Conclusions: The Interest for Metaphysics Today
At the end of Scienza e metafisica oggi Agazzi proposed a reflection which is still valid, maybe even more than at that time. After having wondered why, despite the demonstrable compatibility between science and metaphysics, in fact it has been precisely scientific progress what caused the crisis of metaphysics, he answered that the reason is essentially «not theoretical, but pragmatic» (Agazzi 1975: 22), since
the increasing intellectual interest for sciences has gradually made decreasing the interest for the other intellectual activities, among which also that for philosophical research.
In its ambit, the discipline which is farthest from any empirical interest, i.e. metaphysics, was fatally destined to suffer more (Agazzi 1975: 22).Then, he asked the crucial question, which is still such also for us, that is: so standing the matter, «how could such an interest arise again nowadays?» (Agazzi 1975: 22). His answer was that
if it is true that the growing of science has led to a weakening of the interest for metaphysics, it will be a reflection on what science, after all, cannot provide us, that could once again give rise to the interest for metaphysics. It is undeniable that there exists a whole set of problems which, just due to their non-empirical nature, are not suitable to be discussed by science: they are essentially problems about how to “give a sense” to the world and the human life, that is, problems on which human beings risk their life in a way instead of another one. [...] If such problems exist, and we want to use our reason in order to understand and try to solve them, as far as we may hope to succeed in it, it is only metaphysics that can help us even today» (Agazzi 1975: 22).
I think this is true, but I would like to add a further point to reflect on. Indeed, this can be taken not only in the sense of a capability of metaphysics of going beyond science, but also in the sense of its continuity with science, i.e. as its capability of accomplishing the task of the search for the ultimate sense of reality, to which science itself tends, although it cannot get it with its own strength, even if sometimes it gives us at least a glimpse of it.
This is evident especially if we consider the problem of the sense of reality not from the point of view of its drama (which is real and important, of course), but from that of its fascination, which is also real and not less important, and is shown to us, at least to a large extent, just by science. Basing on my personal experience, I have to say that very often this approach is more convincing than the first one, above all if the goal is to build a metaphysics which could be rational and cognitive, and not merely “hermeneutic”, because in this way it is more emphasized the aspect of substantial continuity with science, despite the diversity of their objects and methods.But, of course, all that holds only under the condition that science is considered, precisely, knowledge, and, more precisely, true knowledge. If, indeed, it were a mere socially determined convention, as nowadays is maintained by the overwhelming majority of the philosophers of science, its fascination would be, in turn, a mere social product without any objective value, unable to justify the search for something “beyond” itself which could represent its ultimate ground. In this sense, it would not be so strange if some day, looking at the whole matter from a historical perspective, we had to reach the conclusion that the greatest contribution of Agazzi to the defense of the value of metaphysical knowledge has been precisely his courageous, passionate and rigorous defense of the value of scientific knowledge.