Summary
Lessons learned from Vietnam to Somalia have validated the requirements and principles of military legitimacy and the need for diplomat warriors in operations other than war. These painful experiences have demonstrated the limitations of combat force in peacetime, requiring a reversal of traditional military priorities: civilians considered obstacles to combat operations are the objectives of civil-military operations, and the force required for military victory in warfighting can undermine public support for political objectives.
The lethal force needed to provide security for both military and civilians alike must be balanced with restraint to ensure military legitimacy and mission success. Ignoring the requirements of military legitimacy can convert military nvictory into political defeat.Civil-military relations are an index of military legitimacy in operations other than war, and civil affairs is the military interface with civilians - a force multiplier that has proven its value in war and peace. Before the above lessons learned in legitimacy and leadership can be of any use, however, they must first be translated into military capabilities - the subject of the following chapter.
Notes
1. Colonel Summers, Jr. has noted that 'public support must be an essential part of our strategic planning, and... Congress has the constitutional responsibility to legitimize that support. See Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: the Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1989), p. 4. A. J. Bacevich has also noted the importance of public support for military operations in 'New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism', Parameters (December 1990), pp. 12, 19, 22.
2. George A. Joulwan, 'Operations Other Than War: A CINC's Perspective', Military Review (February 1994), p. 9.
3.
Ibid.at p.5.4. Carnes Lord, Project Director, Civil Affairs: Perspectives and Prospects (draftj February 1993), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, p. 7 (hereinafter CA Perspectives).
5. Ibid, at p. 10.
6. Joulwan, n. 2 supra, p. 8.
7. War Powers Resolution (or Act), 50 USC 1541-1548.
8. FM 100-23, pp. 1-16 - 1-18.
9. Joulwan, n. 2 supra, p. 9.
10. Summers, n. 1 supra, p. 1.
11. Ibid, at p. 49.
12. Idem.
13. Summers, n. 1 supra, p. 55.
14. 'The military operation was highly successful but the civil-military operation much less so... and the outlook for democracy and prosperity in Panama remains uncertain.' CA Perspectives, n. 4 supra, p. 6.
15. David L. Marcus, 'Panama: Still in Turmoil', Dallas Morning News (reprinted in The State, Columbia, SC, 16 December 1990, p. D-1).
16. In one incident a Marine gunnery sergeant shot a Somali boy with his grenade launcher after the boy reached into the sergeant's patrol vehicle and grabbed his sunglasses. For his indiscretion the sergeant was tried and convicted of aggravated assault by general court-martial. In a second incident Marine snipers firing long-range at a man with a machine gun in one of Mogadishu's busiest intersections accidentally killed a pregnant Somali woman. The shooting was in compliance with UN ROE (carrying a machine gun was evidence of hostile intent), but the incident illustrated the limitations of ROE
as a standard of legitimacy in operations other than war: ROE can never be a substitute for good judgment. Commenting on the first case, Jim Hoagland has questioned reliance on combat forces in humanitarian operations, suggesting that specially trained units be used in such ambiguous and unforgiving environments. See Jim Hoagland, The Washington Post, 15 April 1993, p. A-29; on ROE in Somalia, see Dwarken, Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope at n. 33 to Chapter 3, supra.
17. Tobias Wolff, 'After the Crusade', Time (24 April 1995), p.
46.18. See James D. Delk, 'Military Assistance in Los Angeles', Military Review (September 1992), p. 13. The ROE used in the LA riot are provided in the Operational Law Handbook (JA 422, 1993) prepared by the Center for Law and Military Operations and the International Law Division at The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army, Charlottesville, VA, at p. H-106.
19. CA Perspectives, n. 4 supra, pp. 7-8.
20. Bob Shacochis, 'The Immaculate Invasion', Harper's Magazine (February 1995), pp. 44, 54-62.
21. On civil-military relations in Latin America, see Gabriel Marcella, 'The Latin American Military, Low Intensity Conflict, and Democracy', Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, edited by John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army war College), chapter 4. On the Peru model, see Jeffrey F. Addicott and Andrew M. Warner, 'Promoting the Rule of Law and Human Rights', Military Review (August 1994), p. 38.
22. See Jacob W. Kipp, 'Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', Military Review (December 1992), pp. 27, 35.
23. Idem.
24. Charles E. Heller, Twenty-First Century Force: A Federal Army and A Militia, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), p. 64.
