Towards a General Theory?
It is important to ask what distinguished Bartolus’ deployment of the non-recognition argument from the way French jurists and others had used it in the course of the thirteenth century in their discussions of kingdoms.
This is because of what was about to happen in Italian jurisprudence, in particular relating to Bartolus’ most celebrated pupil, Baldus de Ubaldis. Baldus applied his master’s logic not to free cities but to signorial regimes, pre-eminently that of the Visconti family, which at its broadest covered a substantial area of the old kingdom of Lombardy and was elevated by Wenzel, King of the Romans, to a duchy to be held in fief by Giangaleazzo Visconti in 1395. Whereas Bartolus’ point of departure had been the observation that all over Italy cities exercised merum imperium without acknowledging the authority of the emperor, Baldus made practically the same observation of signori - whom Bartolus in conformity with Guelf propaganda had tended to characterize as tyrants - and reached a remarkably similar result in concluding that their claim to a fullness of power or plenitudo potestatis had de facto validity independently of imperial 89concession.
Appraising the significance of Baldus’ step comes down in large measure to what role is attributed to consent in Bartolus’ original theory of non-recognition, and this is no easy question to settle. Bartolus’ famous formulation of the free city is after all not a comment on the manner in which a city governs its inhabitants, but a mere expression of the fact that the city recognizes no superior in temporal matters. Although signorial regimes were in practice constrained by real political and not infrequently formal legalistic limitations of consent, their significance in Bartolus’ theory is in their more reductive shape: quintessentially, a non-consensual rule.
Modern scholars have suggested that Bartolus required the people constituting a city to be free in another sense entirely, as a pre-requisite of its successful non-recognition of a superior, as if the internal arrangements of such a city somehow softened the legal impact of its usurpation of merum imperium.90 But this is probably both to ask and answer a question in terms that Bartolus would have found otiose. For legislation - certainly for the legislation of a city - to be effective it had to conform to a fundamental requirement: D. 1.3.32 stressed the centrality of the people’s will in legislation, both in the strict sense and in the creation of custom. Cities had long been seen as local peoples by interpretation of D. 1.1.9 and hence as local legislators by imperial concession. Now they were legislators in their own right, admittedly in the counter-intuitive sense of Bartolus’ de facto legitimacy. But this hardly altered the juristic DNA of customary and indeed all local law, which was the consent of the people. However, the example of Baldus’ jurisprudence does demonstrate that once out of the bottle, the genie of de facto non-recognition of a superior was hard to discipline, because it could be applied to practically any regime which did not violate natural and divine law.The question is significant because it reveals a suggestive contrast with the juristic analysis of royal power - and far more people lived under monarchs in the western middle ages than in city-states.91 It was noted above that the thirteenth-century notion of the king who was emperor in his own kingdom as a consequence of his non-recognition of the emperor’s superior authority left everything else about royal power unexplained. That included the requirement or otherwise of consent. Consent was comfortably circumvented by Marinus de Caramanico, a fact all the more noteworthy because his starting-point was the natural ius gentium legitimacy of kingdoms, whose genesis both Azo and the Glossa ordinaria had explained by reference to election.
