D Curiosity-Driven Science, QMB, and the Hypothesis
Despite numerous differences, there are also similarities between Curiosity- Driven Science and QMB, especially their attitudes toward the hypothesis. Both Curiosity-Driven and QMB programs mischaracterize it at times, and both admire Newton's famous put-down of it.
Moreover, both Firestein and Glass worry about scientists' fecklessness; a lack of spine that leaves scientists “in the grip of a hypothesis” or “forced” by their hypotheses to behave badly; for them, scientists are gullible patsies, intellectually timid and readily swayed by other people's hypotheses. It is a sorry picture of their colleagues, but is there any truth to it? Scientists are social animals and the forging of scientific consensus is a genuine, yet barely understood factor in determining what science “knows.”26 Still, neither Firestein nor Glass acknowledge the fact that science is very competitive or that scientists can be a contentious, contrarian lot who rarely take anyone's word for it, especially when their reputations and egos are on the line. No matter what climate change deniers claim, scientists are not simpletons marching to the beat of the loudest drum. It would be interesting if we could compare how many scientists buy into a popular hypothesis just because “everybody accepts it” to the number that disparage a popular hypothesis for the same reason.Although the Reproducibility Crisis is the focus of valid concerns in Curiosity-Driven Science and QMB, their tendency to blame hypothesis-based thinking for the problems is hard to understand, even self-defeating on statistical grounds. As we saw in Chapter 8, open-ended search modes, such as the Curiosity-Driven Science and QMB programs, are more prone to generate less- reproducible results than is hypothesis-based research.
Firestein and Glass find fault in the NIH grant review process that they also blame on hypothesis-based research without making it clear how QMB and Curiosity-Driven projects will alleviate the problems.
Why should we expect reviewers to be wiser, more consistent, objective, and reasonable, when evaluating projects driven by curiosity or open-ended questioning than when evaluating those based on hypotheses? I suspect that, along with anything else, the NIH's lack of unambiguous positions on different kinds of research causes some of the problems (Chapter 13). Applicants who don't fully appreciate what a hypothesis is or how to write a grant to test one will be at a major disadvantage in any case. An even bigger roadblock may be the absence of consistent, agency-wide standards for judging research. Regardless of the specific issues surrounding grant applications, there is no reason to oust the hypothesis from science even if it is a challenge to write and review a solid, hypothesis-based grant application.I'll end this section by considering the implication of both Firestein's and Glass's arguments that the hypothesis is particularly likely to foster cognitive bias. I'll take up the topic of bias in general in Chapters 11 and 12, and only want to note here that neither author makes a persuasive case that his preferred alternative is immune from generating bias. Both authors suggest that you can avoid bias by being open-minded, but this is like saying that nations can avoid war by not fighting. If we could ensure good behavior, we wouldn't have to worry about bad behavior. Our minds automatically interpret the world, prefer certain solutions over others, leap to conclusions, and indulge in a host of questionable cognitive processes. No doubt hypothesis users are biased at times, as are Curiosity-Driven scientists and followers of QMB. The problem is with the mind, not the method, and we have to learn to keep an eye on what our minds are up to. In fact, one clear danger is that, in pinning blame on the method—the hypothesis—we'll risk missing out on the advantages it offers.
One thing that Curiosity-Driven Science, QMB, and hypothesis-based science do have in common is a frame of reference: they all accept that empirical observations are the stuff of science. The last anti-hypothesis point of view that I will consider rejects empiricism. It is not the work of a mystic or metaphysician, but the controversial position of a theoretical physicist, David Deutsch. His plan for reconceiving the methods of science and the hypothesis is next.
10.