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Conclusion

Did war make the state and did the state make peace or war? European states did make war and war was also important for their development but in a way that conforms neither to Tilly’s nor to Morris’ picture.

Their internal development was not the result of a strong conqueror — ‘a stationary bandit’ — suppressing an area and forcing its inhabitants to live in peace together. On the contrary, remarkably stable states were created from the ninth and tenth centuries onwards through the introduction of dynastic succession, that is, stable in the sense that the dynasties usually continued to rule until they became extinct, although they had no mono­poly of violence and only limited control of their subjects. When they eventually achieved this, war was clearly an important factor, mainly through the mobilization of the leading men in the country for the king’s war, first, as his allies, then as officers in organized armies. Warfare and military preparation were by far the lar­gest items on the budget of most states, the main explanation for the increase in taxes and the growth of bureaucracy in the early modern period, of crucial importance for the technological development and for increased professionalization of the armed forces as well as the civilian bureaucracy. There was also a clear trend in the early modern period in the direction of warfare between the states replacing internal conflicts within them. There was even a direct connection between the two; uniting the aristocracy against an external enemy was a means to prevent internal conflicts, as can be illustrated by the Spanish kingdoms which were united against external enemies until the mid-thirteenth century and from the late fif­teenth century onwards but suffered from internal unrest in the intervening period. So far, there is much to say in favour of war making the state.

An equally important factor, however, was conflict solution.

This can also be traced back to the early Middle Ages. In the beginning, the king was only one of several powers that might be involved in it. It mainly took the form of arbitration, as pointed out by a number of recent scholars, who have also argued for the posi­tive effects of this, often in contrast to the later system of royal justice. It is also easy to sympathize with arbitration when comparing it to the inquisitional process and the brutal punishments in the early modern period. Nevertheless, the statistical evidence clearly supports the view that the state’s monopoly or near monopoly of violence led to a dramatic decline in homicide and in general made societies more peaceful. In addition, the growth of public justice may be considered against the background of changing social and economic conditions: increase in trade and urbanization, greater geographic mobility and the need for protection of travellers and for predictable justice in commercial cases.

The state developed first in the judicial field and had reached a fairly advanced level already before the military revolution from the mid-fifteenth century onwards. There was also a sliding transition between the struggle against internal and external enemies, as illustrated by the conflict between England, France and Germany in the early thir­teenth century, partly also the Hundred Years War. Moreover, the ‘most governed’ country of Europe, England, did not participate in the military revolution and was weak militarily until the second half of the seventeenth century. By contrast, this country probably had the most efficient judicial system. Finally, it must be added that the militarization did not lead to military dictatorship, unlike what happened in many other places in the world, such as the Arab and Ottoman Empires. There was no ‘extraction-coercion cycle’ and the army was under civilian control.

In addition to these two factors of a concrete and institutional character, we must add a third one of a less tangible nature, namely, norms, ideology and culture.

The legitimacy of dynasties was a crucial factor in state formation. It largely determined the territorial divisions and whether or not a particular unit would remain separate or be joined with another in a personal union. Internal conflicts in a country were mostly over the succession to the throne. The existence of clear rules for this and whether or not there was a successor in the direct line might determine the question of internal peace. In most cases, hereditary monarchy led to greater stability than rule by elected officers, as will be further developed in the following. A further contribution to this was the ideology celebrating the ruler as God’s representative on Earth, expressed in unction and coronation and courtly rituals, as well as strong links between him and the elites of the country, as expressed most clearly in Louis XlV’s Versailles. Although the instrumental char­acter of the courtly culture has sometimes been exaggerated and there are also some examples of successful state formation without it, notably Prussia, it never­theless remains an important factor in linking the elites to the monarchy.

Finally, these three factors are not just additions to Tilly’s and his successors’ exclusive focus on warfare but imply a different perspective according to which alliances and cooperation become more important than force. Tilly is right in pointing to the relative independence of the state, in contrast to the Marxist idea of ‘the executive committee of the aristocracy’. There is always an advantage in being in the centre; institutions have a power in themselves, in addition to the one delegated from the forces they are supposed to represent. On the other hand, when the ‘extraction-coercion cycle’ can be shown not to have worked in practice, we have to look for another basis for the king’s power; he had to seek support from society. Although state formation involved a considerable amount of oppression, and it can hardly be said to be in the interest of the whole population, it did not consist in a general competition between power-holders in which the strongest won.