A markedly different story could have been told using the evidence from the canon lawyers in this respect. Henricus de Segusio, known by his cardinal’s title simply as Hostiensis, noted in an off-hand way that if a king was emperor in his own kingdom, his power ought to reach him and be defined in scope by some such mechanism as the lex regia.92 Even by 1400, the variety of political phenomena which the Roman-lawyers were called upon to analyse was not reducible to a universal set of legal formulae. There was no common denominator to articulate the relationship between rulers and ruled in such diverse organizations as the empire, kingdoms, territorial lordships, and autonomous cities. What made legal science valuable was its sensitivity to the particular. The vicissitudes of such fissile cities as Florence called forth some of the most sophisticated political analysis of the age from lawyers such as Cinus and Ricardus, whose opposing consilia on the Ordinances of Justice show a gritty respect for the realities of factionalism and the true, tortured contours of the legal landscape. Baldus was in the same tradition in stating that a gulf separated one type of polity from another, as he explained that a kingdom approximated more closely to dominium than any other form of government.93 Despite the ubiquitous awareness amongst the lawyers that all governance was subject to natural and divine law, comments such as this by Baldus only did justice to the truth that not all temporal government was the same.Change was in the air by the early fifteenth century. We saw that in his commentary on D. 1.3.9 Paulus de Castro repeated what was by then a standard opinion to the effect that the Roman people was now powerless to revoke the lex regia thanks to the advent of Christ. Most significantly, he argued elsewhere that in consequence of the fall of the Da Carrara dynasty and Padua’s submission to Venice the city was no longer an independent unit capable of legislating for itself: ‘The community of Padua has no jurisdiction, since it has transferred all its jurisdiction and imperium to the lordship of the Venetians, as in the Digest, 1.4.1’.94 In Paulus’ construction of events, the Paduans had mimicked the Romans by enacting their own lex regia.
In handing themselves over to an external superior power they had effectively terminated the existence of their own city as an autonomous entity. The two positions encapsulate the ambivalent character of civilian jurisprudence at the end of the period under examination here. An orthodox reading of the lex regia as an irrevocable moment in Roman history which still underpinned the fundamental structure of Christendom in the here and now was accompanied in the jurisprudence of the same lawyer by a new kind of lex regia. If in the opinion of a standard-setting jurist like Paulus this ‘little’ lex regia could explain the creation and internal workings of a new hegemony such as Venice’s terra firma lordship, then why not others too? There is every reason to believe that by the early fifteenth century Roman law was emerging from the restrictive hermeneutic imposed by the Roman empire into an institutionally neutral - and for that very reason generally applicable - body of ideas, capable of furnishing universal principles of political analysis.Notes
1. D. 1.4.1; Ulpian.
2. Inst. 1.2.6.
3. C. 1.17.1.7.
4. D. 1.2.2.11.
5. Accursius, Volumen, col.
41 [Nov. 6 = Auth. 1.6], gl. imperium.6. Jul. D. 1.3.32.1: ‘Ancient custom is not without reason observed as if it were law, and this is the law which is said to be established by mores. For since statutes themselves bind us for no other reason than that they have been accepted by the judgment of the people, certainly what the people has approved without any writing will bind all. For what does it matter whether the people declares its will by voting or by its very actions? Accordingly, it is absolutely right that statutes may be abrogated not only by vote of the legislator, but also by the tacit agreement of everyone expressed through desuetude.’ (Translation adapted from Watson ed. of Digest.) See also Accursius, Digestum vetus, col. 36 [D. 1.3.32], gl. abrogentur.
7. E. Cortese, La norma giuridica. Spunti teoretici nel diritto comune classico, 2 vols., (Milan, 1962—1964), vol. 2, 126 n. 55 for edition; A. Gouron, ‘Coutume contre loi chez les premiers glossateurs’, in Renaissance du Pouvoir Législatf et Genèse de l'État, ed. A. Gouron and A. Rigaudière (Montpellier, 1988), 117—30; A. Gouron, ‘Non dixit, ‘Ego sum consuetudo’’, ZSS 74 (1988): 133—40.
8. E. Cortese, Ilproblema della sovranità nel pensiero giuridico medioevale (Rome, 1966), 96.
9. Cortese (n. 8), 96.
10. Cortese (n. 8), 97; Placentinus, Summa codicis 17 [1.14]; 416 [8.56]. Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 128 with n. 61, and 127 for the relationship between this notion and the argument advanced by Martinus.
11. Cortese (n.
8), 98-100; Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 174-75.12. The phrase ‘sole legislator’ came from Justinian; see C. 1.14.12.4.
13. Azo, Summa super codicem, 9a; Azo, Lectura super codicem, 44; Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 175—76 and n. 14; Q. Skinner, ‘The rediscovery of republican values’, in Q. Skinner, Visions of Politics (Cambridge, 2002), vol. 2, 13-17.
