Polypolitanism

An Approach to Immigration Policy to Support a Just Political Economy

DANIELLE ALLEN

Introduction: Justice by Means of Democracy

In my book Justice by Means of Democracy, I argue that a rightly constructed theory of justice will start from the premise that political equality is non- sacrificeable.

If human flourishing rests on political equality, then it also depends on an ideal of non-domination. Political equality is achieved when no individual or group can dominate any other individual or group within the polity, where domination is defined as having arbitrary reserve control over others.³ The ideal political institutions of a liberal, rights-protective democracy are de­signed so as to hedge against any given member of the polity dominating any other, or any group another group, but political institutions themselves are insufficient to ward off the emergence of domination.

To pursue the application of a principle of difference without domination in the social realm, I have commended the ideal of a connected society as a guide to social policy.⁶ A connected society supports cosmopolitan bonding relationships—forms of in-group relationship that also cultivate openness to connections across lines of social division. A connected society also de­signs institutions—both private and public—to maximize the formation of bridging social ties. Support of this kind for the emergence of bridging social networks, on top of healthy bonding networks, leads to forms of social policy that, I posit, are most likely to succeed in advancing the principle of differ­ence without domination.

What sort of political economy embodies the principle of difference with­out domination? What sort of political economy might be built on a theory ofjustice that treats political equality as non-sacrificeable? The goal of polit­ical economy, on this account of justice, is to build empowering economies— economies that empower the citizenry broadly to succeed as civic agents.

With regard to the economic realm, I similarly argue that the goal is to ascertain how to build nonexploitative and empowering economies. Exploita­tion is that act of profiting from vulnerabilities that characterize those in the weaker position in a relationship of domination. An economy will be nonex- ploitative, in other words, when it is also free from relations of domination. The largest problem of exploitation that comes into view when one considers the contemporary economy of the US is the large dependence of the economy on undocumented workers who have little access to civil and political rights. In other words, the social phenomenon that most urgently requires our atten­tion as part of an effort to build a just political economy is immigration.

Ascertaining how to build nonexploitative and empowering economies for a citizenry of political equals turns out to require, as a foundational matter, a just immigration policy.⁹ My goal in this chapter is to outline an approach to immigration policy that is compatible with the principle of difference with­out domination. I will make the case that we need a new conceptualization of political membership.

To pursue such a fresh conceptualization of political membership, I will begin by looking at the relationship between the ideal of an empowering economy in a domestic nation-state context and questions of membership. This will be followed by a look at the relationship between the structure of the global economy and the world's rules for political membership. After we have considered the history of these relationships and what we can learn from them about the puzzles to be solved in building an empowering and nonex- ploitative economies, I will consider one recent proposal for adjusting global immigration and membership rules, the Visas between Individuals Program (VIP). Proffered by economist Glen Weyl and legal theorist Eric Posner in their book Radical Markets, this idea for adjusting membership rules has as its goal not the cultivation of empowering economies but the achievement of global distributive justice. While they have since moved beyond this policy, the VIP proposal usefully clarifies the logical conclusions of some quite com­mon utilitarian and distributive justice views and therefore continues to be relevant for clarifying the conceptual choices in front of us.

Empowering Economies, Difference without

Domination, and Immigration

Immigration policy is fundamentally about questions of membership. Who gets to belong to a particular society? Most importantly, who gets to be a citi­zen? Who gets access to this vaunted political equality that, I am arguing, is the foundation of full justice? Issues of migration, immigration, and natural­ization are clearly political questions. Beyond that, they might seem at first glance to be social, not economic, questions. But this is incorrect.

Above I argued that a framework for social policy that accords with the principle of difference without domination will focus on building a con­nected society, one that supports cosmopolitan bonding relationships (to repeat: in-group relationships that also cultivate openness to connections across lines of social division) and where private and public institutions are designed to maximize the formation of bridging social ties. These princi­ples pertain regardless of what the democracy's membership policies are. In fact, in an essay, “Toward a Connected Society,” I outlined the features of a connected society without once considering the question of who can be a member and how membership is determined in that kind of society. Regard­less of who the members are—to what degree they are native-born or im­migrants, speakers of a dominant or minority language—the principles of a connected society are the same.

The same cannot be said of the economic realm. Here the question of who gets to be a member of which polity and on which terms is, perhaps, the first economic fact. Since property rights, for instance, are anchored by the legal regimes of particular political communities, membership in a specific politi­cal community (or lack thereof) even precedes property. Relatedly, the mobil­ity of labor, a constitutive element of the global economy, is fully dependent on immigration and membership policies. The question of what sorts of im­migration and membership policies we build will constrain the possible set of political economies. As we turn from the application of the principle of difference without domination in the social realm to the economic realm, the question of membership in the polity—of who has visiting, residential, and/ or national political rights—becomes distinctively salient. The allocation of membership within particular national polities is one of the building blocks of the global economy and therefore of the economy of any particular polity. Questions ofjust approaches to migration, immigration, and membership are a necessary way station on the path to envisioning a just political economy.

