The Systemic Perspective of Evandro Agazzi

In Agazzi, we find an acute diagnosis of the pathologies of Modernity, partly sim­ilar to that of other philosophers of the 20th century, as for example Habermas (1968). In general, we could speak of a sort of isolation illness, of a disconnec­tion between the different fields of life and knowledge, of a loss of balance in the search for autonomy.

We could in any case point out a further, and deeper, affinity between the thought of Evandro Agazzi and that of Jurgen Habermas, i.e. the philosophical use of the systemic theory. However, the different ways they use the same theory dis­closes very significant differences for the development of our argument. While in Agazzi, in fact, the general systems’ theory is useful to build new links between different areas of human life, links that avoid opposite poles as undesirable as hier­archy and autarchy, in Habermas the systemic logic is seen rather as a threat for the correct links between science, art, morality and the life world.

In a certain sense these differences are decisive. In fact, if Habermas’ interpre­tation of systems theory were the only possible one, then the use made by Agazzi should be reconsidered. We think, therefore, that a further interpretation of the sys­temic theory is possible, able to solve our initial problems—i.e., disconnection and colonisation—without triggering new ones.

Agazzi’s systemic perspective opens a demand for the dignity of ethics, with­out falling into easy moralism. It is the very logic of each subsystem, particularly of the techno-scientific subsystem, that indicates how one should pay attention to moral criteria:

It is necessary to take up again here the discussion on human beings and try to discover the whole scale of values that inspire their actions, recognizing that their profound free­dom consists in their possibility of self-realizing by honouring such values.

Even further, ethics itself is seen as an integral part of the system, like a subsystem amongst others, set at the same level, not so much as an alien area to be layered over the others in a dominating position. The type of rationality presupposed in all these spheres is the same, that is, the human rationality that supports action both in the scientific and the ethical system as well as in any other one. The key to the suc­cess of such an integration resides in the fact that in Agazzi there is no rigid link between systems and necessity. That means that human action, conditioned as it is by some kinds of systemic limits, remains, however, free and undetermined by any systemic automatism. It is so for what concerns techno-scientific production, as well as for moral, political, economic and aesthetic aspects.

Thus Agazzi develops decisively the general systems theory, elaborated for the first time by Bertalanffy (1968) and born in the field of cybernetics and biology. As is well known, such theory, because of its very general and abstract charac­ter, retains sufficient plasticity to make possible its application in many areas of reality. The possibility of its application also to the relations between techno-sci­ence and other fields of human life was actually suggested to Agazzi himself by a book which Jean Ladriere contributed to the UNESCO convention in 1974. In Ladriere’s prologue we read:

This book is for those - university students, professors and people interested in culture - who wish to clarify, on one hand, the complex relations between scientific knowledge and the tech­nology generated by such knowledge, and, on the other hand, the impact of science and tech­nology on culture, in particular on morality and aesthetics.

This means to affirm that such restructuring will move forward from techno-sci­ence. We are in front of the same landscape we have often described: there is an excessive breakup amongst different areas of human life, which may be potentially colonised by techno-science. The book also goes all the way back from the sphere of knowledge to the life world, with the goal of considering the impact of techno­science on the industrialised societies and on those on the way to industrialisation. Furthermore, the clear intention here was to suggest the possible use of the general systems theory as a theoretical frame to think the relationships between different fields, characterised as subsystems of the social system.

We accept, to start with, the autonomy of techno-science as a desirable value.^[175] In Ladriere’s words: “The growth of the scientific field’s autonomy means that this field has each time the necessary resources to ensure its own support [...] and growth” (1978: 46). It seems positive that techno-science frees itself by and by from rather uncontrollable external circumstances. Such a freedom could though give the idea of techno-science as a closed system, entirely free from external influence and therefore coinciding with the global system.

Some philosophers of technology (Ellul, Mumford and Winner, for instance) have insisted on the danger of a completely autonomous technological system, tending to grow independently from life styles, traditions or any other external value, including those expressed by a democratic will. Even from the sphere of the philosophy of science and technology there arose voices of criticism against an uncontrolled spreading of the scientific vision of the world, and, in general, of sci­entism. Already Kant himself recognized our need of worlds other than the scien­tific one, especially those of morality and art.