14. Accursius, Digestum vetus, col. 30 [D. 1.3.9], gl. Non ambigitur, referring to Hugolinus de Presbiteriis, for whom see Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 131, 175, 183 n. 39 (on this gloss by Accursius).
15. D. 1.3.1.
16. Odofredus, Lectura super digesto veteri, fo. 10va [D. 1.3.1].
17. Not a new idea: cf. Azo, Summa super codicem, 9a.
18. Odofredus, Lectura super digesto veteri, fo. 10va-b [D. 1.3.1].
19. lang=EN-US>Odofredus, Lectura super digesto veteri, fo. 11va.
20. lacobus de Ravanis, Lectura super codice, fo. 36 vb [C. 1.14.12].
21. Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 185 n. 45.1 omit for reasons of space a detailed treatment of the French lawyer Johannes Faber, who represents something of an exception.
22. G. Zanetti, Questiones de iuris subtilitatibus (Florence, 1958); H. Lange, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter. Vol. 1: Die Glossatoren (Munich, 1997), 408—13; for the most plausible interpretation, see E. Cortese, Il diritto nella storia medioevale. Vol. 2: Il basso medioevo (Rome, 1995), vol. 2, 111—16; the last treatment in English: R.W. Carlyle and A.J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Thought in the West. Vol. 2: The Political Theory of the Roman Lawyers and the Canonists, from the Tenth Century to the Thirteenth Century; vol. 6: Political Theory from 1300 to 1600 (1909, 1936; repr. Edinburgh — London, 1970), vol. 2, 8—19; latest attempt at attribution in A. Gouron, ‘Les ‘Quaestiones de juris subtilitatibus’: une ceuvre du maitre parisien Albéric’, Revue Historique 618 (2001): 342—62.
23. B. Paradisi, ‘Diritto canonico e tendenze di scuola nei glossatori da Irnerio ad Accursio’, Studi medievali 6.2 (1965): 91; U. Niccolini, ‘Leggendo le “Quaestiones de iuris subtilitatibus” ’, Jus 28.1 (1981) esp. 30—47.
24. Zanetti (n. 22), 13 (para. 11): ‘Law differs from the other sciences because only authority is required in the latter, whereas a legal judgment cannot subsist unless it is upheld both by the support of knowledge and power.’ (‘Distat ius a ceteris artibus illa quoque ratione, quod in illis quidem sola desideratur auctoritas, iuris autem censura non subsistit, nisi subnixa sit tam scientie quam potestatis aminiculo’).
25. Zanetti (n. 22), 13, with reference to Luke 2.1.
26. Quae sit longa consuetudo: C. 8.52(53).2.
27. C. 8.52(53).2: ‘The authority of long-established custom is not negligible, but it should not prevail to the point of overcoming reason or law.’
28. The following is based on Gouron (n. 7, both papers cited) and Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 102—46. The only resumé in English of some of the more important arguments is the concise if outdated A. J. Carlyle, ‘The theory of the source of political authority, in the mediaeval civilians to the time of Accursius’, inMélanges Fitting vol. 1, 181—94. Aalen, repr. 1969.
29. Gouron (in Gouron and Rigaudière, n. 7), 120.
30. This in summary of the most important and ultimately successful position in a debate which had numerous etiolations, for which see Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 39—167 and 113 n. 29.
31. Azo, Lectura super codicem, 672 [C. 8.52(53).2].
32. Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 414.
33. For biographical details on Albericus see Lange (n. 22), 200—1; for the opinion itself that ‘custom is either general, such as the custom of the Roman people, or rather of the emperor who stands in place and instead of the people, or it is special’ (consuetudo alia generalis, puta populi romani, immo principis qui optinet locum et vicem populi, alia specialis), see Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 125 n. 53.
34. For biography, see Lange (n. 22), 207—9.
35. Cortese (n. 7), vol. 2, 128 with n. 61, and 127 for the relationship between this notion and the argument advanced in the previous generation by Placentinus’ teacher Martinus.
