Sharia in the aftermath of the February Revolution, reviewed
In February 2011, following the steps of neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, Libya witnessed a revolution that ended Gaddafi's rule. Since then, a heated debate has started on what role to assign to Sharia in the legal system.
The main parties to this debate are Islamists, religious scholars (ulama), and nationalists. In the first four years, the responses of state authorities—legislative, executive, and judicial—were more in favour of the Islamists. The divide between these authorities and institutions since July 2014 can, to a considerable extent, be described as one along the side of this Islamist-nationalist dichotomy. This debate has also influenced the CDA when drafting the constitution's stance on the role of Sharia. The UN, which has once again been involved in Libya, has played a rather limited role, compared to its earlier involvement, in this debate. Now that, under the guidance of the UN, there are efforts to end Libya's political divide, a question arises as to what role Sharia is actually going to have in the new arrangement.Islamist groups are not new in Libya, but their rise in post-Gaddafi Libya is unprecedented. The presence of some groups, i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), can be traced to the Monarchy Era, but they grew under Gaddafi's rule despite his fierce war against them, a war that the regime seemed, at that time, to have won. Those who survived the war were either in jail or in exile. Later on, as part of the reform efforts largely conducted under the auspices of Saif al-Islam, Gaddafi's son and presumptive heir (Fitzgerald 2015, 117-204), many members of the MB returned from exile, and those imprisoned were released. The leaders of the Libyan Islamist Group (LIFG) that fought against Gaddafi and almost succeeded in assassinating him, reviewed, in jail, their position to conclude that correct interpretations of Sharia do not actually justify jihad against him and his regime.
They all seemed to accept the regime's authority and seemed to give up their ideas and plans to install Sharia in Libya by force. When the February revolution started, however, they joined in and resumed their efforts to implement Sharia.Libya's Islamists are not a monolithic group. While they all, of course, see Sharia's implementation as an ultimate goal, they differ, a.o., over how to see this happen. There are those who seek democratic means: forming political parties and running for elections so they can get to power and bring a top-down change. For example, the MB established a party called Justice and Construction, ‘adala wa al-bina,, and the LIFG formed the Homeland Party, al-watan; both ran for the GNC's elections. There are, however, those who aim to get to power to bring about the required change through jihad. They do not recognise democracy in the first place and believe that jihad against infidel regimes, those adhering to democracy, is the way to see Sharia realised. Ansar al-Sharia and the Libyan branch of Islamic State are obvious examples (Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2015).
Finally, there is an interesting group: Madkhali Salafism. It is a strand of Salafism known as scientific Salafism, al-salafia al-‘ilmia. As such, it is supposed to reject involvement in politics, discourage political dissent, and focus on changing society from below through missionary preaching. It is known for its intolerance toward other Islamist groups (Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2015). As expected, it did not join the revolution against Gaddafi, but when in 2014 General Heftar waged his war against the other Islamists in the eastern part of the country, Madkhali Salafists were amongst the first to join him. Now, their influence in the area Heftar controls is evident. They control the Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Endowment, and voice their demands for more Sharia recognition in public life. Such demands are increasingly granted. For example, on 16 February 2017, because oftheir pressure, the Military Governor in the east issued Decision No.
6/2017 preventing Libyan women from travelling abroad without a male chaperone. A few days later, on 20 February, they issued a statement praising this decision and demanding the Military Governor fulfil his promise to issue another decision preventing women from driving without a male chaperone. Their statement was entitled: It is us who are more entitled to implement Sharia (Afriqiyah News Gate 2017).In addition, in Libya there are groups composed of conventional religious scholars, ulama, and Islamists. An influential one is the Council of Libya's Religious Scholars (CLS), hay'at ulama Libya. It was established on 18 May 2011 by religious scholars, e.g., Ghaith al-Fakhri, Associate Professor of Sharia at Benghazi University, who is also the Deputy Mufti, and Hamza abu Faris, Professor of Sharia at Tripoli University.17 The CLS is closely connected to Islamist groups, notably the Muslim Brothers with their transnational ties. This distinguishes it from another group: the League of the Religious Scholars of Libya (rabitat ulama Libya) (LUL), established on 6 February 2012. The LUL disassociates itself from political parties' affiliations and external agendas, identifies with the Maliki School, and has spoken out against what it deems Islamist extremists.18
Besides the Islamists, there are also nationalists who do not necessarily object to assigning Sharia a role in lawmaking, but they surely oppose the Islamists' views about this role. Those nationalists vary in their political affiliations, but they are united in their opposition to the Islamist groups. One clear example of their unity is the Coalition of National Forces (CNF) (see, e.g., Juma'a 2016).
It is against a background of interaction between, and within, these groups that I will examine the development of the role of Sharia in lawmaking. I will trace this interaction and its effect on the subsequent authorities since February 2011: the National Transitional Council (NTC), General National Congress (GNC), and the House of Representatives (HoR). I will also study this interaction vis-a-vis the ongoing the constitution process.