The effort to envision forms of political economy that align with the principle of difference without domination intersects with the question of membership in political communities in three ways. First, there is the fact that previous efforts to build empowering and egalitarian economies have often not only failed to align with the principle of difference without domi­nation but have actually proactively used domination as a tool to support the construction of an empowering economy for a privileged group of people classed as citizens. Second, in our current world, the opportunity to migrate presents would-be migrants with a meaningful chance to improve their own economic and social prospects, but the asymmetry between the human right to freedom of movement, as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Hu­man Rights, and the absence of a right to be received in any particular place (except in the case of refugees) sets up potential conditions for exploitation. Third, the world's membership and migration policies structure the world's labor market and therefore structure the potential of both global and na­tional economies for growth, efficient operation, and equitable distribution of the gains of productivity. Not only migrants themselves but also receiving societies stand to benefit materially from labor mobility (even if some spe­cific members of the receiving societies might lose out). In other words, the material bases of an empowering economy are affected by the world's mem­bership and migration policies. If we are to maximize the power of the global economy to deliver to the world's peoples the material bases for civic agency, we need approaches to membership that make it possible for the workers of the world to move. Yet the coupling of the material benefits of migration to both migrants and receiving societies with the asymmetry between rights to move and rights to be received further entrenches the vulnerability of would-be migrants to exploitation. By organizing the world's labor market, the world's membership policies structure the potential of both global and national economies for growth, efficient operation, and equitable distribu­tion of the gains of productivity and simultaneously establish patterns of power and vulnerability for the world's populations.

How historically has the goal of an economy that empowers a body of citizen-equals been linked through membership policies to the problem of exploitation? How do frameworks of membership structure the economy and patterns of power and vulnerability? Understanding these two things will help us develop parameters for an empowering economy that accords with the principle of difference without domination.

Empowering Economies and the Historical Problem of Exploitation

As I said above, political economies directed toward the empowerment of the citizenry are not new. Both Aristotle and the founders of the United States thought that a “middling” or “middle-class” economy was the neces­sary foundation for a polity of free and equal citizens. In ultimately seeking an end to enslavement, Lincoln pursued an empowering economy that also ruled out the most extreme forms of domination in labor relations and made a commitment to “free labor” a precompetitive feature of market societies. Importantly, in deciding to fight enslavement, Lincoln sought to replace the founding generation's model for a political economy of empowerment. The founders of the early American republic did indeed seek to ground political equality on economic egalitarianism. For instance, the Georgia land lottery gave land out to white men, widows, and orphans in equally sized plots via a random process.¹¹ Yet the land lottery was, of course, not open to the enslaved population. Even more fundamental, the land that was being given away had been expropriated from Native Americans. In other words, an empower­ing economic egalitarianism was created by virtue of designating a subset of people as existing outside the circle of political inclusion.¹² Indigenous Americans had access to none of the tools economist Albert Hirschman con­sidered necessary for both freedom and a well-functioning economy: exit, voice, or influence through loyalty.¹³

Historical versions of the commitment to a theory of justice grounded in the non-sacrificeability of political equality have typically relied, for their conceptual and practical success, on exploitation of those outside the penum­bra of protection. This is a philosophical error that requires correction. The correction we need is the one Lincoln offered—namely, the recognition that democracy should be defined by the following moral orientation: “As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master.” The example of the Georgia land lottery brings into view that a twenty-first-century effort to ground a theory ofjustice on the non-sacrificeability of political equality within a polity also has the burden of explaining how an economic order can be constructed that supports a domestic project of political equality without making the exclu­sion of others from access to political equality a necessary condition of its own success. This is the twenty-first-century equivalent to the nineteenth­century injunction to imagine an economy without enslavement.

Why should we care whether a domestic project of protecting political equality and of securing an empowering economy exploits the lack of access of others to political equality? The ground for our own pursuit of political equality is a recognition of its value to human flourishing generally. This general applicability of the value of political equality is the reason we should respect its importance for those outside our own domestic project as well as for those protected by the penumbra of our domestic commitments. Such respect need not come in the form of bringing about political equality for others. We cannot wave a magic wand and transform every person on the globe into a citizen in a well-functioning democracy. Indeed, not only can we not do so; we should not do so. Political equality is not something that some can create for others; democratic agency must be made by its own agents for themselves. It would be a violation of the principles defining this account of how to achieve justice through democracy to force others to be free, for in­stance at the tip of a spear.¹⁴ The questions of how to structure membership in national polities to support the project ofjustice is more complicated than the democratizing invasions of various imperial armies (including those of the US) have seemed to suggest. Instead, respect for the value of political equality to human beings generally entails refusing to take advantage of the vulnerabilities that accrue to those who do not have access to political voice and influence.

The membership policies of the world's countries create vulnerabilities by differentially distributing political equality. Some countries offer politi­cal equality to some residents but not others; some countries offer political equality to only a very few residents. Some people have access to voice and influence because of the membership status into which they were born; mil­lions are stateless and have no access to voice and influence at all. Of course, economic inequalities within any given country also affect who has genuine access to voice and influence, but membership policies are prior even to this. The question of how the globe arranges its membership policies will affect the degree of vulnerability we are morally obliged to avoid taking advantage of. As those of us in the protected space of democracies seek to build empow­ering economies, our work is less likely to slip into injustice to the degree that vulnerabilities of others stemming from the lack of access to political equality are minimized. We ought therefore to seek this minimization in or­der to protect ourselves from slipping into acts of injustice. Our moral ques­tion is this: How can we avoid treating other parts of the globe as the found­ers treated Indigenous Americans?

Before we can explore how to build empowering and nonexploitative economies, then, we need to ascertain how to build membership policies for the globe's states that simultaneously, and in relation to each other, maxi­mize the potential of labor to move, for the migrants' own sake as well as for the sake of the economies of receiving societies, while minimizing the vulnerability of the world's populations to exclusion from political equality. Here, then, are the first rudiments of a just system of membership for the world's states and for a just political economy focused on the development of economies that are simultaneously empowering and nonexploitative:

1. the global membership system should maximize thefreedom of labor to move;

2. while minimizing the vulnerability of the world's populations to exclusionfrom political equality.

How do frameworks of membership structure the economy and patterns of power and vulnerability? We need a full understanding of this question if we are to develop a political economy that accords with the above criteria.