36. Carlyle and Carlyle (n. 22), vol. 2, 57—8.
37. H. Fitting, Summa codicis des Irnerius (Berlin, 1894), 16 [1.14.3]; Carlyle and Carlyle (n. 22), vol. 2, 58 n. 1.
38. U. Meier, Mensch und Bürger. Die Stadt im Denken spätmittelalterlicher Theologen, Philosophen und Juristen (Munich, 1994), 138.
39. Ms. Stuttgart, WLB cod. jur. 123, fo. 12vb-19ra at 12vb: ‘It is clear that the people and senate can do nothing relating to the governance of the empire without him [i.e., the emperor] because they constitute a corporation and he who belongs to a corporation can do nothing without consent or without its head.’ (patet quod populus et senatus quantum ad regimen imperii nichil facere potest sine eo [scil. imperatore] quia universitas et is qui pertinet ad universitatem nichil sine consensu sive capite facere potest ar. C. de decuri. l. ii [C. 10.32.2] et de ser. re. pu. ma.l. i. et ii. [C. 7.9.1face=Arial>—2]). On Matarellis, who died in 1310, see M. Duynstee, ‘An Unknown Fourteenth Century Lecture of the Orleans School: Jean Nicot on Book VI of the Code’, in TR 60 (1992): 371—72.
40. Cinus at D. 1.3.9 in D. Maffei, La ‘Lectura super digesto veteri' di Cino da Pistoia. Studio sui mss Savigny 22 e Urb. Lat. 172. Quaderni di Studi Senesi 10 (Milan, 1963), 56.
41. Iacobus Butrigarius 1963, fo. 1va, and discussion in C. N. S. Woolf, Bartolus of Sassoferrato — His Position in the History of Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge, 1913), 35—37.
42. M. Ryan, ‘Bartolus of Sassoferrato and free cities’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser. 17 (2000): 75—76.
43. J. Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis (Cambridge, 1987), 62; Baldus, In primum, secundum et tertium Codicis libros commentaria, fo. 66rb [C. 1.14.4]: ‘Secondly, note that the emperor’s authority depends from the lex regia which was promulgated by divine command’. (Secundo no. quod authoritas Imperatoris pendet ex lege Regia quae fuit nutu divino promulgata). Baldus’ comment here relates only to the lex regia, not to laws in general; cf. L. Mayali, ‘Lex animata. Rationalisation du pouvoir politique et science juridique (XIIème-XlVème siècles)’, in Gouron and Rigaudière (n. 7): 163. Baldus appears to have been thinking of Accursius’ gloss at C. 1.14.4 and altering it.
44. Paulus Castrensis, Pauli de Castro prima super digesto veteri, fo. iovb [D. 1.3.9]; see Carlyle and Carlyle (n. 22), vol. 6, 147; H. Morel, ‘La place de la Lex regia dans l’histoire des idées politiques’, in Etudes offertes àJean Macqueron, ed. Y. Lobin (Aix- en-Provence, 1970), 547 n. 11.
45. The addition ‘rex’ is justified by the incipit of the quaestio, but the comment in K. Pennington, The Prince and the Law. Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition 1200—1600 (Berkeley — Los Angeles, 1993), 35 n. 116 should nevertheless be noted; F. Calasso, Iglossatori e la teoria della sovranità, 3rd ed., (Milan, 1957), 33—34; E. Landsberg, Die quaestiones des Azo (Freiburg, 1888), 86ff.
46. Calasso (n. 45), 22ff.; F. Ercole, ‘L’Origine francese di una nota formola Bartoliana’, Archivio storico italiano, 6th ser., 73 (1915): 241—94; F. Ercole, ‘Sulla origine francese e le vicende in Italia della formola: “Rex superiorem non recognoscens est princeps in regno suo” ’, Archivio storico italiano, 7th ser., 16 (1931): 197—238.
47. The only other citation is D. 21.2.11 pr. The sequential reading of the separate argumenta of this text at Pennington (n. 45), 35 n. 116 is misguided.