From early on, there was an idea of the royal office on which only a limited number of people might have a claim. A further expansion of state power could only take place by the ruler creating alliances with and serving the interests of other leading men in the country, through the distribution of justice, feasts, ceremonials and courtly culture and through mobilizing them in war against foreign enemies. The rela­tive importance of these three main factors varied over time and from country to country, as will be discussed more in the following, mostly in Chapter 5.

Notes

1 Morris, War, p. 18.

2 Ibid., pp. 29-47.

3 Cf. Reinhard, Geschichte der Staatsgewalt, p. 16, who observes that, according to the strictest criteria, there were only sovereign states in Europe during a short period from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century.

4 Verhulst, ‘Economic Organization’, p. 487; Fossier, ‘Rural Economy’, p. 59 and Reyerson, ‘Commerce’, p. 51.

5 Imsen and Vogler, ‘Communal Autonomy’; Blickle, ‘Conclusions’.

6 Zmora, Monarchy, pp. 17-21.

7 Duby, Les trois ordres; Oexle, ‘Deutungsschemata‘; Le Goff, ‘Les trois fonctions’.

8 The Deeds of Frederick, vol. I.32, pp. 66-7.

9 Bagge, ‘Ideas and Narrative’; Berend et al., Central Europe, pp. 192-3.

10 Fryde and Postan, ‘Public Credit’, pp. 507-11.

11 Scales, The Shaping, p. 93.

12 Bachrach, Warfare, pp. 179-83, on the provisioning of Ottoman armies, which imply extensive royal estates.

13 Zmora, Monarchy, Aristocracy and the State, pp. 1-36.

14 The classic account is Ganshof, Feudalism.

15 The etymology of the word is disputed. The most common opinion is that it is derived from Old French *fehu-od, in which fehu means ‘cattle’ (cf. German Vieh) and -od means ‘goods’, in Latin feudum which replaced the earlier Latin term beneficium (= gift).

Poly and Bounazel, La mutation feodale, pp. 1—85.

Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals.

For example, Bisson, The Crisis, pp. 24—5; Debax, ‘L’aristocracie languedocienne’ and Althoff, ‘Establishing Bonds’.

The opposite point of view is expressed by Reynolds, ‘Fiefs and Vassals’ and Kasten, ‘Economic and Political Aspects’.

Debax, ‘L’aristocracie’ and La Feodalite langedocienne.

Althoff, ‘Establishing Bonds’.

Bartlett, England, pp. 121—2.

For the following, see Helle, Cambridge History, pp. 105—234; Berend et al., Central Europe, pp. 110—249 and Bagge, Cross and Scepter, pp. 9—118.

Nelson, ‘Queens as Jezebels’; Stafford, ‘Sons and Mothers’.

Nelson, ‘Kingship and Royal Government’, pp. 400—1; Airlie, ‘The Aristocracy’, pp. 431—50, on mothers.

Tellenbach, ‘Die Unteilbarkeit des Reiches’; Schmid, ‘Das Problem der Unteilbarkeit des Reiches’; Becher, Die mittelalterliche Thronfolge.

Collins, From Tribes to Nation, pp. 150—2.

Eisner, ‘Killing Kings’, p. 556; Morrill, ‘Conclusion’, p. 297.

Bagge, ‘The Decline of Regicide’.

Duby, Medieval Marriage.

For practice in various countries, see e.g., Lachaud and Penman, Making and Breaking the Rules.

Morris, War, pp. 134—9.

Tilly, Coercion, p. 79.

Contamine, ‘Introduction’, p. 3.

Admittedly, this came late in the British navy. In 1747, some young officers met in a coffeehouse and agreed that uniform would be a good idea for naval officers (Morris, War, p. 189).

See McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, pp. 158—84 for the following.

Kroener, ‘The Modern State and Military Society’, pp. 202—3.

The attitude is aptly illustrated in Tolstoy’s caricature in War and Peace of the Prussian officer Pfuel during the campaign in 1812, who insists on well-planned and scientific campaigns, regardless of their results.

