Conclusion

The new approach to causality that is being developed from the new mechanistic and new dispositional philosophy is proving very fertile ground and has been applied in a number of fields of the natural and social sciences.

This paper has aimed to clarify some foundational issues around causality in order to provide metaphysical support for the scientific image of the world. In it has been analyzed the concept of mechanism from the new dispositionalism (from a monist perspective) and has been demonstrated that it is possible to do so without adopting an essentialist position. In brief, it is understood that causality operates through mechanisms, which are made up of entities, and effects are produced through the interaction of the properties of these entities. Properties are disposi­tional, and they therefore have the power to affect other properties in a certain way, producing certain effects; and this is what it means causation. The metaphysics of this mechanistic and dispositionalist conception of causality leads us to natural kinds and a non-essentialist account of them.

There are still many unanswered questions regarding laws, the nature of prop­erties, dispositions and powers, natural kinds and essences. Even, the very notion of causality is understood differently by different authors. But this approach to causality is very promising and is constantly providing new contributions to some of the most fundamental philosophical issues.

Acknowledgements This article has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Research Project FFI2012-33998 and Research Project (FEDER) FFI2015-64529-P).