48. Calasso (n. 45), 78; Pennington (n. 45), 31.
49. Contra: Calasso (n. 45), 35 who characterizes Azo’s position as current doctrine at Bologna; Calasso’s comment is true, however, of the canon lawyers there: see 31ff.
50. H. Lange and M. Kriechbaum, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter. Vol. 2: Die Kommentatoren (Munich, 2007), 461—68.
51. J. Acher, ‘Notes sur le droit savant au moyen age’, Nouvelle Revue Historique de Droit Francois etEtranger 30 (1906): 125—78 is unusable; seeJohannes de Blanosco, De actionibus tractatus clarissimorum iurisconsultorum, fo. 246rb; R. Feenstra, ‘Jean de Blanot et la formule “Rex Francie in regno suo princeps est” ’, in Etudes d'histoire du droit canonique dédiées à Gabrielle le Bras (Paris, 1965), vol. 2, 890—91: ‘general jurisdiction’ is preferable to ‘natural’ (as opposed to Calasso (n. 45), 114), which also resolves the doubt expressed by M. Boulet-Sautel, ‘Jean de Blanot et la conception du pouvoir royal au temps de Louis IX’, in Septième centenaire de la mort de Saint Louis: actes des colloques de Royaumont et de Paris, ed. L. Carolus-Barré (Paris, 1976), 66.
52. For dominium as jurisdiction rather than in a proprietary sense, see Accursius, Codicis lustiniani ex repetita praelectione libri novem priores, col. 1397 [C. 7.37.3], gl. Omnia principis; Canning (n. 43), 82; Pennington (n. 45), 16ff.
53. lang=EN-US>Feenstra (n. 51).
54. In lieu of a vast literature, see the fundamentals at Calasso (n. 45), 110ff.; 34fr. and K. Pennington, ‘Law, legislative authority and theories of government, 1150—1300’, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c.g$0—c. 1450, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge, 1988), 432-33.
55. Johannes de Blanosco (n. 51), fo. 246va; Boulet-Sautel (n. 51), 68 (without the Roman law reference); G. Post, ‘Two Notes on Nationalism in the Middle Ages. I. Pugna pro patria’, Traditio 9 (1953): 289-90.
56. Pennington (n. 45), 97.
57. Cf. Pennington (n. 45), 98 and n. 99, which must refer to pp. 99-110 and nn. 95 and 97.
58. Canning (n. 43), 68-70.
59. Calasso (n. 45), 125-162 and 179-205 for text.
60. Marinus de Caramanico in Calasso (n. 45), 180.
61. Calasso (n. 45), 197.
62. Calasso (n. 45), 198.
63. Cf J. Canning, ‘Ideas of the state in thirteenth and fourteenth-century commentators on Roman law’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 33 (1983): 7.
64. ForAzo see mssBAVVat. lat. 1408, fo. 3r [D. 1.1.5, gl. regna condita]: asingulisgentibus que sibi reges elegerunt. az., also in Vat. lat. 2512 fo. 3r, Munich, BSB, Clm 14028 fo. irb and Bamberg, SBJur. 11, fo. 3rb. SeeAccursius, Digestum vetus, coi. 14 [D. 1.1.5], gl. condita.
65. I reserve a detailed discussion of the provincia in the works of the jurists for a separate study: see in the meantime Accursius, Digestum vetus, col. 86 [D. 1.18.3], gl. praeses.
66. Marinus de Caramanico in Calasso (n. 45), 195, citing Azo, Summa codicis 1.14. Cf. Pennington (n. 45), 103.
67. Azo, Apparatus ad Digestum vetus, D. 1.1.9, gl. partim/proprio: mss BAV 1408, fo. 3va; BAVVat. lat. 2512,fo. 3rb; MunichBSB Clm. 14028, fo. 1rb, Bamberg SBJur 11,fo. 3va: C. de leg. et con. l. ult. [C. 1.14.12; BAV 1408 adds: contra. Solutio] hec corrigitur per illam vel dicamus hanc non corrigi sed loqui secundum sua tempora hodie enim omne ius quod [Clm: omits] populus habuit in imperatorem est translatum sed olim non habebat utff. de leg. et se. con. non ambigitur [D. 1.1.9]. az. Only BAV 1408 is clear in attributing the gloss to Azo. Mss BAV 2512 and Munich give ‘z’ or something very similar, and ms Bamberg gives no siglum. In each case, however, the gloss pertains to the primary Azo stratum. There is no equivalent gloss in ms Munich BSB Clm 3887, fo. 1rb; Paris, BN lat. 4459 is illegible here owing to water damage.