How Frameworks of Membership Structure the Economy

The world has never seen an economy dis-embedded from social relations, nor is such a thing imaginable.¹⁵ The world's global economy is embedded not only in the political systems of particular nation-states but also in a global system structured above all by rules about membership, migration, and im­migration. Those rules of membership typically flow from underlying para­digms for belonging—the two dominant ones have been nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

In Radical Markets, Weyl and Posner offer a very helpful review of the inter­twining history of capitalism and migration from the eighteenth century to the present; through their review we can also see the intertwining histories of nationalist and cosmopolitan concepts.

In the late eighteenth century the protectionist mercantilism of the early modern European sovereigns gave way to policies of free international trade advocated by thinkers like Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith, and David Hume. These political philosophers argued that free exchange across borders—of goods, capital, and credit—would maximize the total welfare delivered by an economy to the citizens of any given nation.

Importantly, migration was not a focus of the work of the eighteenth­century free marketeers, largely because migration just did not matter that much at this point in time. Despite the age of exploration and the significant movements of people effected by the transatlantic enslavement trade, “per­sistent differences in mass living standards across countries were unknown until the late nineteenth century” (Weyl and Eric Posner 2018, 133). As Weyl and Posner put it, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the most extreme gaps in prosperity, as between China and the United Kingdom, “were only a factor of 3,” while by the 1950s the gap had reached a factor of 10. They combine several historical datasets on global inequality and show a remarkable transformation in the period between 1820 and 2011. Most impor­tantly, income inequality across countries “increased from about 7% in 1820 to about 70% in 1980”; since 1980, the degree of inequality has shrunk some­what, thanks to growth in China and India, but is still at about 50 percent. At the same time, average within-country income inequality has held relatively steady and even shown a slight decline. That decline reflects both increases of inequality in wealthy countries and decreases of inequality in developing countries. The combination of the dramatic increases in between country inequality and the modest decrease of within-country inequality means that on the whole global inequality is far greater now than it was in the early nine­teenth century. In other words, people's standard of living varies significantly with the accident of where they were born. The consequence of these eco­nomic facts is, as Weyl and Posner argue, that the world of Bentham, Smith, and Hume was one “in which migration did most people little good” while “ours is one in which migration can be a primary route to well-being and prosperity for most people in the world” (Weyl and Eric Posner 2018, 135).

Whereas the early theorists of capital argued for the free movement of goods and capital, they made no equivalent case for the free movement of people. This was not because they were against such free movement but sim­ply because migration was not relevant to maximizing the efficiency of the globe's economy in the late eighteenth century. That has changed in the in­tervening centuries. And as it has changed, the globe's countries have also become more controlling of migration. Migration was relatively unrestricted until the early twentieth century. Then the wealthy countries of the world began to close their doors to migrants, doing so just when migration had begun to matter from the point of view of maximizing the capacity of the global economy to deliver welfare to all the world's peoples (Weyl and Posner, 137). Over the course of the twentieth century and into the early twenty-first century, as the globe marched forward breaking down residual forms of trade protectionism and mercantilist economic policy, capital was set free to flow across the globe in the direction of its maximally efficient allocation. For the most part, labor was not similarly enabled to travel. Those with higher levels of education have been able to move freely, but less well-educated workers have not shared that same mobility.

Where experiments were made, as in the European Union, which permit­ted free movement of the citizens of member states within the boundaries of the EU, the asymmetrical flows of people from poorer countries, such as Poland, to wealthier ones, such as the United Kingdom, generated forms of backlash to the necessarily ensuing cultural hybridization. In other words, the EU experiment discovered that different kinds of friction attach to the movement of peoples than to the movement of capital. The frictions are not a matter of interest rates or the availability of viable investment vehicles. Instead, they consist of matters of language, culture, and religion—the bases for collaboration. The well-functioning of human beings depends not merely on each individual's competencies and resources but also on the capacity of communities to build healthy patterns of interaction. Cultural connection and integration are necessary for the successful movement of people; the frictions attached to the movement of labor need to be addressed as part of thinking about how to maximize the productive potential of the world's labor markets. Yet the resistance to the free movement of ordinary workers means that the gains from freely moving capital go largely to the owners of capital, and the growth of a globalizing world has been captured by wealth elites rather than being “widely shared” (Weyl and Posner,140).

In addition to pointing out that methods of globalization have freed goods and capital to flow to where they can best be put to use without having similarly freed labor and that these methods have consequently resulted in unequal gains in the global economy, Weyl and Posner also underscore the consensus among economists that nearly all of the benefit to be had from lib­eralizing trade and capital flows has already accrued. At this point, the single component of the global economy with the biggest potential for positive im­pact on the distribution of wealth and the material bases for welfare around the world is migration policy. In short, membership policies—in the form of restrictive immigration policies in the early part of the twentieth century; European experimentation with liberalization of membership in the late twentieth century; and European retrenchment in the twenty-first century— are currently the most important constitutive element for adjustments to the functioning of the world's economy. Since no national economy can now operate without attention to its place within a global economy, the question of what just and empowering economic policy might be at home depends on each country's approach to migration and membership and the world's resulting aggregate framework. This story of restrictive immigration poli­cies, experimentation with openness, and retrenchment reflects an underly­ing dialectical argument between nationalist and cosmopolitan concepts for thinking about membership. The former dominates the current structure of the global economy, but both are relevant to understanding its operations.

