Introduction
This paper sits at the intersection of two recent debates: the first concerns the contrast between so-called ‘recipe' realism and an exemplar driven form (Saatsi 2016), whereas the second has to do with the relationship between metaphysics (Callender 2011; Ladyman and Ross 2007).
In essence it represents an attempt to delineate a more moderate, ‘third' way in each debate, using the example of structural realism to give concrete form to this attempt.I shall begin by outlining ‘exemplar-driven' realism which has been offered as an alternative to the traditional, ‘recipe-based' framework. As an example of a form of realism that adheres to the latter, structural realism has been held up for criticism and I shall argue that this criticism is either unwarranted or can be accommodated. In effect, I shall suggest that structural realism can be articulated as an exemplar-driven project. However, when it comes to the relevant examples, it is
S. French (s)
School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
e-mail: s.r.d.french@leeds.ac.uk99
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E. Agazzi (ed.), Varieties of Scientific Realism,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_12 metaphysical considerations that crucially motivate the shift to structures and this takes us into the second debate.
A number of commentators have noted the apparent divergence of much of current metaphysics from modern science. Metaphysicians have been admonished for failing to pay attention to developments in modern science, especially physics, and various metaphysical devices, principles and theories have been taken to be ruled out by these developments. However, French and McKenzie (2012, 2015) have argued that metaphysics may yet have instrumental value in providing a kind of toolbox that philosophers of science can use for their own ends. In particular, I shall suggest that metaphysics offers an array of tools that the realist can deploy to help make good on the claim that science offers a view of how the world is, and not just how it could be. And in particular I shall argue that these tools can help the structural realist further articulate her position and respond to various criticisms and concerns.
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