Agazzi indicates the price of such extreme solutions. In the first place, the moral field is reduced to the intimacy of individuals (becoming so a simple act of will or a fideistic act), with the consequent removal of a public rational debate on its problems. Secondly, morality is reduced to an object of scientific expla­nation (and, why not, also of technical manipulation), examined by psychology, sociology, neurophysiology and genetics. In this sense, “the 20th century—writes Agazzi (1992: 146)—has known a fundamental eclipse of this branch of philos­ophy, namely of the philosophical research that looks for the clarification of the meaning and for the proposal of guidelines for an ethical commitment”.

Not only does the moral field result so blurred, but also the natural world is colonised by artefacts, that bring also, at the same time, to positive and negative results. On the negative side, we can argue that the sacred dimension of nature is eliminated, the fine arts are bound within the dark realm of the irrational, various traditions and values are debased, religion, wisdom and everyday experience lose value, and common sense is imprisoned in the world of insignificance. As already pointed out, what is outlined here has also produced adverse reactions that are to be correctly diagnosed as symptoms. In particular, in the field of morality, Agazzi (1992: 146) recalls with satisfaction how “in recent years a certain interest for ethical problems has arisen, and this is a very significant signal, in fact it is the sign that the scientifization of the ethical field does not attain a positive result, and therefore the moral aspiration of man rises again strongly and underlines its differ­ence with respect to the scientific dimension”.

In the light of such considerations, the very systemic perspective may help us to overcome the contrasts amongst distinct and autonomous fields, without can­celling their differences nor the conditions for their specific autonomy. The main conclusion we may reach from such systemic approach is that, for pure systemic reasons, techno-science must respect in its development the values inherent to human life. This perspective, capable of rehabilitating ethics, is certainly alien to any type of moralism. As we will see, in fact, the duty of respect just mentioned does not emerge from moral reasons, but from systemic ones. We do not ask sci­entists as such to identify themselves, driven by altruism and good intentions, with the very values of the political, juridical, economic or ethical system. We are rather making clear that also the specific values of techno-science are realized thanks to the respect for the other areas of human life. This approach consists in highlighting that the colonisation of human life by techno-science could be pur­sued only at the cost of a loss of faith in techno-science itself. The excessive impo­sition of the scientific vision of the world ends up being an obstacle for scientific development itself, and the lack of social control on technological development ends up frustrating the very technological progress.

Furthermore, in line with the systemic perspective, techno-science is seen as a system of human actions. We may consider this system as a subsystem of the social one, connected with other subsystems (political, economic, educational, military, religious, ethical, mass media...). We could amplify our discussion to affirm that all these subsystems form the framework, the social environment, where techno-science is generated and operates. There are also natural subsys- tems—for example, the ecosystems and the planetary system—that constitute the other side of the setting where the techno-science subsystem lives. The exchanges of techno-science with all such subsystems are evident.

The characteristics mentioned above are also in common with many other sys­tems. The specificity of techno-science consists in its constitutive functions, that is, in the goals it pursues. According to Agazzi, science follows, in fact, two essential purposes: the development of rigorous and objective knowledge, and the diffusion of it. From his approach, technology will tend, instead, to an efficient knowledge and, at the same time, to its application directed towards innovation. Agazzi refers to these goals as “essential variables” of the system.^[176] They are essential in the sense that they must remain within the limits of a certain critical range in order for the system to function and survive. It is intuitively clear that, if techno-science stopped producing rigorous, objective and efficient knowledge, if it stopped diffusing and applying it, then it would simply have ceased to exist anything that we could rightly name “techno-scientific system”.

The failure to realize the essential functions of the system may be caused by internal tensions or external pressures. In the first case it occurs inside the system itself—we recall, in this sense, the title of one of Kuhn’s books: The essential ten­sion (Kuhn 1977). In fact, it is true that certain tensions must be maintained and are essential to the survival and functioning of the system. Let’s think, for exam­ple, of the tension between tradition and criticism, or between simplicity and pre­cision. If scientists were not educated in a certain scientific tradition, science itself would be impossible, but if criticism to this tradition was prohibited, then science would certainly come to an end. If a theory is totally imprecise, even if very sim­ple, it is useless, but if precision is acquired to the detriment of understanding and intelligibility we are not in a better position. Techno-science, therefore, is deter­mined by tensions, delicate balances, without which it could not work. At the same time these tensions imply a potential danger, from the moment that they may be shattered or lose balance in any direction.