Thanks to the Treaty of Versailles and its articulation of principles of national self-determination, later reinforced through the United Nations, a concept of a culturally unified people that determines a life-form for it­self undergirds common contemporary expectations for how membership in a polity will operate. The nationalist concept of membership is therefore frequently "ethnonationalist." Immigration poses a challenge by definition because it very often entails the arrival within national borders of people without a historic or cultural connection to "the people" who define and "de­termine" the polity at issue. The settler societies—the United States, Austra­lia, and Canada—have always been the exception to this model, as countries where immigrants overran Indigenous populations and therewith oblit­erated any stable concept of a cultural basis for membership. While these countries have themselves seen episodic efforts to establish a cultural ba­sis for membership—and the US is living through such an effort now—the thoroughgoing hybridity of the population makes this an impossible task. Nonetheless, these countries, too, have sought significant immigration re­strictions, reinforcing by practice, if not by ideology, the dominant pattern in the globe of nationalist, and even ethnonationalist, models of member­ship. Importantly, these nationalist models of membership restrict the ca­pacity of the globe's political economy to maximize material welfare for all the peoples of the earth. The protection of the nationalist ideal depends on relegating some populations around the globe to deeper forms of poverty than is, strictly speaking, economically necessary. With restrictive member­ship policies, the effort to pursue an empowering economy in any developed country means that the benefits of internal egalitarianism rest on exploi­tation of peoples outside the borders of the country, much as was the case when the economic egalitarianism of the early American republic rested on the exploitation of native peoples.

This picture of the relationship between membership policies and politi­cal economy has, of course, also generated an extreme position at the other end of the ideological spectrum: a cosmopolitan ideal of membership. On this ideal, the gains to distributive justice to be had from allowing the free movement of peoples mean that all the countries of the world should have open borders. With labor able to move freely, the globe's economy would generate maximally fertile conditions for material welfare, and the wealth produced would be distributed in a maximally egalitarian fashion. This is a utopian picture of the relationship between membership policies and eco­nomic policy. It treats the phenomenon of human movement as on the same footing as the movement of capital, as if people and capital can move with equivalent degrees of frictionlessness. But the cosmopolitan vision for how to maximize distributive justice founders on the unwillingness of popula­tions in any given society to admit any and every one to membership in their society accordingly as arriving migrants see fit. Nor is this unwilling­ness altogether reprehensible. Social cohesion reduces the transaction costs within an economy and so is also a contributor to productivity. If we increase the movement of labor for the sake of economic growth, we should avoid doing so in ways that simultaneously undermine growth by increasing the friction of within-economy transactions. The cosmopolitan ideal founders because it fails to address the frictions that necessarily attend the movement of peoples and that introduce additional transaction costs to the functioning of an economy.

The nationalist model of membership entails members' of wealthy coun­tries securing their material good by exploitation and at the expense of those in other countries. The cosmopolitan model of membership entails members of less well-off countries improving their material well-being at the expense of the viability of the political and social institutions of receiving countries. The flaws of the nationalist model lead us to ask how to build membership policies that do not build a domestic egalitarian empowering economy on the exposure to domination and exploitation of those not included within the penumbra of political membership. The flaws of the cosmopolitan model lead us to ask how to minimize the specific kinds of friction that attend the movement of people and the harms that may be done by those frictions to those who have “high functioning” political and social institutions.¹⁶ The former correction requires finding a path to free movement of labor coupled with access to political voice; the latter correction requires finding methods for reducing the frictions attendant on movement. We can modestly adapt our framework for a just political economy that cultivates economies that are simultaneously empowering and nonexploitative:

The global membership system should maximize thefreedom of labor to move by means of aframework that:

a. Minimizes the vulnerability of the world's populations to exclusionfrom political equality.

b. Reduces the frictions attendant on migration.

The first prong proposes a correction to nationalist and ethnonationalist approaches to immigration and membership; the second, a corrective to cosmopolitanism.

A Modest Proposal: The Visas between Individuals Program

Before I turn to my own proposal for an approach to immigration that aligns with the criteria sketched above, I want to review one recent policy idea that attempted to free labor to move (counter to the nationalist paradigm) while also reducing the frictions of movement (counter to the cosmopolitan para­digm) and that sought to do so in the interest of securing global distribu­tive justice. I have in mind a proposal mooted by Weyl and Posner called the Visas between Individuals Program (VIP). Although their arguments have now evolved beyond this formulation, the proposal is useful for bringing to the surface the consequences of attending only to the material benefits of immigration, via a focus on distributive justice, without also attending to protections for political equality.

The VIP policy proposes a market-based policy designed to minimize the frictions of migration by aligning the incentives of migrants and native-born citizens through market transactions.¹⁷ The objective of this proposal is to unlock global economic growth in a fashion that will bring more equitable distribution of the material benefits of growth across the world's popula­tions. The VIP proposal is that citizens of wealthy countries ought to be per­mitted to sponsor workers of their choice from elsewhere in the world, much as companies are currently often able to sponsor highly skilled workers. Any individual citizen would be able to sponsor one worker at a time and either a “rotating cast of temporary guest workers” or “one permanent migrant over a lifetime.”¹⁸ Sponsorship would include securing housing, health care, and employment for the migrant and a commitment to pay the migrant some specific amount, set at a level that sponsors could expect to earn money ei­ther by having the migrant work for them in some fashion or by finding the migrant employment at a higher wage rate and pocketing the difference. For this to work, on the VIP proposal, migrants are permitted to work for less than the country's minimum wage, though all other worker protection laws and regulations would cover migrants. Sponsors would themselves be civ­illy liable should the migrant they are sponsoring commit a crime of any kind or abscond from their designated residence. Nor would migrants auto­matically receive any commitment to permanent residence in the receiving country. The VIP proposal optimistically conjures up a scene in which, after a period of enhanced earnings in the receiving country, migrants will want to go home and help reboot the economies of their home countries.¹⁹

The goal of the VIP program is to turn migration into something that ben­efits a receiving country's native citizens. Native-born, low-skilled workers in a wealthy country might find themselves displaced by a migrant willing to work for less, but they could sponsor that same migrant by being a manager of the workers who take their place. By turning migration into something that could economically benefit non-elites in the native population, the VIP program is designed to take the sting out of the cultural impact of the arrival of those who speak different languages, eat different foods, worship different gods, and sing different songs. Nationalism and cosmopolitanism are rec­onciled, or such is the aspiration, in the cause of global distributive justice.