Finer, ‘State and Nation Building’, pp. 90—7.

Tallett, War and Society, pp. 191—3.

Post, Studies, pp. 434—53; Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, pp. 259—67; Menache, Vox Dei, pp. 177-87.

For the following, see Guenee, States and Rulers, pp. 91-110, and Ormond, ‘The West European Monarchies’, pp. 133-5.

Spruyt, The Sovereign State, p. 157.

Trevor Roper, ‘The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’, pp.

43-81; Steensgaard, ‘The Seventeenth Century Crisis’ and ‘The Seventeenth Century Crisis and the Unity of Eurasian History’, the latter arguing that the crisis was specific to Europe.

Brunner, Land und Herrschaft, pp. 11-17.

Fryde, The Tyranny, p. 150; Hyams, Rancor & Reconciliation, pp. 264-5; Cf. also Car­penter, Wars of the Roses, pp. 44-66, on English government in the fifteenth century. Barthelemy, Nouvelle histoire, pp. 79, 246-52.

Edward has a bad reputation among medieval chroniclers as well as modern historians. The recent biography by Phillips, Edward II, offers a rehabilitation on some points.

Fryde, The Tyranny, pp. 58-68; cf. the comparison with the greater leniency in the 1260s, pp. 78-9.

Gillingham, ‘Enforcing Old Law’; Strickland, ‘In coronam regiam iniuriam’.

Nelson, ‘The Frankish Kingdoms’, p. 134.

Althoff, Spielregeln, pp. 36-8.

Broekmann, Rigor iustitiae.

Valente, The Theory and Practice of Revolt, p. 205.

54 Bellamy, The Law of Treason, and Gillingham, ‘Enforcing Old Law’.

55 Harriss, England 1360—1461, pp. 644—5.

56 Cuttler, The Law of Treason.

57 Maitland, The Constitutional History, p. 19.

58 Brown, ‘Society and the Supernatural’; Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water; Davies and Fouracre, The Settlement of Disputes, pp. 207—40; Hyams, ‘Trial by Ordeal’.

59 Berman, Law and Revolution, pp. 467—81.

60 Harriss, ‘Government in Late Medieval England’, p. 53.

61 For this and the following, see Foucault, Surveiller et punir, pp. 10—72; Dupont-Bou- chat, ‘Guilt and Individual Consciousness’, pp. 123—38; Berman, Law and Revolution, vol. II, pp. 131-55.

62 Foucault, Surveiller et punir, pp. 9-11 and 36-7.

63 Berman, Law and Revolution, vol. II, pp. 317-19.

64 Dupont-Bouchat, ‘Guilt and Individual Consciousness’, pp. 128, 136.

65 Castan, ‘Criminelle’.

66 Berman, Law and Revolution, vol. II, pp. 133-7; Foucault, Surveiller et punir, pp. 47-51.

67 The King's Mirror, p. 319; Bagge, The Political Thought, pp. 63-4. The statement about God not punishing twice (‘non iudicat Deus bis in idipsum’) stems from Jerome and was often quoted in the Middle Ages, including by Thomas Becket in his dispute with King Henry II about clerics who had committed crimes (Brooke, The English Church, p. 205, n.l).

68 Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory, p. 326.

69 Bayley, ‘The Police’, p. 342.

70 Quetel, ‘Lettres de cachet’.

71 Strayer, On the Medieval Origins, pp. 23-5.

72 For the following, see Cheyette, ‘Suum cuique tribuere’; Davies and Fouracre, The Settlement of Disputes, pp. 208-40; Esmark et al., Disputing Strategies, pp. 1-31. See also the debate about the Feudal Revolution in Past and Present 1994 and 1997 between Thomas Bisson, Timothy Reuter and Chris Wickham.

73 Diamond, The World until Yesterday, pp. 139-40; cf. also Morris, War, pp. 7-19.

74 Miller, Blood-Taking and Peace-Making, in particular pp. 221-308;White, ‘Feuding’, p. 202.

75 White, ‘Feuding’, pp. 214-21.

76 Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, pp. 48-9, on the peace movement. Generally, Bisson is a strong spokesman for the traditional view.

