Introduction

In 1976 the philosopher Hilary Putnam wrote: „Idealism makes the success of science a miracle" (Putnam 1976). And in 1980 the philosopher Bas van Fraassen talked about the success of science as the „Ultimate Argument for realism" (van Fraassen 1980).

In this paper we try to give a better argument. The best arguments for realism is not the success of scientific theories, but the failure of so many more theories. In order to understand this we should say what we mean by „success" and „failure".

A scientific theory is successful if it helps us to reach our goals. We distinguish cognitive and practical goals. Cognitive goals are:

• useful descriptions,

• testable hypotheses,

G. Vollmer (s)

Technische Universitat Braunschweig, Braunschweig, Germany

e-mail: gerhardvollmer@gmx.de

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 165

E. Agazzi (ed.), Varieties of Scientific Realism,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_9

• satisfying explanations,

• correct predictions,

• simplifying theories,

• unifying theories.

Practical goals are:

• simplifying life,

• mastering nature,

• avoiding and evading dangers, mishappenings, disasters,

• diagnosing and healing illnesses.

These goals are not always reached. The relevant theories then are not suc­cessful: they fail. Normally we prefer successful theories. But failing theories have at least one advantage: They teach us that theories can and do fail and they provoke the question why theories fail. This is the great moment for the realist: He has an answer to this question: Whereas most other positions—constructivism, idealism, phenomenalism, positivism, solipsism, transcendentalism—have no answer, the realist does have an answer, and a simple one at that: Theories fail, because they are wrong! Or, in the realist's language, because they are simply not true!

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