25. Harry F. Walterhouse, A Time to Build (Columbia, SC, The R. L. Bryan Company, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC, 1964), p. 56. For a shorter but more recent history of civil affairs, see Stanley Sadler, 'Seal the Victory: A History of US Army Civil Affairs', Special Warfare (Winter 1991), p. 38.
26. 'The parts do not exist on their own, but accept subordination to the whole. Neat lawns surround compact, trim homes, each identified by the name and rank of its occupant. The buildings stand in fixed relationship to each other, part of an overall plan, their character and station symbolizing their contributions, stone and brick for the senior officers, wood for the lower ranks.
The post is suffused with the rhythm and harmony which comes when collective will supplants individual whim... There is little room for presumption and individualism. The unity of the community incites no man to be more than he is. In order is found peace; in discipline, fulfillment; in community, security.... West Point embodies the military ideal at its best; Highland Falls the American spirit at its most commonplace.' Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 465.27. The early Corps of Engineers made significant contributions in opening the US frontier. Among the first were Captain Meriwether Lewis and Lieutenant William Clark, who surveyed and mapped the area from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean. Pushing ahead of the settlers moving West, the US Army established a series of fortifications and connecting roads to provide security against the Indian menace. Outside the stockades garrisoned by the Army early settlements were established. The Army provided the security essential to survival in the hostile environment of the 'wild west'. Following Lewis, Clark, and Pike, Captain Benjamin Bonneville and his men, disguised as fur traders, set out in 1832 to study the habits of the Indians. The mission to the Rockies lasted five years and provided valuable data for military operations in the West. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant John C. Fremont explored and mapped routes in Oregon territory and California. The Army also made transportation possible for early settlers, surveying and building canals, mapping railroad routes, building bridges, and even launching steamboats - all while fighting the ubiquitous Indian. In all of these undertakings the Army managed to be self-sufficient in an inhospitable land. Back in the new capital, Captain Montgomery Meigs and his fellow Army engineers were designing and supervising the construction of public facilities, including the Washington aqueduct.
Over the years the Army Corps of Engineers was responsible for building the Washington Monument, buildings to house the State, War, and Navy Departments, the Library of Congress, the Old National Museum, the Old Post Office, the Pentagon, and many bridges, schools, streets, and other public facilities. Walterhouse, n. 25 supra at pp. 57-58.28. Ibid, at pp. 58, 78 (note 42).
29. Ibid, at p. 59.
30. Idem.
31. Ibid.at p. 60.
32. Ibid, at p. 62.
33. A common saying of the Depression era indicated the need for erosion control on land wasted by overplanting cotton: 'General Erosion has wrought more havoc on the land than General Sherman'. One of the few surviving CCC commanders, Colonel George Buell, 91, of Summerville, South Carolina, remembers the hectic days of 1933 when the Army was given three months to prepare for the onslaught of unemployed boys and men: 'It was astounding what was done overnight. The Army had these warehouses that were full of everything that was needed-clothing, cots, tools, tents... everything.' Glenn Oeland, 'Heritage of Hard Times', South Carolina Wildlife, July-August l992, pp. 16, 23.
34. One CCC recruit wrote home of the experience: 'During the first few days the company did little except eat, sleep, and take long hikes'. But then came a fight: 'The chief weapons were bottles, but any object available was put into action. No deaths or bodily injury occurred, but the next day the company was sent to the woods to work, and that work hasn't stopped yet.' Idem.
35. Charles E. Heller, n. 24 supra at pp. 68-69.
36. Colonel Joseph K. Dietrich, the senior USAR advisor to the United States Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida has proposed that reserve component Special Forces (SF), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and CA forces use their annual training active duty to provide military civic action in a remote Indian reservation in Montana. The citizen-soldiers would 'conduct training in teaching people to help themselves focusing on the young people with the objective of increasing pride and self-esteem.' The project is based on an earlier successful model known as Special Proficiency at Rugged Terrain Training and Nation Building (SPARTAN) which helped local residents build improvements on a reser-vation plagued with endemic problems of alcoholism, drag abuse, a high school drop-out rate, and unemployment.