77 Reuter, ‘The Origins’; cf. Harriss, ‘Political Society’, pp. 51-3, on arbitration in the later Middle Ages.

78 Harriss, Shaping the Nation, p. 81; Spruyt, The Sovereign State, pp. 158-67; Watts, The Making of Polities, pp. 207-19.

79 See e.g. Wieland, Studien zur Integration, on this process in Bavaria in the sixteenth century. An example of increasing royal involvement in justice in local society in France is Firnhaber-Baker, Violence and the State in Languedoc.

80 Eisner, ‘Long-Term Trends in Violent Crime’; Pinker, The Better Angels, pp. 71-102. For a case study, see Sharpe and Dickinson, ‘Revisiting the “Violence We Have Lost”: Homicide in Seventeenth-Century Cheshire’.

81 By contrast, if the chronology is correct, it is obvious that the explanation cannot be better health care. No significant improvement in this field took place until the twentieth century.

82 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests.

83 Berman, Law and Revolution, pp. 9-10.

84 Davis, ‘La femme au politique’; Oakley-Brown and Wilkinson, The Rituals and Rhetoric of Queenship; Duggan (ed.), Queens and Queenship in Medieval Europe and Fossel, ‘The Political Tradition of Female Rulership in Europe’, pp. 68-83.

85 Davis, ‘La femme au politique’.

86 Le Goff, Saint Louis, pp. 99-128.

87 Guenee, States and Rulers, p. 128; Clanchy, From Memory, p. 45; Harriss, ‘Government in Late Medieval England’, p. 35; Weiler, Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture, p. 35.

The King's Mirror, p. 169.

Strayer, The Reign of Philip the Fair, pp. 36—99.

Althoff, Kontrolle derMacht, pp. 152—87 on Henry IV of Germany’s failure to listen to advice. Elias, The Court Society, pp. 42—65; Bluche, Louis XIV, pp. 179—97, 363—80; Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV; Chaline, ‘The Kingdoms of France and Navarre’, pp. 67—93; Collins, From Tribes to Nation, pp. 375—88.

Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, pp. 9, 87—91.

Blanning, The Culture of Power, p. 32.

Heimskringla, pp. 327—9.

Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship, pp. 45—84; Zotz, ‘Carolingian Tradition’.

See e.g. Mulryne et al., Ceremonial Entries in Early Modern Europe.

Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, pp. 249—58.

Erkens, ‘Thronfolge und Herrschersakralität’, pp. 361—8. On coronation and sacred monarchy in the Middle Ages, see e.g. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies; Schramm, Der Konig von Frankreich and Geschichte des englischen Konigtums, and Le Goff, ‘Le Roi dans l’Occident medieval’.

Le Goff, Saint Louis, pp. 574—85 ; Cohen, The Sainte-Chapelle. Gotzmann, ‘Weihen’, pp. 22—3.

Kolmer, Der Tod des Mächtigen; Monod, The Power of Kings, pp. 33—42.

Bloch, Les rois taumaturges, pp. 27—49; for the date, see Le Goff, Saint Louis, p. 832.

Bloch, Les rois taumaturges, p. 398; Blanning, The Culture of Power, p. 408. According to Bloch, the story, which stems from Saint-Simon, is probably not true. There is no clear evidence either of the cause of Madame de Soubise’s death or of her having been the king’s mistress.

Adamson, ‘The Kingdoms of England and Great Britain’, p. 117.

Worseley, Courtiers, pp. 229—30.

Thietmar, Ottonian Germany, p. 185.

Guenee, States and Rulers, pp. 78—9, on numbers and sums.

Redworth and Checa, ‘The Kingdoms of Spain’, p. 47.

Elias, The Court Society.

Blanning, Culture of Power, p. 41.

Redworth and Checa, ‘The Kingdoms of Spain’, pp. 54—8.

Ruiz, A King Travels, p. 18.

Pognon, Les tres riches heures, pp. 30—1.

Stürner, Friedrich II, vol. 2, pp. 429—47.

Blanning, Pursuit of Glory, pp. 393-401.

Burke, Fabrication, pp. 32-5.

The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, p. 41.

Elias, The Court Society, p. 89.

Blanning, Culture of Power, p. 31.

Ibid., p. 40.

Ibid., pp. 54-5.

Blanning, Pursuit of Glory, pp. 430-7.