In originally presenting the VIP policy idea, Weyl and Posner acknowl­edged that their program might seem objectionable, at first blush, on the grounds that it is rather like a program of indentured servitude. They sought to ward off this objection by asserting that “migrants would be free to leave at any time” and that the program is analogous both to the programs by which companies bring in high-skilled workers and programs by which fami­lies bring in au pairs. But in fact, neither assertion helps the case. Someone earning below minimum wage is unlikely to be in a position to travel back to their home country and will in most cases be at the mercy of their sponsor if they wish to secure exit.²⁰ In addition, an important requirement of the programs in the US in which corporations sponsor highly skilled workers is that these workers be paid at the prevailing wage. The VIP policy explicitly depends on abandoning such a requirement. And programs for au pairs have recently come under great scrutiny because they are rife with exploitation.²¹

Indeed, another analogous practice of migrant sponsorship—namely, sex trafficking—crystallizes the inadequacies of the proposal. The VIP policy does not include sponsorship of migrants into illegal work and therefore ex­plicitly rules out such forms of “migrant sponsorship” as are represented by sex trafficking. Nonetheless, features of the program bear important similari­ties to sex trafficking. The migrants will be dependent on their sponsor for any access to their rights; and their economic power within the receiving country will be limited in ways that undermine any meaningful access to exit or voice. The VIP policy rests on an account of how the economy of the world will be better off, using this model, with increased productivity and gains shared between citizens in wealthy and poorer countries. But the migrant workers would be vulnerable to exploitation to such a degree that we should expect that gains projected to accrue to them are likely to be captured by sponsors and others in the receiving country. Since their gains would be at the mercy of the good faith behavior of their sponsor, they would be exposed to the arbitrary power of their sponsor day in and day out, and so would be subjected to domination. In addition to the likely capture of their material gains by those in a position to dominate them, we would have to add into the balance of an assessment of such a program the psychological and social costs to them of an ongoing experience of domination. The productivity ex­pected from this mode of free movement of labor would be undercut by the hindrances to productivity introduced by domination.

This is not to say that indentured servants have never flourished. Surely, some did or currently do in those parts of the world where indentured servi­tude still operates. But it is to say that any broad economic gains that arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth century from indentured servitude are unlikely to have been distributed equally or equitably.²² Moreover, the mon­etary gains achieved through this approach to productivity growth are offset by the psychological and social costs of domination. These are real and mea­surable as demonstrated by measurement of the reverse by Richard Wilkin­son and Kate Pickett in The Spirit Level. The VIP policy is not a solution to the question of how to organize membership in the world's polities with a view to promoting empowering economies in accord with the principle of difference without domination and a standard of justice. It does, however, help bring into focus how market mechanisms can help reduce the relevant kinds of frictions and transaction costs associated with the free movement of labor.

Weyl and Posner called their program the VIP plan. We might call it, more loosely, a free market approach to membership. In their model, the boundar­ies of membership would adjust wherever a free market transaction leads to a stable relationship between a sponsor and a migrant. The boundaries of polities—and of who is inside each one of them, whether as a citizen or not—would continually shift as market forces move labor around the world. Yet just as the nationalist and cosmopolitan views were each compromised by a form of exploitation, the VIP model, too, was so compromised, in this case by the exposure of migrants to domination by sponsors.²³ The value of their model was to identify the dynamics of a global labor market and free market transactions as elements of a system of membership that might help us toward nonexploitative economies, but they failed to adjust their model to protect against the domination of migrants.

Taking what is positive and seeking to avoid what is negative in the VIP program, we can make another adjustment to our criteria for a policy that might build empowering economies in accord with the principle of differ­ence without domination:

1. The global membership system should maximize thefreedom of labor to move by means of aframework that:

a. Creates incentivesfor host citizens to welcome migrants and migrant inte­gration, and thereby avoids an increase to transaction costs in the receiving economy.

b. Ensures that migrants have access to political equality within receiving countries.

An Alternative: Polypolitanism

A viable membership policy, I suggest, will be one that provides migrants ac­cess to the protections of political equality while simultaneously maximizing the value of the liberalization of labor markets. That is, any liberalization of labor markets must be constrained by the requirements that migrating la­borers have access to political equality and that the receiving country be able to integrate immigrants. How might that be done?

I have been arguing that the set of just polities that can sustain human well-being across all of its dimensions include only those forms of politi­cal arrangement that provide access to political empowerment in relation to polity-level decision-making. This might seem to lead to the requirement that every resident in a polity have access to citizenship rights to provide that access to political empowerment. Indeed, historian of political thought, Richard Tuck, argues for just this position, and he connects it to a defense of restrictive immigration policies. Yet against this position, I will argue that the range of political arrangements that can provide protection of political empowerment is broader than is typically recognized. While provision of citizenship to residents in a polity is the fundamental means of providing access to political empowerment, it is not the only means. Here is where we run into, and must adjust, the rigidity of our expectations with regard to membership policies. Our cultural horizons have been trained for so long on a nationalist framework that we can scarcely imagine political equality out­side the context of national political institutions. The invocation of access to political equality leads us immediately to think that what must be meant is that those to whom that equality will be provided will be voting in national elections. My goal in what follows will be to sketch some of the other routes available to protections for political equality.