The initial reaction of senior commanders to Col Dietrich's proposal was '... great but there are statutes against soldiers being involved on the domestic scene'. This is a typical reaction to innovative civil-military projects in an over-regulated environment; there are legal restrictions, but they do not preclude such projects.37. See Ralph R. Young, Snapshots of Civil Affairs: A Historical Perspective and Views, unpublished paper presented at the 39th Annual Conference of the Civil Affairs Association at San Antonio, Texas, June 1986, p. 4. Also Alexander M. Walczak, Conflict Termination-Transitioning From Warrior to Constable: A Primer, unpublished paper prepared as part of USAWC Military Studies Program, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1992. Walczak emphasizes the responsibility of commanders for the welfare of civilians in their areas, and their role as constables in establishing and maintaining law and order and providing essential services until CA forces arrive.
38. Ted B. Borek, 'Legal Services During War', 120 Military Law Review, 1988, pp. 35-40.
39. US Army Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, December 1985, p. 1-1. Joint doctrine has since confirmed the priority of operational law to CA operations. See JCS PUB 3-57, Joint Civil Affairs Operations (Final Draft, November 1990), pp. xx, 1-1,1-7, II—3, IV-6, and C-2, 3. For a discussion of some of the legal issues peculiar to CA and their relationship to legitimacy, see Barnes, 'Legitimacy and the Lawyer in LIC: Civil Affairs Legal Support', The Army Lawyer (October 1988), p. 5.
40. General William Richardson, Commanding General, Army Training and Doctrine Command, draft memorandum to General John Wickham, Army Chief of Staff, Subject: 'Civil Affairs Modernization', dated June 1986, p. 4.
41. Walterhouse, n. 25 supra, pp. 73-74.
42. Ibid, at pp. 76.
43. Ibid, at pp. 76, 77.
44. Ibid, at p. 77.
45. Ibid, at p. 84.
46. Ibid, at pp. 84-90.
47. Reference is made to William Lederer and Eugene Burdick's The Ugly American (New York: W. W. North & Co., 1958).
48. Charles M. Simpson, III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years: A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), Chapters 10 and 13; also, Shelby L, Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1988), Chapters 1 and 2.
49. See references to Philip Caputo's experiences as a Marine Corps lieutenant in Vietnam from his book, A Rumor of War in Chapter 1, nn. 35-41.
50. William R. Berkman, 'Civil Affairs in Vietnam', unpublished paper written for US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 1973.
51. See Charles M. Simpson, III, Inside the Green Berets, cited at n. 48 supra, pp. 69-70.
52. John T. Fischel and Edmund S. Cowan, 'Civil-Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America', Military Review (January 1988), pp. 40, 43. The authors use the term civil-military operations, which has essentially the same meaning as civil affairs in this context. For other
examples of military civic action in Latin America and elsewhere, see Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action cited at n. 21 supra.
53. See Delbert L. Spurlock, 'Grenada Provides Classic Case', The Officer (August 1984), p. 17; also, Barnes, 'Grenada Revisited: Civil Affairs Operates in Paradise', The Officer (July 1985), p. 14.
54. See 'Civil Affairs in Just Cause', Special Warfare (Winter 1991), p. 28.
55. See John R. Randt, 'Working in a Place Called Zacho: Stories from the Storm', Army Reserve Magazine (third issue of 1991), p. 10.
56. Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter (Civil Affairs Association, Kensington, MD), January/February 1995, p. 3.
57. Bill Maddox, 'Haiti Recovers', Army Reserve Magazine (Spring 1995), p. 20.
58. Karen Elliott House, 'The Wrong Mission (Beyond the Cold War: Foreign Policy in the 21st Century)', The Wall Street Journal, 8 September 1994.
59. 'Compassion, or respect for the dignity of each individual, reflects a moral code as ancient as the Golden Rule, the mandate to treat others as one desires to be treated. Americans have shown their compassionate nature in peace and war... during humanitarian missions like Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and Provide Hope in Somalia'. Army Focus 1994, Force XXI, An Official Department of the Army Publication (1994), p. 35.
60. Gordon R. Sullivan, 'The Challenge of Peace', Parameters (Autumn 1994), pp. 4,7.
61. Ibid, at p. 8.
62. Ibid, at pp. 9-10.
63. Joulwan, supran. 2, p. 10.
64. United States National Military Strategy, 1995, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, p. 1.
65. Ibid, at p. ii. The elements of peacetime engagement are further elaborated at pp. 8-9. 7 New Capabilities for the New Total Force