Civil Affairs Missions in Operations Other Than War
In wartime and conflict, CA supports combat forces; but in peacetime priorities are most often reversed: combat forces should support CA in civil-military operations. Whenever civil-military relations and legitimacy are essential to mission success, CA is more than a force multiplier: it is the military's link with the public support required for legitimacy.
This is evident in three categories of CA activities: combat support and post-conflict activities, continuing nation assistance and emergency nation assistance. Combat support and post-conflict activitiesCA combat support reflects the wartime primacy of force over political objectives. Its focus is on preventing civilian interference with combat operations and providing civilian support (labor and supplies) for military operations, while ensuring command compliance with legal and moral obligations to civilians. Post-conflict CA activities reflect the priorities common to operations other than war, with political objectives predominating over the use of force. They usually begin as emergency humanitarian assistance and evolve into continuing nation assistance activities.4
Provide Comfort was a post-conflict operation following Desert Storm; it began by helping the Kurds in northern Iraq through disaster relief and refugee control, and evolved into longer term humanitarian and security assistance (it would be called nation assist-ance if Kurdistan existed as a nation). Provide Comfort illustrated the value of CA expertise in achieving military legitimacy:
In this case, the military commanders conceived and planned the operation as a fundamentally civil-humanitarian operation carried out by both military forces and civilian agencies (both US and international). While the need to ensure security for the Kurds was a major consideration, military issues were never at the forefront.
The primary focus was on humanitarian assistance activities to feed, house, and care for Kurds displaced from their homes by Saddam's campaigns.... One major reason this operation was carried out more smoothly than its larger counterpart in Kuwait and southern Iraq was the availability to the European-based commanders of expert CA advice from trusted members of the team.5General Wayne A. Downing, Commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), has emphasized the importance of the CA post-conflict capability to secure the victory:
Any operation we undertake in the future will have to include civil affairs. While we have always recognized the moral and legal obligations of the commander to the civilian population, the impact of this role has grown in recent years. Such challenges as dealing with refugees and cementing military victory with a plan to create stable nations in the aftermath of war highlight the importance of civil affairs to the commander. We must not only win the war, we must win the peace. Civil affairs is a key part of this post-conflict mission.6 Continuing nation assistance
As described in Chapter 2, nation assistance includes a wide range of humanitarian and security assistance missions conducted under the auspices of the US ambassador. As noted earlier, General Joulwan has practised unity of effort by working closely with US ambassadors in USSOUTHCOM, He has recognized CA as the core of the USSOUTHCOM nation assistance capability:
... provding assistance to developing democratic governments by co-ordinating and conducting civil affairs training assistance visits; providing humanitarian and disaster relief assistance when required; and supporting the development of viable host nation counterinsurgency programs.7 Emergency assistance
Spreading primal violence has created floods of refugees across Africa, Eastern Europe, and closer to home in Haiti. Military operations such as Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, and GITMO have attempted to contain this human flood tide, and their legitimacy has depended upon the protection of human rights and the humanitarian treatment of refugees.
Refugee control and disaster relief are emergency nation assistance activities that have recently proved to have a high priority, whether or not associated with combat. Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post noted their importance, and made the unlikely comparison of refugee control to nuclear arms control:
Combatting population flight is likely to occupy global strategy in this decade much as nuclear arms control and international arms integration did in the 1980s. It should be an organizing principle of international action beyond the Cold War.... Foreign aid, trade concessions, investment strategies, and even military intervention are becoming tools to achieve this goal.8
Disaster relief is a surge form of humanitarian assistance. Mr Hoagland noted that in May 1991, 20,000 US forces were deployed to help disaster victims in Bangladesh, as well as Kurdish war refugees in Provide Comfort. He called for a new military capability to provide disaster relief, but acknowledged bureaucratic resistance:
The military forces of the world's great powers organize in peacetime for every contingency however unlikely. They are the ideal core of a new disaster relief system.... [But] Generals and international-aid bureaucrats will balk at the concept of institutionalizing the military role in relief. This is not what military units are for, they will argue. But in the post-Cold War era there could be no better rationale for keeping a significantly sized military force with global logistical capabilities.9
Civil affairs has a pre-eminent role in emergency assistance. One authority has described CA as
the only part of the military force structure prepared by doctrine, training, experience, and personnel recruitment policy to deal with these organizations [that take the lead in humanitarian relief, and whose managers]... have repeatedly commented how well they could work with US forces if they could deal with civil affairs officers instead of combat commanders.10 Changes needed in the Total Force
A CA capability for combat support and limited post-conflict activities already exists; but, as suggested by Jim Hoagland, providing a military capability for emergency and continuing nation assistance activities will require changes that will not come easily.
