THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AS THE HISTORY OF ITS METAPHYSICAL FRAMEWORKS
The world is full of well known yet unstudied phenomena, of often heard but seldom debated theories. Historians of science all agree that some theories - Copernicus’s, Maxwell’s - and some experiments - Oersted’s, Michelson’s - are of supreme scientific importance.
That Oersted’s experiment was of metaphysical significance is obvious in view of the supreme prestige Newton’s metaphysics enjoyed at the time. The greatest problem in physics between 1820 and 1905 was, could there be a (satisfactory) Newtonian (or semi-Newtonian) explanation of Oersted’s experiment? Study of this problem led to Newtonianism losing its interpretative power. It soon transpired that the only unrefuted satisfactory explanation of Oersted’s experiment was Maxwell’s, and it became an urgent task for Newtonians to interpret fields in accord with Newton’s metaphysics, which means - since for Newton forces are attached to matter and since Maxwell’s equations are not invariant to Galileo’s transformations - with the aid of the assumption that space is full. A scientific version of this assumption was refuted by Michelson and Morley. In 1904 Kelvin still hoped that another Newtonian or Boscovitchian interpretation of electrodynamics could be found; but though a few shared his hope no one did anything about it, especially since his misgivings about Maxwell’s theory were not shared by others. Undoubtedly, Maxwell’s theory was so significant because it was a satisfactory explanation which conformed to Faraday’s metaphysics. Undoubtedly Planck’s theory became so important in 1905 when Einstein showed its conflict with Maxwell’s theory because it seemed a major breakaway from Faraday’s program.
I do not know why the significant events in the history of science should be metaphysically significant, but I have so far found it almost always to be the case. I suggest the theory that significance with respect to (pure) science is usually significance with respect to science’s metaphysical frameworks.
It is understandable that if metaphysical frameworks are research projects they should be taken very seriously, but why should all (pure) research projects be geared to a few metaphysical doctrines? Indeed, I think most research projects are not intended, at least not consciously intended, to be relevant to the dispute between the few competing metaphysical doctrines of the day. Yet those projects viewed later as significant show a capacity to throw light on current metaphysical issue. I can see no other explanation of the situation but that it is essentially metaphysical interest which gives (purely scientific) significance to this part of science rather than to that; hence, most (pure) scientists are more interested in metaphysics than they seem to be.There are many studies which are not directly related to metaphysics. Take the continuum theory; it is the study of properties of matter, especially elasticity, on the assumption that matter is continuous. This study belongs to applied mathematics or technology rather than to pure science because it is based on a metaphysically unacceptable assumption. Its value for pure physics becomes apparent only when it is shown to throw light on an important scientific problem related to metaphysics. Indeed, since the Newtonian interpretation of the wave theory of light is the theory of the elastic ether, the rise of the wave theory caused immense efforts to be made to create any theory of elasticity whatever which might be used as a tool to render the ether theory scientific. Prior to that, the effort to develop a theory of elasticity were strictly in the Newtonian mode. We see how a significant plan of scientific research was first directly and then indirectly metaphysically relevant, and later it lost all relevance and with it all significance. Present day aerodynamics interests only few non-aeronauts, but it will interest more of them if it will reveal some bearing on existing metaphysical issues.
But what about scientific work unrelated to metaphysics? Let us take two examples.
Jenner’s study, his attempt to refute some village superstition, was highly idiosyncratic. Possibly it was connected with Bacon’s idea that superstitions are dangerous to science, and yet as hardly anyone except Jenner undertook such researches, his work may well be viewed as idiosyncratic. The device of vaccination, which resulted from his study, was for long chiefly of practical value. The mechanistic interpretation of vaccination is identical with the theory of antibodies. It is thus a metaphysical theory. In the popular literature it is often presented pseudo- scientifically. Biochemists have used it as a program and found scientific instances which conform to it; they are still searching for others. This story shows how one idea entered into the mainstream of science because it fitted a metaphysical framework.My second example is the discovery of the asteroids. It is insignificant. It refuted Hegel’s doctoral dissertation, but this was of no value in any case. It refuted Kepler’s metaphysics, but nobody had ever taken notice of this metaphysics. It agrees with Bode’s law, but this law is related to no metaphysics. The discovery is insignificant because it has no direct or indirect relevance to topical metaphysics. It may, however, become significant, if asteroids are going to play some role in a future cosmogony.