appendix : BARTLEY’S CRITIQUE OF POPPER
In the present chapter I rely heavily on Bartley’s paper (['Demarcation9]), and also on his previous work ([Retreat]). I have not referred, however, to Bartley’s own chief departure from Popper’s philosophy, his comprehensively critical rationalism which he wishes to replace Popper’s critical rationalism.
On this point I am much less in agreement with Bartley than with Popper; and I prefer an even more skeptical attitude than either. Nevertheless, I think Bartley’s effort to push a theory of rationality to its limit is fresh and interesting and yields many new and interesting results. One of these is Bartley’s thesis that the problem or problems of demarcation are facets of the problem of rationality. In brief, he says, once we prejudge issues and identify rationality with being scientific, the problem of demarcating science becomes urgent; but it is preferable to pay less uncritical respect to science, i.e., to respect science to the extent that it is rational, and to dwell on the problem of the demarcation of rationality instead. This criticism is not very upsetting, but worthy of notice all the same, I should have thought.Perhaps I should refer to the critical comments on Bartley’s paper which were originally published together with it, as far as the thesis from which I have just paraphrased it is concerned. These are by J. O. Wisdom, J. Giedymin, A. E. Musgrave, and Sir Karl Popper himself. Wisdom agrees with Bartley. He says, “one can draw a demarcation line very near to where Popper drew it, not exactly in the same place, though in spirit the same”; he also says the problem of the demarcation of science is important because it relates to the problem of rationality (66). Giedymin defends Popper. He says, it all depends on whether one accepts Popper’s statement, “nontestable systems of statements are of no interest to empirical scientists” ([Conjectures], 257; quoted by Bartley, ['Demarcation9], 54), questions Popper’s concept of ‘interest’ and relates this to Popper’s concept of ‘accept’, questions this concept as well, and then proceeds to analyze only the latter concept (70).
Musgrave does not comment on the point at issue but registers disagreement (83, line 3 from bottom). Popper repeats his demarcation of science, and his claim that the problem of demarcation of science is very important. It is very important both historically and philosophically, he says. Bartley says, philosophically the problem of rationality is now (thanks to Popper) more important than the problem of demarcation of science. Popper is doubtful; considering the problem, which of these two problems is more important, he says he doubts that this problem “will become a very important philosophical problem; if for no other reason, because the two... are historically extremely closely interrelated” (95). True, but historically all too many empirical scientists declared themselves not interested in unempirical statements, and by unempirical they all too often meant unverifiable. They were in error about verification as Popper claims, and they were also in error about the value of metaphysics for research, as Whewell claims. Will Popper endorse the statement Giedymin quotes from his Conjectures! If he will, his view is narrower than even the one he has expressed in his Logic of Scientific Discovery of 1935. If he will not, then, surely, he can see why Bartley is not very happy with his insistence on old problems while holding newer and more liberal views - even if he does not share Bartley’s feelings. Finally, Bartley replies to Giedymin’s comment: Bartley had said that due to Popper’s studies the problem of demarcation of science is now less significant than Popper had initially claimed; Giedymin quotes Bartley erroneously to assert the grossly erroneous view that the problem of demarcation of science is insignificant tout court (104).The rest of the fifty odd pages of comments on Bartley are devoted to other points of Bartley’s important paper and to Popper’s important ‘Back to the Presocratics’. As Popper says in his comment on Bartley, all criticism is of some value; let me apply this maxim to the criticism (quoted in the last paragraph) of Bartley’s thesis (64): “The later development of Popper’s thought, and the generalization and application of his ideas outside science, have rendered his discussion of demarcation obsolete”.
In this thesis, the word ‘obsolete’ should be qualified by, “though decidedly not in retrospect and not very significantly for those who insist that ‘unte- stable statements are of no interest to empirical scientists’”. I have not checked, however, whether Bartley would agree with me on this qualification.But I am being much too finicky. My main point is that Bartley’s chief thesis, just quoted, seems to me to be of the best kind of compliment any philosopher can receive, particularly one who advocates the critical approach. Popper, however, declares Bartley’s criticism of very small value and says it “came as a shock” to him (['Remarks9], 89). A few pages later (97) Popper says, “I am always grateful for any criticism”. His chief thesis in his ‘Remarks’ (101) is a conjecture concerning the reasons for “Bartley’s change of mind”. A conjecture which Popper says explains “to some extent” some of Bartley’s criticism. His reason for offering the conjecture, or perhaps for having the problem that it comes to solve, is this: “(By eliciting this conjecture, these criticisms may be regarded as having some intellectual value.)” I wonder, pondering this bracketted statement, not only about its own possible meaning, but also about the possible meaning of intellectual activity in general, and of intellectual value in particular.
The problem of demarcation of science, the problem of demarcation of rationality, and, for my money, the problem of demarcation of intellectual interest and of the examined life which may perhaps be worth while - this kind of activity has an extremely dangerous allure, in that the solutions it may lead to, if true, may look somewhat dictatorial. And we all think the views we hold are true or else we would not hold them. And so, I feel, first and foremost, interesting as these problems are, one prerequisite for their study, as a safety measure, may be the attention to the fact that we study them on account of our finding them interesting - that by the same token anyone may study any problem which he may find interesting, regardless of whether it fits professor Jf’s demarcation of science or professor K’s demarcation of rationality, not to mention professor Z’s demarcation of interest.
I say ‘safety measure’ with some chagrin: When Popper and Bartley speak of importance, they have something interesting in mind yet sound a trifle banal - at least to each other. Popper’s ‘Remarks’ center on the intellectual value of criticism. For me glamorous intellectual values have their honourable place in abroader context of spiritual values which likewise includes such ungla- morous items as human understanding and concern. Perhaps these values, the intellectual and the plain, must work in an interdependent fashion - for reasons I have ventured to indicate in the body of this chapter. Let this stand as my tribute to my former teacher and as my final challenge to him. My challenge, to repeat, is that he try to consider Bartley’s criticism in the manner described in his theory of the critical tradition, i.e. read it in its most forcecul reading and take it as a tribute.4
NOTES
1 The motto is from p. 137 of Vaihinger’s If]. (Square brackets refer to the bibliography at the end of this essay.) This essay was intended for the Schilpp Popper volume but withdrawn and replaced with a three page extract at Popper’s request.
2 Popper makes another dichotomy within naturalistic epistemology - between optimists and pessimists ([Conjectures], 6, 11). The optimist trend leads to liberal utopianism; the pessimist trend allows for true knowledge only by authority, this leading to authoritarian politics (for example Plato’s Laws). It seems to me clear that the proper inquisitive approach rests on a pessimistic or distrustful view combined with a restless quest or curiosity.
I suppose that this is a highly individualist philosophy which goes back to the mediaeval skeptics, who were all highly individualistic and even loners. It is no accident that they seldom studied problems of social philosophy. See my [‘Unity’], especially notes there. See also Scholem’s [Kabbalah], especially Chapter 2, for the conservatism cum radicalism of the Kabbalist.
3 A little contemplation might raise alarm as to the consistency of these remarks; they look alarmingly paradoxical. I need not say that it is impossible to judge the consistency of the view adumbrated here in its present state of fluidity and sketchiness.
4 I have been disappointed on this matter already. See note 1 above.