Introduction
The discussion presented in this paper is based on the assumption that the most plausible metaphysics behind the scientific image of the world is causal realism. In large part, as Samuel Alexander argued, ‘the only reason for attributing reality to something is that it has causal powers' (Glennan 2010a, 373).
Thus, the world is constituted by events that are causally related, it is not a Humean world of independent events; causality is discussed in Aristotelian terms, rather than linguistic ones as Humean empiricists do. The aim of this contribution is, first to lay down the basic elements of a theory of causality in terms of mechanisms (within the framework of the New Mechanical Philosophy); second, to explore the ontology that underlies this conception of causality presenting arguments in support of properties, dispositions and powers; and third, to argue that such an ontology can be sustained without relying on essentialism, contrary to what most New Disposi- tionalists have held thus far.A. Gomez (s)
University of La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain e-mail: agomez@ull.es
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
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E. Agazzi (ed.), Varieties of Scientific Realism,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_20
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