For this reason we speak of “dynamic balances”, for which a non-catastrophic deviation may be internally compensated within the same system, as it occurs, for instance, with the homeostatic capacity manifested by living organisms. So, in historical periods when the biggest risk was the loss of a certain tradition, scien­tists have chosen to insist more on traditional values, instead of underlining those of criticism. On the contrary, in front of a risk of stagnation of a certain disci­pline, the critical aspect was encouraged. In this perspective, certain historical cases show a form of rationality that, without such interpretation, would appear incomprehensible.

It may also occur that the system suffers external pressures in addition to the internal tensions. In front of such possibility, the system may operate internal modifications or even modify its environment in order to recuperate its balance point or find a new one. Therefore, the history and philosophy of science should not ignore these external pressures if they really want to understand the techno- scientific system. But, in general, we may interpret the interaction with other subsystems in the light of the concepts of input and output. The techno-scientific system receives from the environment various types of input, like demands, sup­ports and obstacles. On the other hand, the system issues to its environment some outputs, like rigorous, objective and efficient knowledge, as well as technological applications. In principle techno-science has to satisfy social demands, earn sup­ports and reduce obstacles, with the goal of optimizing its essential variables.

We must not in any case forget that between the system and its environment there is a feedback loop, so that actions undertaken by a given subsystem cause indirect effects on the very same subsystem at the end of the cycle. In this way, for example, a loss of efficiency in knowledge production occurred in the techno- scientific system could influence negatively the economic system, and, at length, damage the financing of the techno-scientific enterprise itself. Or again: if sci­ence promotes researches contrary to socially recognized values, such as human dignity, health or safety, probably this would cause negative effects in other social subsystems, which would, in turn, react putting legal, economical or other kinds of obstacles to the scientific enterprise. These cycles are not necessarily of a vicious kind. Obviously, also virtuous ones may be created. Here too the examples, both historical and fictitious, could be multiplied at will. We prefer, anyway, to proceed in a different direction, outlining two important conclusive consequences.

In the first place, we note that, like any other system, techno-science demands a sound environment where it may be located. If, in the course of the maximiza­tion of its own essential variables, techno-science suffocated the other surround­ing subsystems, it could suffer negative consequences. Therefore scientists and technologists should tend to optimize, rather than to maximize, these variables. This means that the variables can grow only inasmuch as the functioning of the techno-science is compatible with the correct functioning of the other surround­ing subsystems. To give an example, it is clear that if we were able to experiment freely on the pain of animals and humans, we could have more rapid information on the physiology of pain. However, scientific research must, at times, accept limi­tations and controls, otherwise social lack of confidence could decree the end of science, making it impossible. Research, supported economically by the citizens’ taxes, cannot oppose openly the main social values. This would bring, actually, to legitimize forms of fiscal objection with respect to certain lines of research. If a government went crazy cutting funds for elementary education to favour research, techno-science would probably have benefits in the short term, but we would end up, in the long term, with substantial losses in the techno-science, because of the lack of generational replacement. The same may be affirmed for the relations of techno-science with many other fields.

In other words, techno-science will work out best if interconnected with other sound subsystems: with a democratic political system, a fair juridical system, a flourishing economical system, a good educational system, a healthy ecosystem, and so on, as well as with a right ethical system. Respect for values of the other subsystems, in line with the perspective we are developing here, is also useful for the very objectives of techno-science itself. Particularly, respect for ethical values and acceptance of external controls are necessary for the development of techno­science, in virtue of reasons that are not of ethical, but of systemic nature (aside from the fact that scientists and technologists, as persons, should act according to moral reasons).

Secondly, it is clear that, in spite of systemic necessity, there is in techno-sci­ence a margin, limited but real, for free decisions. The members of the techno- scientific system can actually influence intentionally other subsystems of the environment, directly or indirectly, and influence the functioning of their own system in line with their own goals, always in respect of some given limits. This means that techno-science will never be perceived as a simple instrument, as a means at the service of any intention. It is necessary, instead, to recognize that techno-science has its own goals. In consequence, its legitimate degree of auton­omy must be respected.

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