68. Accursius, Digestum vetus, col. 16 [D. 1.1.9], gl. suo proprio.
69. Odofredus, Lectura super digesto veteri, fo. 8va [D. 1.3.9]; 15va [D. 1.3.32].
70. Iacobus de Arena, Commentarii in universum ius civile, fo. 63va [D. 1.1.9].
71. See, e.g., as an example Raynerius de Forlivio, Repetitionum seu commentariorum in varia iurisconsultorum responsa volumen primum, fo. 63vb [D. 1.1.9]: ‘those subject to the emperor do this by the authority granted them by this law, therefore such things are legal’ (subditi imperatoris hoc faciunt authoritate imperatoris eis per hanc legem concessa. ergo sunt licita). See also fo. 65ra: ‘The solution is: I admit that peoples can do this by the authority of the emperor for as long he tolerates and suffers it: according to this law’. (Solu[tio]. fateor populos hoc posse authoritate imperatoris quandiu tolerat et patitur: per hanc legem).
72. Raynerius de Forlivio (n. 71), immediately following the passage above: ‘but he nevertheless has the bridle in his hand, for by the most trivial law he can revoke that law [i.e., D. 1.1.9] and the statutes ofthe peoples’, [sed tamen ipse habet frenum in manu, nam potest legem istam et populorum statuta una lege levissima revocare).
73. M. Bellomo, I fatti e il diritto. Tra le certezze e i dubbi dei giuristi medievali (secoli XIII-XIV) (Rome, 2000), 450, n. 36.
74. Brief remarks in Bellomo (n. 73), 191, 286; M. Bellomo, Quaestiones in iure civili disputatae. Didattici e prassi colta nel sistema del diritto comune fra duecento e trecento (Rome, 2008), 300 for the casus.
75. Quoted here from ms. BAV Chigi E. VIII. 245, fo. 137va-138ra at 137va: style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>‘So the Florentine popolo or those who represent the Florentine popolo could easily give the authority to legislate to the Piors and the Gonfaloniere, since they had previously been able to pass law, nor is the law passed by the aforementioned to be called the law of the Priors and the Gonfaloniere but the law of the Florentine popolo since “we rightly make all our own” etc.’ (bene ergopotuitpopulusflorentinus seu illi qui representant populum florentinum quia pri[ius] l[egem] condere poterant prioribus et vesellifero conde[ndi] l[egis] auctoritatem prestare nec l[ex] q[ue]perpredictos conditur lexpriorum et veselliferi dicetur sed populi florentini cum omnia merito nostra facimus etc. ut C. de veteri iure et [sic] enucle. l. i. § sed neque [C. 1.17.1.6].)
76. Ms. BAV Chigi. E.VIII. 245, fo. i37ra-va. See Bellomo (n. 73), 450; Bellomo (n. 74), 299 for a partial edition.
77. See the marginalia published in Bellomo (n. 74), 300.
78. Ms. BAV Chigi E. VIII. 245, fo. i37ra, as an argument contra his own eventual position but which he does not challenge as a principle — only its execution in this case: ‘it is clear that the statutes of the cities are civil laws as in D. 1.1.9. But civil laws can be altered, therefore [etc.] ’ (certum est quod statuta civitatum sunt iura civilia ut l. omnes populi [D. 1.1.9] sed iura civilia mutari possunt ergo etc. ut insti. de iure na. § ult. [Inst. 1.2 § 2]).