With but the smallest step back from the nationalist view and a shift of focus, we can readily see that each of us who lives in a developed democracy possesses multiple political memberships. We are political members of our towns, of our states or federal subunits, as well as of the national polity. If we are a member of a labor union, we also have access to political equality through that solidaristic structure. If we are an employee at a corporation, under current US law, that corporation can function as a “person” in politi­cal discourse and presumably does so on our behalf. If we are a member of a political party, we have access to political equality through that organization. We might remind ourselves that at an earlier point in American politics, it was commonly the case that some people could vote in city elections, say, but not in state or national elections. Takoma Park, Maryland, currently gives municipal voting rights to noncitizens who do not have the right to vote in national elections. If we could recover an orientation to the multiplicity of kinds of membership that provide access to political voice and influence, and so to political equality, we would have more tools available for building fresh paradigms for immigration. Those of us who are members of developed dem­ocratic nation-states have no necessary requirement to think of ourselves as either nationalists or cosmopolitans. We might instead thing of ourselves as “polypolitans”—people who are members of several polities simultaneously. As polypolitans, we have multiple avenues for accessing political power and protecting our interests. The odds are that most polypolitans use many fewer of the resources of political power than are available to them. Polypolitanism also provides resources for giving migrants access to political voice.

Polypolitanism is not a new phenomenon; it has perdured alongside de­mocracy since its inception. Ancient Athens found polypolitanism a great challenge as it periodically had to tamp down the emergence of power chan­neled through tribal affiliations rather than through the political institutions of the city. Indeed, the fact of polypolitanism can bring instability when po­litical affiliations at different levels come into conflict with one another. The US Civil War is a good example here of the consequences when national and regional affiliations and forms of membership came into conflict with each other. Moments of crisis have often made visible the degree to which people function in the world in “polypolitan” ways; the crisis emerges when they have to choose between their loyalties to different political institutions and therefore to different avenues for voice. Yet, despite the dangers of remind­ing people that they have access to a multiplicity of political memberships, that multiplicity of those possible membership roles may provide an impor­tant institutional opportunity as we try to reenvision just politics and econo­mies in the twenty-first century.

Here, then, are the rudiments of a just system of membership for the world's states, now modestly revised for a final time to incorporate the idea of polypolitanism:

1. The global membership system should maximize thefreedom of labor to move by means of aframework that

a. Creates incentivesfor host citizens to welcome migrants and migrant inte­gration, and thereby avoids an increase to transaction costs in the receiving economy;

b. Draws on the resources of polypolitanism to ensure that migrants have access to political equality within receiving countries.

One possible approach to membership policies that would meet these cri­teria would adopt the sponsorship model proposed in the VIP framework but would align it more closely to the policy design in which corporations sponsor highly skilled migrants. The key difference would be that the program would not place the power of sponsorship in the hands of individuals. Instead, it would place it in the hands of corporate bodies that can provide voice and influence, and therefore political equality, to those who are their members. By “corporate bodies,” I do not simply mean for-profit or commercial corpora­tions; I mean, rather, all the organizations of civil society. In particular, cities, states (understood as subunits of the national polity), labor unions, faith or­ganizations, and other civil society organizations could serve as sponsors for migrants into roles for which migrants would be paid a prevailing wage and in exchange for a fee they would pay to their sponsor. Indeed, Canada has suc­cessfully operated precisely such a program for refugee admissions for four decades. The proposal here is to expand that model to migration generally. The number of available sponsorships could be calibrated annually in rela­tion to the size of the population, with the goal perhaps of hitting a target of admissions of 1 percent of the existing population annually.²⁴ Sponsored slots could be divided between permanent resident slots and temporary worker slots, as long as there is also a policy in place for opening the possibility of permanent residency to qualifying temporary workers after a set time period. Sponsors would benefit financially from their sponsorship.²⁵ The fees paid to sponsors could support a market in sponsorship just as fees paid to the pro­viders of study abroad programs support a market in study abroad programs. Sponsorships of this kind would accelerate migrant integration—by making the sponsoring organization responsible for that integration. Sponsoring or­ganizations would be held accountable through routine auditing by an Office of Civil and Political Rights, which would also approve organizations to be sponsors in the first place. They would be held to account specifically for their role in protecting the rights of migrants and giving them voice.²⁶ Spon­sorship approaches to migration would permit greater intentionality around migration policy, including greater responsiveness to specific labor market needs and attention to regional economic variation as regional sponsors take responsibility for clarifying and presenting their specific needs.

The proposal is in effect an updated and formalized variant of an infor­mal nineteenth century approach to supporting labor migration: the use of transnational workers' mutual aid associations. In the nineteenth century, as laborers were migrating from agricultural to urban areas, and also from one part of the globe to another, they commonly formed mutual aid associa- tions.²⁷ I am thinking of organizations like the Independent Order of Odd Fel­lows, Masonic lodges of various varieties, the Knights Templar and Knights of Columbus, and many other organizations. Civil society associations of these kinds formed—in advance of the development of the liberal welfare state—to secure health care, unemployment insurance, and retirement re­sources for the unprotected workers of the nineteenth century. Because these organizations were cross-regional and even transnational, they could sup­port the movement of laborers to markets where opportunity was greater as well as facilitate their integration on arrival. In addition, they often provided voice for the politically voiceless. As an example, consider the Prince Hall Masons, formed in the late eighteenth century in Boston, to provide political power to disfranchised African Americans. The Prince Hall Masons achieved their formal organizational status through affiliation with a network of Scot­tish Masonic lodges—securing voice for themselves that was not available within US political institutions. With solidaristic efforts through the Prince Hall Masonic lodge, these African American laborers were able to pursue the abolition of enslavement in Massachusetts (achieved in 1783), to contemplate removing themselves to Africa (a question of late-eighteenth-century labor mobility), and to develop resources to deliver education to the children of their community. The emergence of the welfare state and the institutional­ized provision of social rights led to the waning of associations of this kind. But we might now encourage their regrowth in support of a sponsorship model for immigration, and the provision of voice and influence to migrants, the components of political equality.

