Semantic of Empirical Theories via (SDTE) and Scientific Realism

How (SDT^E) is related to SR? Introducing empirical valuations meet two objections raised against the realistic account of science based on STT. Firstly, SR + (SDT^E) can be interpreted as the view that empirical theories are about the real world and, secondly, truth accounted semantically allows to distinguish intended empirical models from other possible semantic constructions.

Moreover, (SDT) does not require any further supplement, for instance, by the idea of partial or approximate truth. (SDT) formalized the traditional conception of the absolute truth (see Wolenski 2012, 2015), because relativizations to L and M are consistent with the assertion that if A is true in M, its logical value does not change, for instance, over time. Yet this statement does not mean that cognitive subjects are omniscient, because empirical valuations depend on many circumstances and can be replaced by other. In fact, it happens notoriously. A general argument for realism as a philosophical view remains unchanged. To repeat, (UT) suggests the conclusion that since the set of truths of PA is not definable in this theory, the same concerns the definability of the class of PA-models. Hence, every empirical theory containing arithmetic, that is, every interesting empirical theory, cannot define its models. Consequently, if T is an empirical theory W cannot be defined within it. The situation will not change in the case of the theory of everything. That models exceed conceptual resources of theories constitutes the main feature of realism from the semantic point of view.

Here remains still one point related to the distinction of internal and metaphysical realism (see Putnam 1987; Gardiner 2000). According to Hilary Putnam, the latter view maintains that we have access to one ready real world. On the other hand, model theory suggests that scientific theories are not categorical.

Hence, every (interesting) empirical theory has many models and model-theoretic semantics per se does not offer resources for picking up the real world as independent of a conceptual system. In particular, STT has no relevance for the proper account of the relation between science and its subject matter (see Wolenski 2004 for criticism of this view). To sum up, the real world must be defined within conceptual systems constrained by epistemic criteria. Unfortunately, Putnam's explanations are too vague in order to be interpreted either as a kind of realism or as a species of anti-realism. According to my earlier declarations concerning the scope of this paper, I do not like to enter into discussing realism and anti-realism in general. Hence, I restrict my further remarks to few points concerning SR in the context of Putnam's distinction. SR can be interpreted as accepting metaphysical realism as well as associated with internal realism. In my terminology, T is a counterpart of a conceptual systems in Putnam's sense. M(T) is obviously dependent on T, but it is controversial issue to which extent. A more concrete solution depends on the view about the theory/observation distinction, the role of terminological convention, etc. As far as the matter concerns W, SR says only that the real world cannot be reduced to T or/and M(T). The empirical valuation function acts mostly epistemologically as linking T, M(T) and W. This construction is entirely consistent with internal realism. Recall that T has a model, if it is consistent. Thus, the existence of a model appears as a direct consequence of semantics. Semantics actually does not suffice for proving that W exists. In other words, the existence of a formal model of knowledge does not entail the existence of its material counterparts. On the other hand, epistemic constraints imposed by O are difficult to be comprehensible without assumption that W exists. Although internal realism provided a basis for a sound SR, its main defect consists in a vague mixing epistemology (cognitive access to W) ontology or metaphysics (the existence of W). SR based on STT avoids this confusion.

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Source: Agazzi E. (ed.). Varieties of Scientific Realism: Objectivity and Truth in Science. Springer,2017. — 411 pp.. 2017

Semantic of Empirical Theories via (SDTE) and Scientific Realism

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