The Meaning of “Interdisciplinarity”

At this point Agazzi, facing the issue of interdisciplinarity directly, declares him­self convinced that

starting from what has been exposed above, it is clear that systems theory, information theory, cybernetics, complexity theory are subjects whose concepts, methods, and prin­ciples find direct application in many fields of scientific research, technological achieve­ments, production structures, social institutions, and the organization of various services in the contemporary civilization (Agazzi 2008: 185).

This means that they have “interdisciplinary” character. In this regard, however, for the sake of clarity he states that this is a sort of “transdisciplinarity”, that should not be confused with the “multidisciplinarity”, defined by the exterior combination of different disciplines that do not really come into interaction. As he exactly explains,

what characterizes interdisciplinary as something different compared to the simple ‘co­existence’ of various disciplines (which is often referred to as multidisciplinarity) is the fact that the interdisciplinary perspective aims to achieve a convergence, a coordination, a mutual exchange between different disciplines in order to solve a particular problem (or certain problems) of cognitive or practical nature. In this sense it is an effort of “unifica­tion” which is the opposite of the reduction (ibi: 185-6).

In other words, we are dealing with something substantially opposite to the tradi­tional approach, since

the unity we try to propose is not considered as a reduction of the complex to the simple, of the differences to the uniformity, but as the comprehension of the complexity through the coordination and the synergy of the different parts of a whole that is holistically com­prehensible, since each part contributes specifically to the operation of the whole and to the formation of its irreducible features (ibi: 186).

He insists on the close connection between this approach and the one that emerged in systems theory and complexity theory, and adds that the need for interdis­ciplinarity has to be understood also in the light of the practical need to make decisions in complex situations. Also, he points out that this approach should not be interpreted as a kind of substitute for specialization, but it should repre­sent an appropriate integration to it. If it is true that the inclination towards what Ortega y Gasset rightly called “barbarism of specialization” (Ortega 1930) is very negative, it is also true that without specialist proficiency the integration of knowledge would suffer of over-generalization. By specifying this, Agazzi appro­priately reaffirms the distinction between Interdisciplinarity, Multidisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity, and once again underlines that only the first “has the acceptance of the complexity as a prerequisite, and aims to understand it (Agazzi 2008: 188). But to be understood it needs to be based on the interaction between rigorous and precise experiences in the sense that

the needs of interdisciplinarity cannot be considered satisfiable by a suppression of spe­cialization. This is certainly a consequence of the increase of knowledge, but it is also one of its conditions, so that giving up the specialization would mean to deprive ourselves of increasingly reliable and advanced knowledge for our practical achievements, apart from giving up an increase of knowledge (ibi: 188-9).

Furthermore, an equally important aspect, “every science is provided with its own methodological criteria and inferential processes (i.e. logics)” (ibi: 189). For this reason it seems appropriate to mention, in line with what Agazzi is highlighting here, the “polilogics of complexity” (Gembillo 2008). From this originates the coherent conclusion that true interdisciplinarity

is built starting from the disciplines and respecting the seriousness and commitment of their technical investigation.

knowledge, but rather to the inability to adopt simultaneously many perspectives, many mental habits, many different methodological settings and master also the related concepts and operational methods (Agazzi 2008: 190).

Another reason is that, as discovered by Humberto Maturana, our brain develops in a certain direction, and from that direction it “looks at reality” (Maturana 1995). But since, as Goethe said, “everything has been given to man both as a treasure and as a curse”, also in our case,

all this represents undoubtedly an obstacle, but also constitutes a richness: once again, not because accepting the plurality of disciplines you know more of the real, but because you know it better, in other words it is possible to get more aspects, exploring more deeply its richness, since we are able to appreciate more adequately its complexity (Agazzi 2008: 190).

Achieving this is difficult, since “the unity of the thing does not guarantee by itself the unity of knowledge” (ibid.), because who assumes the task of understanding the complexity of the events must have an unordinary capacity of synthesis and be fully aware of the fact that

the truly interdisciplinary discourse is established when one admits that, in front of a complex problem, different optics are necessary for its comprehension, and one makes an effort to consider it under each views, comparing them and trying to see how each one contributes to the comprehension of the whole. (ibi: 191).

We could say, at the end of the short process outlined until now, that

the successful completion of interdisciplinary work is the achievement of a certain syn­thesis. This however cannot be understood as the achievement of a unique and definitive image, but rather as the overcoming of the one-sidedness of the individual views, through the awareness of their differences, their partial mutual translatability, the existence of interconnections, homologies, and analogies, that increase our comprehension of the stud­ied reality, without exhausting it.

If this is true we cannot deny that “interdisciplinary work therefore is never fully accomplished: it is reasonable to stop when one has reached the desired objectives” (ibid.). Given that all this is based on the clear recognition of the historical and tem­poral structure of each existing thing at any level, then, “claiming that this work comes to a definitive and absolute end would correspond to the pretension of being able to ultimately know the truth, which instead is an endless challenge for the human being” (ibid.). And this happens not only because the individual subject cannot pos­sess the ability to dominate all the possible points of view on reality, but because, as we have pointed out elsewhere, Reality is constantly changing and so it is never sub­ject to a “full” and complete description of it (Gembillo and Anselmo 2013).

Agazzi’s reasoning culminates ideally and theoretically with the considera­tion that what emerges from all this is the need to redefine the concept of sci­ence starting from all the objects of which it is responsible. To this purpose he takes as an example three sciences: “Cosmology, climatology, and the science of new materials, since they are significant examples of these new settings, linked to interdisciplinarity, complexity, systemic vision, that characterize the new spirit of contemporary science” (Agazzi 2008: 193). Of these three sciences I will focus only on the one that, having a longer historical tradition, allows not only for an adequate theoretical analysis, but also a concrete comparison between old and new conceptions of scientificity. I am obviously talking about that “science” that strives to understand the Cosmos.

For this purpose, Agazzi first underlines a serious limitation, wondering:

The fact that in practice modern cosmology studies the universe using as sources only cognitive theories of physics (general relativity and quantum theory) is not perhaps in contrast with the complexity that the universe obviously possess (from a certain point of view, it should be the most complex object of all)? (ibi:166).

This and many other questions of the same content imply, as we will see now, just a new idea of scientificity, which does not escape the analytical sensitivity of Evandro Agazzi.

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