Indeed, the Canadian model has inspired the growth of new associations of this kind. Where once they formed primarily to secure something like social rights for workers, now they might instead operate to deliver voice, to protect civil rights, and to provide representation in political processes, in that sense delivering political rights. With the opportunity for migrants to secure protection through political voice in solidaristic societies of this kind, developed economies could set a pace for the rate of admission of mi­grants into full national citizenship that avoids cultural backlash while also avoiding falling into the injustice of maintaining a caste system where some members of the polity are permanently disfranchised. Just as native-born citizens pass through stages of membership and participation, so too might migrants. Rather than being simply without political voice, they might—as polypolitans—begin their lives as civic agents in their receiving societies by means of access to political voice through avenues other than national po­litical institutions. They might begin with participation in solidaristic civil society organizations. Nor should we forget, of course, that some migrants will have access to political voice through the political institutions of their sending country. Receiving countries ought also to ensure that the embassies and consulates of sending countries are appropriately empowered to provide voice to migrants from their countries.

The Canadian model for the private sponsorship of refugees is widely rec­ognized as a success; the question, then, is whether we can indeed extend such a model to migration generally and, as we do, offer migrants a “polypoli- tan” path to political equality that includes participation in and representa­tion through solidaristic civil society organizations.

Conclusion

Because the functioning of an economy interacts with the political system in which it operates, it can be tempting to think that particular economic goals ought to be achieved by means of adjustments to the underlying political regime. In some cases, this instinct may be correct. The end of the commu­nist structures of the former Soviet bloc, for instance, was very much in the interest of the economic well-being of the populations living under Soviet jurisdiction but could be achieved only by means of adjustment to the under­girding political structures. Yet the economic benefit was not the reason for seeking an adjustment in the direction of democratic politics. The choice of a polity form rests not on economic foundations but on broader conceptions of human well-being. Consequently, the question of which polity forms can sustain human well-being should be answered prior to the effort to answer questions about which economic systems to adopt. That is, the complete set of polity forms that can sustain human well-being, across all of its dimen­sions, establishes limits on possible structures for a just political economy.

Connected societies live up to the principle of supporting difference with­out domination and in so doing lay the groundwork for empowering econo­mies. Connected societies can be pursued on a nationalist model, or a cos­mopolitan model; to achieve not only a social universe but also a political economy that lives up to the principle of difference without domination, however, we need to transition to a polypolitan model. For market econo­mies, the requirements of a just polity establish what sorts of commitments should be precompetitive—for instance, a commitment to the protection of positive and negative liberties and a commitment to free, nonexploitative labor. These precompetitive commitments will be most flexibly fulfilled through a polypolitan approach to membership.

This concept of polypolitanism brings into salience the fact that it is pos­sible for any individual to have simultaneous political memberships in more than one political community; this idea in itself introduces new flexibility into how we think about borders, membership, and immigration. In other words, I argue for an approach to analyzing access to political empowerment that recognizes the possibility that individuals may hold multiple and di­verse kinds of memberships in a diversity of polities. The aggregate of the memberships they possess should result in their political empowerment in relation to the polity-level decision-making that affects them. This look at how any given person aggregates membership and pathways of access to po­litical empowerment provides a route to versatility with regard to how we think about immigration, migration, borders, and the global movement of labor. The value of this versatility is that it embeds protection for political empowerment or political equality in the foundations of any just political economy while also maximizing the set of polity forms available to support empowering economic well-being across the globe.

Some economists have been tempted into advocating for caste systems in their effort to achieve a maximally egalitarian distribution of the fruits of productivity. In so doing, they have sought to answer the questions put on the table for them by political philosophy. The reigning paradigm raised the question: How can we distribute the fruits of the world's productivity

in the way that benefits the least well off? Though Weyl and Posner may already have moved beyond their arguments in Radical Markets, in that book in effect they simply answered the question that had been posed to them by philosophers. They responded that we could achieve global justice by giving up on political equality. In this answer, they were in good company. John Rawls, too, sometimes argued that political equality should be sacrificed in response to limiting material conditions. In other words, Weyl and Posner gave the right answer to the question that has been put to economists by phi­losophers for the last three decades. It is a question about distributive justice that had implicitly taken political equality out of the equation, and econo­mists answered the question by taking it out explicitly. We get this kind of answer—proposing intentional establishment of a caste system—because we philosophers had already taken political equality out of the equation that we are asking economists to solve. We stopped conveying its importance to them. Can we, then, develop a different political economy if we put a differ­ent question on the table? If we ask for a political economy structured by a commitment to political equality, will we get one?

With the principle of difference without domination, the ideal of a con­nected society, and the flexible possibilities of membership policies and op­portunities for political voice defined by polypolitanism, I believe that we have at least the first conceptual tools for building empowering economies.

Notes

1. On my argument, benevolent autocracies may be able to achieve material well-being for their population, but by definition they will never achieve the basis for full human flourishing and so will never achieve full justice (Sen 1999a, 1999b). This normative fact, however, does not itself in any way determine what the foreign policy stance should be of democracies toward nondemocracies, and that is not an issue I address in the book. Rawls (1993) does a good job of distinguishing the differing foreign policy stances that democracies might take toward other democracies, toward autocracies that are well ordered in being in effect benevolent and delivering basic rights protections, and toward autocracies that are not well ordered. I largely con­cur with his discussion there.

