China before 1905: gentlemanly imperialism on the defensive
The agenda of British gentlemanly imperialism in China as described by Cain and Hopkins was to uphold China's territorial integrity and financial stability. Gentlemanly imperialism was thus bound up with a framework of informal European predominance.
That framework seemed threatened when power politics and expansionism came to East Asia around 1895 and Russia, France and, fitfully, Germany, pursued policies implying dismemberment, 'pacific penetration', and the creation of spheres of influence.4 China's weakness and reluctance to embrace reform combined with increasing rivalry amongst the powers created an atmosphere in which British policy came to appear less gentlemanly and more imperialist - despite the very specific interests and motives behind British policy, it was, in method and aim, hardly distinguishable from what other powers did, however different their interests and motives may have been.The tendencies of these years crystallized in the 1898 'scramble for concessions' (started by Germany's decision to occupy Jiaozhou Bay), in the course of which all the powers acquired railway concessions and naval bases in China. The 'scramble' shows gentlemanly imperialism on the defensive, though rather aggressively: Britain acquired several large railway concessions. These were geographically dispersed so as to prevent the partition of China or the creation of exclusive, commercially closed 'spheres of influence'. But in the heat of battle, this objective was often subordinated to the more immediate one of making a good showing in a game of imperialist rivalry - a situation with a dynamics of its own where structural causation may fail to provide an adequate explanation of the course of events.5 The crucial initiative in defence of the 'open door' was, interestingly, taken by the United States, not by Britain.
During the scramble, Britain was successful, but in ways not necessarily compatible with the interests of gentlemanly capitalists. Britain's railway concessions had been conceived as private enterprises; China having granted the concessions, the terms for financing, constructing and operating the lines remained to be agreed upon between the Chinese and private investors. But the gentlemanly capitalists of the City were not interested - however desirable railways might be from the point of view of trade, they certainly were not seen as good investment.6 British policy in China remained on the defensive, and even supported Chinese economic nationalism which appeared as a welcome check on the ambitions of rivals like France with her policy of penetration pacifque. Sir Ernest Satow, British minister in Beijing (1900-06), wrote: 'We have heard a good deal of la conquete paisible de la Chine par le chemin de fer and that is what I am trying to oppose...it is necessary for us to be vigilant on behalf of China.' More positively, British diplomats encouraged British railway firms to co-operate, first with each other, and then increasingly with French financiers who showed primarily a financial, not industrial or political, interest in Chinese railways (and therefore could not count on much political support in Paris). In 1905, the Anglo-French railway entente was concluded, supplementing existing co-operation agreements between British and German firms.7
On the whole, however, the years around the turn of the century were marked by an aggressive and competitive expansionism which made it difficult to actually exploit the opportunities perceived by gentlemanly capitalists when China's need for foreign capital first became acute in the aftermath of her 1895 defeat. As long as the 'open door' seemed constantly under threat, loans and railway concessions were bound up with rival imperial strategies and their attractiveness from a business point of view remained limited - political influence had to be bought at the price of lower interest rates and/or greater insecurity.
The Boxer Uprising of 1900 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 considerably modified the international situation as well as conditions within China and thus opened up new possibilities for gentlemanly imperialism. The Boxer intervention can be regarded as the culmination of China's weakness and European interventionism. But instead of toppling the seemingly fragile system of informal European predominance, it served to strengthen it by showing clearly that additional territory or privilege acquired in China would not be easy to digest. Paul Claudel, the French writer and at that time a consular officer in China, said that the most important lesson of the Boxer events was to make everyone understand the 'double impuissance' of both Europe vis-à-vis China and China vis-à-vis Europe.8 Russia and Japan, the only powers to pursue openly expansionist policies after the Boxer Rebellion, eventually clashed and exhausted themselves in war. Russian and Japanese expansionism thus was temporarily stopped. As for the other powers, both Germany and France felt their strategic positions in East Asia were weakened and exposed to Japanese threats. The Boxer Rebellion had already taken the expansionist edge out of French and German policy; now, both powers felt that, strategically, they were on the defensive.9 Thus, at a stroke, several major threats to British interests in China, and to gentlemanly capitalism, had been removed. Once again, it seemed possible to think in terms of an imperialism of free trade and development: 'The focus of competition for advantages in China between the powers now shifted from division to development, and the advance was led by bankers instead of gunboats.'10
The Russo-Japanese war also had an important effect upon China - an effect that has been described as a patriotic awakening, and one that was clearly perceived by all the foreigners present in China at that time. A new generation of politically mobilized Chinese were now convinced that an Asian nation could beat a great European power, and that modernization and constitutional government were the road to success.