Footnotes to Popper*
To what extent and in what respect is science intellectually valuable? This is a controversial matter. What is hardly disputed is that what is alterable in science is of mere ephemeral value; and what is valuable in it is that which is more universal and permanent, that which is more solid and lasting.
One of the very few philosophers who oppose this accepted view is Sir Karl Popper. In his view, science is so valuable because of its open- mindedness, because any of its achievements may at any time be given up and newer achievements may be hoped for to replace the relinquished ones. Science, says Popper, is at constant war with itself, and it progresses by revolutions and internal conflicts.Popper’s philosophy is far reaching in its consequences and thus very challenging and most interesting. It should be particularly interesting to examine its claims and compare what it describes as science with the phenomenon of science, in its history and in its contemporary manifestations. In particular, it may be seen that there exists a certain degree of stability in science, and one may query how does Popper’s theory of science in flux account for the relative stability which science manifests. Possibly the observed stability refutes Popper’s theory. Possibly, the observed stability is neither a refutation of Popper’s theory nor is it explained by it. Possibly the observed stability is explained, but only with the aid of certain minor ad hoc additions to the theory. Possibly the theory of science in flux explains the relative stability in some more satisfactory manner. (These, of course, are all the possible relations between a theory and a fact.) The view which will be presented here is twofold. First, Popper himself accounts for the relative stability of science only with the aid of a few very unsatisfactory ad hoc assumptions; and this renders his theory much less exciting and attractive than it looks at first. Second, these assumptions are not necessary at all for Popper’s theory of science.
In as much as one may report an observed stability in science (rather than express wishful thinking), one may consider it from the Popperian view as some rather regrettable sluggishness. Alternatively, îöå may view it as the stability of the social institutions which administer and apply science, rather than the stability of science itself.The attitude from which the present discussion is launched is somewhat logically austere, then. Popper’s fundamental assumptions are presented as a whole theory of science, and they are examined as such. If Popper’s fundamental assumptions will not work as a complete theory, then, doubtlessly, one may try to add epicycles to Popper’s cycles and see if these help. Alternatively, one may prefer to destroy the whole machine and search for a totally new one. Although thus far this has not been found necessary, it may yet be; the addition of epicycles, however, is worse than scrapping the whole machine.
Let me, then, introduce the chief ideas of Popper’s philosophy, and discuss the additional assumptions of it later on. Had I started in a traditional manner, I would have the choice between the inductive and the deductive modes of presentation: either starting from the detailed facts on which Popper’s philosophy is based, or starting from the fundamental axioms from which it follows. Being a Popperian, I shall proceed dialectically : let me first introduce the intellectual background to the problems which Popper has attempted to solve, then his problems and his solutions, and then related problems which may be of some interest in our context.
I.