79. Ms. BAV Chigi E. VIII. 245, fo. 138ra: ‘if the people wishes it is released from the laws... and the people annuls its own law as it wishes’ (populus si vult suis legibus solutus est ut ff. de leg. l. princeps [D. 1.4.1] et C. de le. l. dingna [sic; C. 1.14.4] et ipsam l[egem] suam populus pro suo libito extinguit ar. ff. ar. ff. [sic] de le. l. de quibus [D. 1.32.2]).
80. See Bellomo (n. 74), 299; Ryan (n. 42), 80-82.
81. Meier (n. 38), 147—59; J. Canning ‘Law, sovereignty and corporation theory, 1300-1450’, in Burns (n. 54), 470-76; Ryan (n. 42).
82. Bartolus de Sassoferrato, Bartoli a Sassoferrato in primam partem codicis commentaria, fo. 49va [C. 2.3.28]: ‘You know that generally the cities in Italy do not have merum imperium but have usurped it.’ (Scitis quod civitates communiter italie non habent merum imperium sed usurpaverunt).
83. Iacobus de Belvisio, incipit: Baro vel universitas in terris ecclesiae castrum sibi constituit. See ms. BAV Chigi E. VIII. 245, fo. 102ra— 103ra, solution to first question. This would still appear to exclude cities. For an analysis of Iacobus’ argument from ‘loci loicalesface=Arial>’ here, see Bellomo (n. 73), 586—93 and Bellomo (n. 74), 273 for an edition of the casus.
84. Examples in Woolf (n. 41), 155—59.
85. Calasso (n. 45), 31ff.; 77fr.
86. Bartolus de Sassoferrato, Bartoli a Sassoferrato in secundam digesti novi partem commentaria, fo. 208rb [D. 49.1.1]; Ryan (n. 42), 77 and n. 40.
87. Bartolus de Sassoferrato in D. Quaglioni, Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano. Il ‘De tyranno' di Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1314—1357) (Florence, 1983), 138—39 [De guelphis et gebellinis, lines 149—151]; Ryan (n. 42), 83 and n. 55.
88. Bartolus de Sassoferrato in Quaglioni (n. 87), 168 [De regimine civitatis, lines 441—448]; Ryan (n. 42), 88.
89. Canning (n. 43), 221—27, esp. 224; Baldus, Baldi Ubaldi Perusini... Consiliorum, sive responsorum volumen primum, fo. 61vb; translation in Canning, 221—27; J. Black, Absolutism in Renaissance Milan. Plenitude of Power under the Visconti and the Sforza 1329-1535 (Oxford, 2009), 63—67, esp. 66.
90. H. Walther, ‘Regnum magis assimilatur dominio quam simplici regimini. Zur Attraktivität der Monarchie in derpolitischen Theorie gelehrterJuristen des 15.Jahrhunderts’, in Sozialer Wandel im Mittelalter. Wahrnehmungsformen, Erklärungsmuster, Regelungsmechanismen, ed. J. Miethke and K. Schreiner (Sigmaringen, 1994), 389.
91. Woolf (n. 41), 380 and Canning (n. 43), 97 for differing views on the magnitude of the step from royal to civic non-recognition, and Canning (n. 81), 470—71.
92. Hostiensis, Summa aurea (Venice, 1574), col. 1168 [3.39 n. 9], quoted by Calasso (n. 45), 78. Hostiensis disagreedwith the application ofthe non-recognition principle anyway; see M. Boulet-Sautel, ‘Le princeps de Guillaume Durand', Etudes d'histoire du droit canonique dediees d Gabriel Le Bras (Paris, 1965), vol. 2, 809—10.
93. lang=EN-US>Walther (n. 90).
94. Paulus Castrensis, Consiliorum sive responsorum... Pauli Castrensis volumen secundum, cons. 230: Sed communitas Paduae nullam habet iurisdictionem, cum omnem ipsius iurisdictionem et imperium transtulerit in dominium Venetorum l. i. in prin. ff. de consti. pecu. [sic; D. 1.4.10].