Leadership Training in Military Legitimacy
The diplomat warriors of CA and military lawyers are not the only officers who must understand the concept of military legitimacy. Leadership training in the requirements and principles of military legitimacy must be provided to all military leaders involved in civil-military operations.
Major General Edwin J. Arnold, Jr., commander of the 10th Mountain Division (LI) during Restore Hope, has advocated training for senior leaders and staff which emphasizes ROE and cultural issues which... focus on such requirements as negotiations, UN operations, integration of all services and coalition forces, inter-agency operations, and operating with non-governmental organizations.41
Training in military legitimacy should be an element of leadership training from ROTC through senior service schools. The diplomat warrior model of leadership and principles of operations other than war should be taught along with the principles of warfighting, and legitimacy emphasized as an integral part of instruction in military law and justice. Unfortunately, the concept of legitimacy is not included in ROTC training and the quality of instruction in military law is not what it should be.
West Point provides the ideal venue for legal instruction. Each cadet receives over 50 hours of legal instruction provided by a faculty of 15 of the brightest military lawyers in the Army, By way of contrast only 17 hours of instruction in military law and justice are required in ROTC during the entire four-year curriculum, and there are no military lawyers assigned to any ROTC detachment. Army ROTC is the largest of all pre-commissioning programs, but an Army regulation that requires that military lawyers teach military justice to officer candidates has never been applied to ROTC.42
A prototype ROTC Legal Instruction Project co-sponsored by the Department of Law at West Point, Cadet Command, and the Army Judge Advocate General's School has introduced the concept of military legitimacy as part of an expanded curriculum on military law and justice.43 The project represents both a foundation for Army officer training on military legitimacy, and an opportunity to reduce the disparity between the quality of legal instruction provided to ROTC cadets and cadets at West Point.
Funding constraints have stalled the project. Its implementation would require USAR military lawyers teaching at over 300 ROTC detachments across the country. There is no shortage of reserve component JA officers to teach ROTC, but for reasons unknown, no reservists other than Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) officers on extended active duty have been assigned to teach at ROTC detachments.
In a time when reservists should be assuming as many active component functions as possible, they should be teaching ROTC cadets; after all, the 'R' in ROTC stands for Reserve. This should not be limited to lawyers - there are many qualified instructors in the USAR and ARNG that could teach ROTC courses.44 But it is especially important that military lawyers teach military law to officer candidates - not only to comply with Army regulations, but also to ensure that future Army leadership understands both the law and legitimacy.45
At more senior levels, leadership training should address more complex issues of legitimacy in operations other than war. The Commandant of the Army War College has emphasized the need for training in negotiation skills and rules of engagement, topics well suited for military lawyers.46 The inter-agency dimension of operations other than war also requires that civil-military relations be better understood as a command responsibility, along with CA roles and missions. Currently there is little understanding of CA within DOD, the inter-agency arena, and in the field.47
General Arnold's experience in Somalia convinced him of the relevance of civil-military relations to mission planning and execution. His command worked among and through Somali social structures, which included 21 clans and sub-clans. Civil affairs teams and other soldiers used diplomacy and negotiating skills to deal with the many different, and sometimes hostile, clans and elders in each village.48
Civil-military operations centers were established to achieve unity of effort between military and non-governmental organizations in different sectors of Somalia.
Inter-agency relations with the State Department and the UN command authority (UNOSOM) required a close working relationship with the Ambassador, but there were inadequate State Department personnel in country to do the embassy's work. The shortage of CA personnel required combat leaders to fill diplomatic positions in the humanitarian relief sector.49General Arnold concluded that it is not practical to rely on limited CA forces in operations other than war. He has advocated special training for combat leaders to prepare them for CA missions, and elaborated on the topics that should be included in staff and leadership training:
We should consider adding to that training topics such as coalition warfare, negotiations, civil disarmament, extensive urban operations, operating with non-governmental organizations, interagency operations, co-ordinating with State Department and UN personnel, and dealing with the complexity brought about by operations other than war.50
Since it may be unrealistic for commanders to expect CA units or even CA staff support whenever needed, it is especially important that senior officers understand the requirements and principles of military legitimacy as they relate to civil-military relations. In short, they must become diplomat warriors.