999), 257-301. Cf. Nörr (n. 10, ‘The Xenokritai in Babatha's Archive'), 83-94. If, as Nörr argues, the ‘xenokritai' named in (among other sources) the formulae in the Babatha archive (early 2nd cent. AD) denote recuperatores, this may suggest that the panel was drawn from an album at least partly comprising peregrines.

61.                  See Frier (n. 6), 204-5; Bablitz (n. 8), 51-70. Cf. Kelly (n. 17, Studies), 121-24.

62.                  Metzger (n. 23, ‘Absent Parties'), 459-68.

63.                  Frier (n. 6), 227.

64.     See, most recently, Randazzo (n. 24); J. M. Rainer, ‘Zum Ursprung der extraordi­naria cognitio’, in Roman Law as Formative of Modern Legal Systems (n. 24), vol. 1, 69-74; Buti (n. 24), 34-9.

65.                Talamanca (n. 1, Istituzioni), 361.

66.                Suet. Aug. 33.3; Tac. Ann. 14.28.

67.                Frier (n. 8).

68.                For what follows, see Buti (n. 24), 44-6.

69.    Also referred to as summons by evocatio, a term which encompasses the tribunal’s broad power to summon.

name=bookmark1558>70.     For what is given below (288—9), see A. Steinwenter, Studien zum römischen Versäumnisverfahren (Munich, 1914); T. Kipp 'contumacia’ in RE vol. 4 (1901), col. 1165; Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 477—81.

71.     See Buti (n. 24), 47-54; Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 485-501.

72.     Kaser and Hackl (n. 1), 570—607; Simon (n. 1), esp. 37—63.

73.    Gaius 4.17b—20; Liebs (n. 49); R. Zimmermann, The Roman Law of Obligations (Oxford, 1996), 835—6.

74.    See P. Birks, ‘Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13’, in The Classification of Obligations, ed. P. Birks (Oxford, 1997), 17—18.

75.    See R. C. van Caenegem, History of European Civil Procedure [International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 16.2] (Tübingen, 1987), 11—23, 32—43, 45—53 ;J. A. Brundage, TheMedieval Origins of the Legal Profession (Chicago, 2008), ch. 5.