... the value of science as metaphysic belongs... with religion and art and love, with the pursuit of the beatific vision, with the Promethean madness that leads the greatest men to strive to become gods.
Perhaps the only ultimate value of human life is to be found in this Promethean madness. But it is a value that is religious, not political, or even moral.
(Russell, The Scientific Outlook, ch.
iv, ‘Scientific Metaphysics’)He who has science and art has religion.
(Goethe)
Abstract
The idea of the unity of science is the historically very important idea of total rationality and objectivity.
This idea is a utopian dream, and a rather dangerous one.
The Popperian view of rationality as a goal directed, i.e., as problem-solving, method of trial and error is a better view or rationality.
Solutions to problems offer the element of unification, and their criticisms offer the element of diversification.
The idea of the unity of science is a utopian dream, which is appealing because it has so many aspects - emotional, moral, social, methodological, epistemological, and ontological - especially, as we shall see, ontological. The idea has seldom been articulated, and almost never been examined - even superficially. On the face of it, at least, it may look as if the idea of the unity of science clashes with the idea of diversity of unique individual things; which latter idea has a great appeal too. Therefore, still on the face of it, there is much room for discussion. Both the idea of unity and the idea of diversity are by no means confined to science. People prefer to apply the idea of unity to science because they take science as synonymous with, or at least as a paradigm of, rationality. Moreover, behind the general idea of unity itself stands the idea of ratidnality. This idea of rationality, in ethics as well as in epistemology, was the idea of universalizability - of all individual phenomena in all their aspects. Furthermore, behind the idea of universalizability stands the idea of rationality again: namely, that universal laws not only cover everything, they can be proved by arguments that all rational men must accept.
Still further, behind the idea of proofs acceptable to all rational men stands the idea of the rational unity of mankind.Now this idea of utter universalizability, as it is used in the history of thought, is rather dangerous. I would contend that the dangerous element in it is precisely the theory of rationality which stands behind it: behind the idea of universalizability stands the idea that rationality is comprehensibility and comprehensibility is universalizability; hence everything is rational (i.e. universalizable). In opposition to this confident promise of complete rationality, I suggest that science is propelled not by aiming single-mindedly at universality, and not by aiming at diversity either, but by the constant conflict between these two tendencies. I further suggest that this thesis can be maintained only at the cost of replacing the old- fashioned idea of rationality as universalizability by means of proof, with' the Socratic idea of rationality as a process of conflict between universality and specificity, often rooted in conflict of ideas about universality, to wit rationality as Socratic dialectic. And insomuch as science may be viewed as a paradigm of rationality - and (considering Plato’s early dialogues seriously in this light) certainly not the paradigm - its history has to be reconstructed as that of a dialectical procedure.
Thus far the dialectic view of rationality presented here is that expressed by Popper in Chapter 24 of his Open Society; I shall now present an elaboration on it, which may be attributed collectively to Popper and his school.1 In the Open Society Popper identifies the principle of rationality with the principle of criticism of putative views, proposals, criteria, desiderata, etc.; here I shall present rationality of thought as a special case of rational action in general. Rational action is (traditionally) viewed as conduct conducive to given ends - i.e. goal directed. In intellectual discourse, the ends are called desiderata; we begin with desiderata.
Hence, rational thought is goal directed, and hence rational. (For example, a discussion within the traditional field of astronomy will at times begin with the description of phenomena to be explained, at times with difficulties stemming from empirical observations to be ironed out, at times with the aim of modifying an existing theory which is at odds with other existing theories, at times with the aim of inventing new tests of a given theory.) Whatever the situation is, we may begin with stating the agenda, the desiderata. These may be critically debated, or ideas allegedly conducive to them may be critically debated. This raises a problem: in order to criticize our standards of x, we need standards of criticism (of x); when x stands for criticism, things (seemingly, at least) get out of hand. How then, can our ideals of rational thinking - as conducive to our desiderata - be subject to critical debate? Criticism is not more fundamental than rationality, since criticism is impossible without reference to desiderata - in this case desiderata for rationality. Nor do the desiderata stand above criticism.Let us leave this difficulty now, and go back to my historical sketch.
I.