According to Popper’s philosophy the perfect division of labor in research would soon stop scientific progress.
His view explains why in the history of science many investigators have concentrated on a handful of problems. The problem arises: How did investigators coordinate their choice of scientific problems? By what criteria did the bulk of investigators of a given period decide which problem was fundamental or important?
There exist a variety of such criteria, but one criterion stands out as the most important.
Those scientific problems were chosen which were related to metaphysical problems of the period; those scientific results were sought which could throw light on topical metaphysical issues.My aim is to present this as a historical thesis. I do not contend that scientific interest devoid of metaphysical interest is in any sense illegitimate or inferior. Investigators may wish to study a small part of the universe without bothering to study the universe as a whole, without even bothering to ask how their partial picture integrates with man’s picture of the universe as a whole. Yet I contend, firstly, that very frequently problems, theories, and experiments which are traditionally regarded as important are highly relevant to the metaphysics of their time; and secondly, that my first contention provides a solution to the question of how the choice of scientific problems is coordinated.
This is all I wish to assert in the present chapter. I shall discuss problems of demarcation of science, of pseudo-science, and of metaphysics, mainly to dispel some vulgar errors concerning metaphysics (namely the identification of it with pseudo-science) and its role in the scientific tradition. I shall argue that metaphysics can progress - not so much in order to defend metaphysics as to expound my view of metaphysics as a coordinating agent in the field of scientific research.
I.