Summary

Values, as well as evaluations, are social and subjective matters. They are subjective in this special sense. If a state of affairs X is valuable, it is so due to the fact that a certain individual, let us say A, has associated that quality with X.

The inter-subjectivity of values and evaluations is one dimension of the form of life. A certain form of life is not ours without an interaction between those who are committed to that form of life. Hence the form of life necessarily presupposes a cer­tain degree of similarity, or family resemblance, as regards the values. This family resemblance of evaluations is the very link that makes it possible, ”all things consid­ered”, to present interpretations of prima facie values. Inside a specific community, a value statement may even reach a wide generality, whereas it may not succeed outside that community.

On the other hand, values can be drawn from objective (empirical) reality in no relevant way. Hume's guillotine has been sharpened for my aims as well. As was emphasised above, evaluations are always related to a certain community, an audience. In this specific sense, the values and evaluations are relative. However, they are not relative in an arbitrary way. To a certain degree, reasons can, and must, be provided for every evaluation. In this sense, a crucial difference exists between an attitude and a valuation. An attitude is related to matters of taste (this apple tastes sour), and they cannot be argued. Therefore, no one can be convinced of an attitude by means of rational argumentation. Attitudes can only be influenced through persuasion.

The same holds true as far as legal reasoning in general and DSL as its specific case are concerned. The norm statement is not the key issue but the discursive proce­dure that justifies the recommendations presented by scholars. This is the real reason why moderate value relativism is deeply connected to the methodology of DSL.