2. Justice by Means of Democracy (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming). In addition to making this case in the book, I make it in an essay, “Differ­ence without Domination: Toward a Revised Theory of Justice,” in Difference without Domination: Pursuing Justice in Diverse Democracy, ed. D. Allen and

R. Somanathan (University of Chicago Press, 2020).

3. Pettit 1999, 2014; Rogers 2020.

4∙ The challenge for a theory of justice anchored in the non-sacrificeability of political equality is also to offer frameworks for the organization of both social and economic life that ward off the likelihood that difference, which emerges from freedom, comes to articulate with domination∙ Doing this requires both protecting basic rights and adopting the principle of “differ­ence without domination,” in addition to the Rawlsian difference principle. The difference principle is defined by Rawls in such a way as that it could easily incorporate the principle of difference without domination, insofar as any decision that results in domination of those who are least well off would also violate the difference principle. (In some sense, Rawls moves in this direction when in section 36 of Theory ofJustice, he lays out the forms of compensation that are necessary to preserve the fair value for all of equal political liberties in the face of wealth inequality.

However, in practice, most people have interpreted the difference prin­ciple in a purely distributive fashion, where the relevant object of distribu­tion is material resources, not control rights. Consequently, it is important to articulate the principle of difference without domination as a second and separate additional principle, which focuses on the allocation of control rights that flow from particular decisions and social arrangements. There is a subsequent question, which I have not yet addressed, as to whether the principle of difference without domination could in fact replace the differ­ence principle. This would require that the standard articulated here for the allocation of control rights of necessity also result in just distributive outcomes, and that just distributive outcomes be defined in terms of access to control rights. If this were to be the case, then difference without domi­nation could supplant the difference principle. I have not, however, pursued either the empirical or analytical elements of this question at this point and so for the time being assume that “difference with domination” is an addi­tive principle, not a substitute for the difference principle.

5. Allen and Somanathan 2020.

6. Allen 2016a.

7. Lincoln and Basler 1953.

8. Foner 2010; Witt 2012.

9. Compare Carens 2010, 2013; Miller 2016; Meissner 2019; Salam 2018; Shachar 2009, 2020; and Song 2018.

10. For an innovative approach to understanding the operations of social dyna­mism, see Farrell, Shalizi, Allen, forthcoming.

11. Allen 2016b.

12. I note that exclusion is a form of domination when those who are “included” and those who are “excluded” are both incorporated in a single social system—for instance, a global economy driven by those in the category of the “included.” Relationships of domination have often been misrepresented as simpler relationships of inclusion and exclusion. This tends to result in

a misdiagnosis of what is required to rectify the position of those in the

“excluded” category. Typically, the necessary rectification will not be inclu­sion merely but a more significant restructuring of relationships between those in each group in order to achieve non-domination. See Allen 2005.

13. Hirschman 1970. See also Shelby (2015) for an interesting use of these ideas for contemporary discussions of relative empowerment and disempower­ment within the citizenry.

14. Despite my best arguments on behalf of justice as I understand it, there will be those who choose another path and eschew democracy. I recognize this as an inevitable fact of the world. My orientation toward those leaders and citizens who make this choice is like that articulated by Michael Walzer (2008) in an essay “On Promoting Democracy”: in general, I would hope to offer aid and comfort by peaceful means to those within their polity who seek to build democracy by peaceful means.

15. Polanyi (1944) 2002.

16. By “high functioning,” I mean societies characterized by high degrees of social capital working in support of rule of law institutions free of corrup­tion. Of course, some would also argue that it might be worth reintroducing frictions to the movement of capital.

17. The Global Compact on Migration, passed by the United Nations in De­cember 2018, also focuses on achieving alignment between the interests of the different stakeholders in migration policy in order to reduce friction. It seeks to achieve this alignment not through market transactions but through inclusive and participatory decision-making processes. See General Assembly, United Nations (2018).

18. Lopez-Guerra (2020) offers a provocative argument that every citizen ought to be able to sponsor as many migrants from abroad as they might other­wise bring into the polity by way of childbirth. That is, every citizen would have a right to “make new citizens,” and they could exercise this right either through birth or through sponsorship.

19. Weyl and Posner 2018 start each chapter or their book with a utopian fiction imagining the world that would obtain if their policies were in place. Some of these narrative elements introduce ideas that go beyond what would actually necessarily follow from their policies. In this sense, they conjure up romanticizing fantasies.

20. The Canadian refugee sponsorship program has had problems of this kind when it was individual sponsorship; a newer Dutch model avoids similar financial relationships because of the problems that arise from financial entanglement of the two parties with each other.

21. See Kopplin 2017 on recent investigations into au pair programs in the US.

22. See Galenson (1984) for an analysis of what indentured servants gained and lost via indenture.

23. See Kopplin (2017).

24. Canada has established this goal of admitting migrants each year at a rate of 1 percent of its existing population. To provide a sense of scale here, a 1 per­cent admission rate in the US would mean about 3 million people a year. Currently, the US admits 1 million legal immigrants a year. International students are currently admitted on what is effectively a sponsorship model; the country currently manages the admission of approximately 1 million for­eign students annually. A target of 1 percent of population would, therefore, be a significant upward movement of effort. The goal would not be to get there overnight, but to begin to build from the existing figure of 1 million (or 2 million if we wish to count the students) toward 3 million over a period of five to 10 years as a society becomes better equipped to manage migration through a sponsorship program and with the intentionality exhibited in the Canadian program.

25. This is also the existing structure of foster care programs, which give evi­dence both of the benefits of this approach and also the dangers of abuse.

26. In July 2020, when the Trump administration sought to withdraw visas from all international students who would be enrolling only in online courses in the wake of universities shift to online learning during the Covid-19 pan­demic, universities leaped into action, suing the administration and forcing the withdrawal of the rule. This was a powerful example of how sponsoring organizations can function to protect the rights of migrants.

27. For a good review of the role of mutual aid societies within the US, see Beito (2000), Kaufman (2002, 286), and Skocpol (2003). Many of the associations they discuss were transnational; for instance, the Odd Fellows and the his­tories outlined here also have their European counterparts. Beito (2000) in particular focuses on the provision of social benefits.

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