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The Future of Operations Other than War: Two Views

The wrong mission

In spite ot the above lessons learned on the limitations of combat operations and the value of civil-military operations during peacetime, some traditionalists still argue that the military should limit its activities to combat.

Karen Elliott House has argued that operations other than war are the wrong mission, citing the depletion of funding for training and readiness, the effect of the debacle in Somalia on public support, and the supposed denigration of combat skills:

Worst of all, nonmilitary missions eventually destroy the fighting capability of a military force. Armies, in the end, are largely composed of young men and women in uniform, not diplomats and philosophers. Such young men and women can be trained as soldiers or as policemen or as social workers, but not as all three.58

Ms House has correctly noted funding problems that compromise combat readiness and the importance of public support for military legitimacy, but she has failed to appreciate the strategic need for civilmilitary capabilities and the potential of military leaders to conduct them. Furthermore, she questioned the theological underpinnings of military professionalism by suggesting that practising the golden rule is inconsistent with warrior skills. To the contrary, it is a value embedded in Army tradition.59

While history has taught that civil-military operations do not degrade combat skills, Ms House has overlooked the fact that noncombat forces have (or should have) the primary role in non-combat operations. These are support and service support personnel such as civil affairs, military police, engineers, medical personnel, transportation personnel, and military lawyers, whose readiness for wartime contingencies is enhanced by their participation in operations other than war. In short, a capability for operations other than war complements and enhances the US combat capability.

The painful lessons learned from Vietnam to Somalia were the result of the wrong application of warfighting, not of operations other than war.

For those like Ms House who mistakenly believe that operations other than war represent a novel and incongruous use of military forces, General Joulwan has reminded them that such non-combat operations are closer to the historic norm than combat:

One might say that the US military is returning to normal at the conclusion of the anomalous Cold War era because, historically, normal operations for US Forces are operations other than war.60 The right mission

The Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, has argued that operations other than war are the right mission for the new strategic environment. He has described characteristics of that environment that emphasize the importance of military legitimacy: long-term political objectives that can be undermined by the inappropriate use of military force and an array of governmental and non-governmental actors that create new complexities and ambiguities for military operations.61

General Sullivan acknowledged tension between the moral and practical dimensions of US national security policy, but noted that moral interests cannot be ignored. He chided those such as Ms House who reject humanitarian assistance as a military mission:

The expressions of surprise from some quarters that we would use military force in support of humanitarian goals ignore our history... [T]he US Army accepts the linkage of moral and practical interests as a given... Support of humanitarian goals is part of our past, our present, and undoubtedly our future... New democracies are generally challenged to develop democratic institutions within their own historical contexts, to develop the role of their army in a democracy, and to define the right of minorities... The political task at hand is to foster democratic governing structures that permit ethnically heterogeneous states to function. Our solution is federalism; we need to learn and understand what relationships will work in other countries.62

General Sullivan has recommended political soldiers to support US governmental agencies in a variety of constructive ways:

The military obviously can provide security; it reflects our purpose for existing. But our fighting forces also can provide medical treatment; build roads, buildings, and ports; and deliver a variety of supplies, to name but a few tasks... Both leaders and soldiers in these environments must be experts at their traditional skills but also be adept at anticipating, reading, and reacting to the complex environment... They must understand the nuances of changing military, political, economic, and cultural dimensions and have the agility to alter our military actions quickly in a dynamic environment.63

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Source: Barnes Rudolph C.. Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium.Frank Cass,1996. — 198 p.. 1996
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