On the Conventionalist Theory
There is, however, one theoretical view that helps us grasp the ontological status of P2: the conventionalist ontological theory. According to Eerik Lagerspetz, such social institutions as state, law and money are social conventions based on shared beliefs (Lagerspetz 1995, 20, 2009, 188).
Let us take as an example a one euro coin. In order for it to be understood as money, and being of one euro in value, one has to believe it really is that kind of entity. In addition, one also has to presuppose that the others (other members of the community) believe the coin to be money. Further, those others have to believe that I believe the same. When separated from these shared beliefs, the piece of metal is not money, nor is it of any particular currency. The same goes for legal institutions. Lagerspetz himself states that the existence of social objects, relationships and features depends on the shared beliefs prevailing in the community. The communities, for their part, also exist for the very same reason.Every one of us belongs to one of these communities. This is also the key to understanding identity. We do exist as biological beings, regardless of shared attitudes, but our identity is formed by our relationships to others, which, in turn, are based on shared attitudes. From the viewpoint of other community members, we are social objects. In this sense, my social existence is a social fact. The things we hold as essential in ourselves are to a large degree social facts concerning ourselves. Therefore, our social existence is based on the community and is realised through its shared beliefs. On the other hand, we are also social subjects and take part in shared attitudes, partly by shaping the attitudes of others.
The situation could be described with the example of language. Language exists regardless of us, for we only progressively take part in language by learning it. Language is a social and communicative practice, which we cannot wholly change, either arbitrarily or through mutual agreement. In a certain sense, and in a way that is inessential for the sake of language as a whole, we may creatively take part in the forming of language, but we cannot change it in any way. Language is a net of shared attitudes preceding our interpretations and beyond our control.
According to Lagerspetz, for example, the word “state” does not refer to anything that can be directly perceived. We might say that the state has certain qualities or even that it does something. But all that we can actually perceive are people, as well as certain physical objects. A term such as “state” is called institutional. All that concerns “state” can be said about other legal institutions, like “legal person” and “CEO”. All these terms have common characteristics. They are bound to certain norms in one way or another (Lagerspetz 2009, 189).