Ibid., p. 51.

Adamson, ‘The Kingdoms of England and Great Britain’, pp. 95-117; Blanning, Cul­ture of Power, pp. 316-22.

Blanning, Pursuit of Glory, pp. 440-4.

Tullberg, Beyond Feudalism; Dabringhaus, ‘The Monarch’; Kunt, ‘Turks’.

Burke, The Fabrication.

Gesta Chuonradi, Chapter 7, p. 130. My translation. Cf. Beumann, ‘Zur Entwicklung’ and Bagge, Kings, Politics, pp. 200-4.

Arquilliere, L'augustinisme politique; Kempf, ‘Das Problem der Christianitas im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert’, pp. 104-23.

Policraticus, V.2.

Melve, Inventing the Public Sphere, pp. 349-74, 35.

For this and the following, see Krynen, L'empire du roi, pp. 70—84.

Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, pp. 42—313.

Coleman, ‘The Individual and the Medieval State’, pp. 14—34 and ‘Property and Poverty’. Pierre de Belleperche (c. 1250—1308), quoted in Schmale, ‘Liberty is an Inestimable Thing’, pp. 171-2.

Dunbabin, ‘Government’, p. 494.

On John’s political thought, see Nederman, John of Salisbury, pp. 59-62.

Inst. I.2.6 = Dig. I.4.1. and Dig. I.3.31.

Skinner, The Foundations, vol. II, pp. 353-8.

Elton, England under the Tudors, pp. 130-7, 160-5.

Bluche, Louis XIV, p. 615.

Blanning, Culture, p. 195.

The King's Mirror, p. 246; Bagge, The Political Thought, p. 63.

Jaeger, ‘Courtesy and Treachery’, pp. 202-3.

Saxo, History of the Danes, ‘Preface’.

Kersken, Geschichtsschreibung, pp. 788-9.

Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.

Hobsbawm, Nations; Breully, Nationalism. By contrast, Smith, in Theories and National Identity, points to trends in this direction in earlier ages. See also Guiberneau and Hutch­inson, Understanding Nationalism, a collection of articles representing different views. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism.

Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 46.

Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 20-38.

Bagge, Society and Politics, pp. 100-5.

Ibid, pp. 100-5; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, pp. 145-6; Blanning, Culture of Power, pp. 21-5; cf. also 16-20.

Whereas many scholars have seen a conflict between religion and nationalism, Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. ix and Blanning, Culture of Power, p. 23 point to the con­nection between the two.

For the following, see Bagge, Cross and Scepter, pp. 250-68.

For the following, see Michaud, ‘The Kingdoms of Central Europe’, pp. 756-63; Scott, ‘Germany and the Empire’ and Klassen, ‘Hus, the Hussites and Bohemia’. Karoli IV Vita, pp. 66-9.

Crossley and Opacic, ‘Prague as a New Capital’.

Opacic, ‘Sacred Topography’; Dolezel, ‘Die Gründung des Prager Slavenklosters’, pp. 112-14.

Housley, ‘Sanctified Patriotism’, pp. 236-41.

Bartlett, The Making of Europe, pp. 236-42.

For the following, see Dyer, Making a Living, pp. 286-93. There is a considerable lit­erature on the rebellion, including Hilton and Fage, The English Rising; Freedman, ‘Rural Society’, pp. 98-100 and Harriss, Shaping the Nation, pp. 447-9.

Fourquin, The Anatomy, pp. 134-9.

Engel, The Realm of St Stephen, pp. 362-4.

Scribner, ‘The Reformation Movements in Germany’, pp. 87-92.

Hilton and Fagan, The English Rising.

Blickle, Resistance, Representation and Community, pp. 325-38; Imsen and Vogler, ‘Communal Autonomy’, pp. 18-27; Blickle et al., ‘The Commons and the State’, pp. 121-4, 128-32, 147-50.

Ladurie, The French Peasantry, p. 372.

For the following, see Mousnier, Peasant Uprisings, pp. 32-149.

Tilly, ‘Food Supply’, p. 411.

Collins, From Tribe to Nation, pp. 321-6.

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Source: Bagge Sverre H.. State Formation in Europe, 843-1789: A Divided World. Routledge,2019. — 306 p.. 2019

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