Conclusion
In conclusion, it is useful to point out that Agazzi does not assume an a priori point of view against artificial intelligence, but he limits its feasibility to the cases of transitive or even immanent operations based on formal rules; nevertheless, also in this case formal operations in humans and in machines are substantially different, since they are embodied into largely different systems.
Mechanical systems differ from the human mind, in which beside intentionality and consciousness, we find very complex processes, where even simple formal operations involve non logical, or non strictly cognitive aspects. In fact, such operations are expressions of a living being, of a complex cerebral system and of an even more complex mind, in which operations, including formal ones, are always interwoven with meanings and guided by specific goals. Actually, it is just the meaningfulness and teleologicity of mental processes which differentiate them from the processes of an artificial system which does neither elaborate nor generate meanings, nor intentionally proposes goals to itself; the distinctive characters of the operating of a mind are just the intentional goals and the processes which create meanings and interpret the stimuli coming from the world; this does not mean that is impossible to build always more complicated machines which allow to obtain results similar to those of human cognitive activities.Such machines could also be useful to understand some aspect of the human mind, but one cannot claim that they are intelligent like the human mind, nor that they are a reproduction of the human mind; in fact, in order to be such they should possess a biological mind like that of humans, be inside of a body like that of humans, and finally, have a life like that of humans, with all its existential, psychological, affective, emotional, relational and significant aspects: these last, the significant ones, are characteristic of subjects which possess a mind and intentionality.
However, finally, what is really interesting is not so much emulating the human mind, but building machines able to perform various very complicated tasks that the human mind cannot perform. In this way one can construct artificial minds different from the biological ones, and forms of intelligence different from the biological ones: they will pursue goals that, in Agazzi’s terminology, are certainly intentional goals of humans, and this is not transferring human intentionality to the machines, or placing in them an intentionality autonomous from that of humans. Whichever is the plausibility of such scenarios, there is also one more possibility: that the robots can autonomously develop, self-generate, self-reproduce and form their own artificial intentionality. But the analysis of the latter scenario is beyond the analysis of Agazzi’s positions, although perhaps he would not exclude it.