These changes should begin at home, where there is a need to realign the missions and capabilities of the ARNG and USAR. Domestic assistance: realigning missions and capabilitiesThe ARNG is the primary source of emergency military assistance to domestic civil authorities, and in recent years has proven indispensable to governors facing natural and man-made disasters. The military was so effective with disaster relief following Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina in 1990 and Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992 that some policymakers have argued that the primary responsibility for managing domestic disaster relief should be transferred from the Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA to the Department of Defense (DOD).11
Colonel Charles Heller has suggested that the American public would be better served if the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) in Atlanta assumed the functions of the FEMA bureaucracy:
The taxpayers would certainly be pleased that not only could the Federal Government be reduced by one bureaucracy, but also happy that defense dollars spent on the USAR would have double value by providing them with the support needed in times of national domestic emergencies.12
Even if the USARC assumed the FEMA function of co-ordinating federal resources employed during national emergencies, the individual states would still have primary responsibility for domestic emergencies. The primary state mission of the ARNG is providing military assistance to domestic authorities in civil emergencies; and unless and until federalized, the ARNG functions under the command of the state governor.
Each state has a state area command, or STARC, to provide command and control during domestic emergencies. Federal forces aften assist the ARNG through the STARC, but never come under its command. Since many of the military specialties needed during a domestic emergency are in the USAR, mobilizing the required federal forces and co-ordinating their separate chain of command with a STARC is at best unwieldy, and would continue to be so under current law even if the USARC were to replace FEMA.13
The specialized military capabilities needed by governors during domestic emergencies are similar to those needed in nation assistance, and share an emphasis on civil-military relations and military legitimacy. CA includes many of these capabilities in its 20 CA functional areas; they represent a full range of public services provided by state government, of which the STARC is a part.14
There are no CA units currently assigned to the ARNG; all are in the USAR where federal law and regulations put them effectively beyond the reach of governors.15 Each state ARNG should have a dedicated CA unit with its functional specialties aligned with its STARC to ensure both competence in the CA function areas and good civil-military relations during domestic emergencies.
The ARNG has few of the non-combat capabilities needed for its primary state mission of disaster relief and riot control since it is primarily a reserve combat force.16 Governors do not need tanks and howitzers for riot control and disaster relief; they need military personnel with the specialized skills required to assist civil authorities provide law and order and essential human services. These support and service support capabilities are found in the USAR, and include CA, military police, engineers, transportation, hospitals and legal units.17
The law also tavors the ARNG for riot control. Federal forces (active or reserve) are prohibited from providing law enforcement by the Posse Comitatus Act.18 The ARNG is not subject to these restrictions while in a state status. The contrast was evident during the 1992 Los Angeles riots: during the early stages when the California National Guard was in a state status it was able to accept 100 per cent of the mission requests received from law enforcement authorities; after it was federalized and joined by additional federal forces they could accept only 10 per cent of the mission requests.
A realignment of missions and capabilities between the USAR and ARNG is overdue, but old traditions die hard. The ARNG prefers being a combat force, but its primary mission is non-combat. Reserve combat forces fit better in the USAR since it is a federal force where training with active component units would not be complicated by governors in the chain of command. Tradition, politics and bureaucratic intransigence should not prevent realignment of mismatched missions and capabilities. These obstacles must give way to new security requirements and budgetary constraints.19 Nation assistance: diplomat warriors in an inter-agency command
As described in Chapter 2, nation assistance includes a wide range of continuing humanitarian and security assistance activities. These require diplomat warriors with a regional cultural and political orientation and linguistic ability.
