Nature and Scope of the Hermeneutic Reflection

By the examination and evaluation of different forms and products of human creativity in a variety of historical and cultural epochs, hermeneutic methods and hermeneutic philosophy have shown how there is one single process of applica­tion of the universal to particulars and how experience is used in the consideration of fundamental issues confronting contemporary society. The task of the humani­ties is not only to protect and promote pluralism in the age of the globalization of information, but also to consider the possibility of intercultural dialogue in the creation of one’s own identity. In this sense, the task of hermeneutical methods is to preserve the certainty and reliability of understanding. The object of study in the humanities is not something abstract or foreign to us, but that which we neces­sarily belong to ourselves: culture and the intellectual tradition which is the fruit of the self-realization of the human spirit. In education we recognize and study the cultural goods passed down to us, and by recognizing and assimilating their inher­ent value we construct our own personality. By our conscious appropriation of cul­tural goods we become a part of the tradition which lives on in us. Without the mediation with the present, without actualization and reception, tradition begins to lose its significance. Cultural tradition comprises not only texts and artistic works, but also institutions and social forms. The intellectual wealth of a culture cannot, pictorially speaking, be passed on from generation to generation like a treasure in a chest. Cultural tradition is passed on exclusively in the dialectic remembrance, which, as exemplified in the Platonic dialogues, is developed in the finiteness and contingency of our existence in critical reflection and the cultivation of our indi­vidual and collective identity.

The advantage of the hermeneutic method is to be seen in its advocacy of a pluralistic dialogue and of the practice of tolerance in the exchange of a variety of experience with regard to the examination and evaluation of existing ethical and cultural norms, with the aim of preserving and enriching our civilization, ever­more threatened by the Moloch of a globalizing abstraction from all concrete cul­tural contents and contexts. The question of the research method is directly related to the discernment and judgment of the researchers. Cultivation is a process of education (Bildung, paideia), in which the Understanding appeals to us.

Thinkers of the hermeneutic school of philosophy, taking as their point of departure Hegel’s definition of identity as self-consciousness, confirm that iden­tity is not only in an abstract sense a fundamental philosophical concept. By self­consciousness the human individual differentiates himself from animals, because by the capacity for self-conscious reflection the human individual can rise above the experience of particulars to the formulation of general concepts and univer­sal norms. Paradoxically, it is through this process of generalization or univer­salization that it becomes possible to develop and cultivate one’s own personal and cultural identity. By the mere fact of their being born into this world, human beings are not already all that they should or could be; it is necessary to differen­tiate between the natural conditions of existence as a human being (conditiones humanae) and their natural potential. It is only by a complex and life-long educa­tion process that the individual re-creates the original characteristics by which he can approach the full expression of his integral personality.

Every individual who on the basis of the natural preconditions of his existence is able to rise to the level of rationality and intuition recreates in the educational process the existing substantiality of the cultural heritage by which his iden­tity to a certain degree is predetermined, and in which he is rooted in a specific, individual manner. The process of growth and education is at once a process of personal maturation in the course of which the individual examines and critically evaluates the preexisting cultural and humanistic heritage, as well as the set of institutionalized norms into which he was born. The wealth of tradition becomes in this process of intelligent (re-)integration and re-appropriation a part of our individuality, while whatever is not subjected to this process remains unassimi­lated and foreign to us.

John McDowell sees Aristotle’s and Hegel’s concept of a “second nature” as the basis for a “partial re-enchantment of nature” with regard to a successful inte­gration of nature, knowledge of nature, and ethics in human behavior. This pre­sents a possible alternative to predominant positivist and materialist concepts of nature, which have failed to provide a universally appealing basis for the forma­tion of sound and reliable moral judgment. The integration of nature and knowl­edge by means of “second nature” depends, however, on education, Bildung.^[141] In McDowell’s view, education completes and perfects our personality with respect to the world, which is never merely empirical, but also “Lebenswelt”. McDowell fails, however, to consider the role of the formation of judgment in this process of understanding of the lifeworld.

McDowell writes that “our nature is largely second nature, and our second nature is the way it is not just because of the potentialities we were born with, but also because of our upbringing, our Bildung. Given the notion of second nature, we can say that the way our lives are shaped by reason is natural, even while we deny that the structure of the space of reasons can be integrated into the layout of the realm of law. This is the partial re-enchantment of nature that I spoke of”.^[142] Wittgenstein’s later work contains several essential philosophical concepts, such as “forms of life” (Lebensformen), “world picture” (Weltbild), “system of rela­tionships” (Bezugssystem), but also “manner of thinking” (Denkstil), concepts which contain reference to various aspects of human identity and cultural produc­tivity. Taking into account the implications they involve, these concepts offer a wide variety of possibilities for achieving as objective a knowledge and under­standing of the “other” as possible, taken in the broadest sense from an under­standing of nature and the natural world to an understanding of other peoples and cultures, through whatever the form of communication.

Formation of judgment is rooted in preexisting cultural and historical contexts, as well as in the intentional formulation of our aims, goals, and ideals. The latter, however, does not occur in a vacuum, but is necessarily informed by education and culture, as well as by reflection on the products of culture, as cultivated by the humanities, by a creative encounter with the natural and intellectual world through technology and the arts, and by participation in and acquaintance with the findings of scientific inquiry.

The successful cultivation of judgment requires the informed and reflective encounter with higher-level manifestations of the human spirit and the study of cultural heritage which forms the specific task of the humanities.¹⁴ The cultivation of judgment is conditioned by physical preconditions, natural structures of motivation and preexisting cultural and social circumstances; it depends essentially on specific forms of encounter with manifestations of higher-level reflection in the arts, culture, humanities and philosophy, as well as on forms of creativity promoted and studied by them. Kant’s Critique of judgment demonstrates that the power of judgment is central not only to human rationality but to the understanding of the integral functioning of our natural and intellectual powers in the production of human experience, knowledge, understanding and action as a whole. Instead of advocating pluralism of interpretation, hermeneutics as a universal theory of understanding should focus on judgment consid­ering the philosophical relevance of the cultivation of judgment.