Their mission requires continuous interface with indigenous civilians and their military counterparts; as part of the US forward presence they must avoid military enclaves that have produced 'ugly Americans'; their presence must emphasize military legitimacy.CA reservists can provide much of the capability for nation assistance (and forward presence) on a rotating basis.20 But civilian soldiers are no substitute for career diplomat warriors who must be the full-time component of a nation assistance capability; they provide the profesionalism and continuity required to achieve long-term US political objectives. Unfortunately, while the need for these career diplomat warriors is increasing, their numbers have decreased dramatically during recent reductions in force.
Foreign area officers are the most experienced diplomat warriors in the active component, but they are not well represented in the higher Echelons of the Department of Defense. As a result they have suffered disproportionate cuts before selective early retirement boards. These officers will be difficult and expensive to replace; they have developed fluency in language as well as political and cultural orientation to their specialty areas, all at a cost far greater than that required for combat officers. Unless priorities are adjusted quickly a valuable capability for nation assistance will be irretrievably lost.
In addition to the lack of diplomat warriors in the active component there is no inter-agency force structure for nation assistance. A good starting point for such a command would be the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) at Fort Bragg, NC, a subordinate command of USSOCOM. USACAPOC is unique in that it has integrated active and reserve component Army personnel required for civil-military operations. Most of its personnel are in the reserve component: 97 per cent of CA personnel and 87 per cent of PSYOP personnel are reservists.21
Congress mandated the creation of USSOCOM in an amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which required a new unified command to provide a capability for non-traditional (special) military operations. Ten special operations activities were identified in the Act: they include CA, PSYOP and humanitarian assistance; all emphasize military legitimacy to achieve political objectives.22
The uniqueness of USACAPOC should be its strength, but has instead been its weakness. In the competition for limited resources and missions during downsizing, USACAPOC has been degraded relative to the other Army Special Operations Forces (Special Forces, Special Forces Aviation and Rangers) which are oriented to combat and have a higher percentage of active component personnel. In the active Army force structure, combat units have a higher priority than non-combat units. While this should be the rule in warfighting, it does not apply to operations other than war.
The preference for combat within DOD is understandable, but it represents an organizational bias that is a serious obstacle to an effective capability for operations other than war. Such a military capability must be closely aligned with the Department of State (DOS) since it has the dominant role in security and humanitarian assistance. But the DOS has little presence or influence in USSOCOM and is absent in USACAPOC. The principles of military legitimacy, political objectives, unity of effort and perseverance require that DOS involvement and oversight be built into force structures tailored for nation assistance.
The commander in chief of USSOCOM, General Downing, cited the importance of inter-agency co-operation in post-conflict CA activities following both Just Cause and Desert Storm:
One of the great lessons 01 Panama was the need for mter-agency work in dealing with the manifold problems involved in returning to normalcy. One of the great success stories of KTF [Kuwait Task Force] was its work with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.23
To overcome the institutionalized resistance to inter-agency co-ordination, a CA study suggested the creation of an inter-agency committee for civil-military operations under the auspices of the National Security Council, together with 'an Executive Order covering peacetime civil-military operations and inter-agency operations at the national and regional levels.... The study noted an absence of guidelines on inter-agency activities:
There is no document that establishes overall guidelines for how civilian agencies and DOD should work together to conduct civil-military operations.24
There are endless vanations of structural arrangements to reflect a joint venture between DOD and DOS in nation assistance. Whatever the structure, there must be operational support and oversight from DOS at all levels, similar to that on country teams and joint US military assistance advisory groups (JUSMAAGs). Political advisors assigned at operational levels within a new inter-agency command could provide such support and maintain continuing liaison with DOS.
Inter-agency training is also important for unity of effort. To ensure both proficiency and compatibility in inter-agency activities, diplomat warriors should be trained alongside their foreign service counterparts at the Foreign Service Institute and other DOS facilities.25 A forward presence for nation assistance: the security assistance force
In strategically important regions where both a forward presence and nation assistance are required, the old Special Action force of the 1960s should be resurrected to provide inter-agency command and control. The concept has been retained in current doctrine by a different name, albeit one sharing the same acronym: the Security Assistance Force, or SAF. The prime virtue of the SAF is that it has no fixed shape; it can be tailored to the unique needs of any region.26