Conclusion: absolutism and constitutionalism: advantages and disadvantages

If we focus particularly on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have found two convincing examples in favour of the thesis about a connection between a commercial economy and constitutionalism, namely, England and the Dutch Republic, in addition to some examples of the combination of a more agrarian economy and absolutism: France, Spain, Denmark, Austria and Prussia, plus a number of German principalities.

What the successful examples of constitutionalism seem to have in common is that the constitutional assemblies had a broader basis than just the high nobility which could easily be persuaded to give up the assemblies in return for privileges. This may in turn point to some degree of urbanization, as in Aragon-Catalonia with Barcelona and of course in the Low Countries, but peasant elites or the lower aristocracy may have had a similar importance, as in Sweden. However, size may also be a factor. It is easier for representative assemblies to meet frequently in small countries than in large ones and, in addition, small countries are likely to be more homogeneous, which makes it easier to make the representatives of such assemblies work together.

In the case of England and the Dutch Republic, we may ask whether con­stitutionalism is the explanation for their commercial success or vice versa.

It is also a question how significant the difference actually was between abso­lutism and constitutionalism. England was far from democratic by modern stan­dards; only a small portion of the population had the right to vote and most decisions were taken by a narrow elite. On the other hand, the power of the absolute kings in France and other countries was often limited. They were cele­brated as God on Earth in Versailles and other places but as we have seen, their power on the local level was restricted and the price of their absolute power was tax exemption and substantial privileges for the nobility. Moreover, although European absolutism meant government on the king’s sole authority, it was not arbitrary rule. Rather, it was combined with the rule of law: as a result, the inha­bitants, particularly the upper classes, for the most part had a degree of security for both their lives and their property. The main problem of absolutist kingdoms was not tyrannical kings but weak kings; there was no Nero in early modern Europe.

Although the difference between European absolutism and constitutionalism should not be exaggerated, neither should it be neglected; it largely explains the success of the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century and that of England in the eighteenth. The most important difference between these countries and most others was freedom of speech and writing and to engage in trade and business.

The difference between more or less efficient absolutist states seems to corre­spond to the presence or absence of venal offices. Denmark, Prussia, Austria and many of the German principalities developed reasonably efficient bureaucracies based on appointment by the king or his advisors, while France and Spain relied on venality. As mentioned about, tradition may have had some importance in this, but a more important factor is probably the frequency of wars. Particularly Spain but also, to a large extent, France were involved in more costly and prolonged wars than other countries, at least until the eighteenth century, when England did the same, although with better finances. As we have seen, there is a direct connection between war and venality in France and the same is probably also the case in Spain. Prussia might seem to belong in the same category, but although this was the most militarized country in Europe, it was less involved in war than France and it also spent less on the court. There is no doubt that strong armies and navies were important factors in state formation, but they seem to have been most efficient when they were not used too often in active warfare.

Finally, one feature is common to all European states, whether constitutionalist or absolutist, namely, the ruler’s dependence on support from his subjects. Evi­dently, no ruler can have absolute power in the sense that he can command without any consultation and without considering any other interest than his own. Attempts in this direction would often lead to dependence on bureaucrats or slave soldiers, as in the Arab or Ottoman Empires and in periods also in China. By contrast, most European bureaucracies were relatively weak and even if armies increased greatly in the early modern period, there was nothing resembling military dictators until the period of Napoleon. European rulers depended on the support of their subjects, admittedly mainly the upper classes, the nobility, gentry and bourgeoisie, in other words, largely the classes that continued to dominate until the introduction of mass democracy in the twentieth century.

Notes

1 Churchill, Marlborough, vol. I, pp. 843—4.

2 The date is occasionally given as 2 August, because England at the time still used the Julian calendar. When the country changed to the Gregorian one in 1752, 11 days had to be added.

3 Bluche, Louis XIV, pp. 551—72. By contrast, Rowlands, The Financial Decline of a Great Power, after a detailed examination of the French finances and their administration, argues that the French were in a desperate situation and were only saved because the British began to withdraw from the war.

4 Ertman, Leviathan, p. 220; Coward, The Stuart Age, pp. 8, 485.

5 Barrington Moore, The Social Origins, pp. 413—505.

6 The criticism began with Henshall, The Myth of Absolutism. See more recently Beik, ‘Absolutism’ and Durchhardt and Schnettger, Barock und Aufklärung, pp. 169—73. Rein­hard, Geschichte der Staatsgewalt, pp. 113—22, points to Hobbes as a representative of the idea of the state rather than that of absolutism, and to the king’s limited control of local society (ibid., pp.

7 Kunt, The Sultan's Servants, pp.31—56; Fukuyama, The Origins, pp. 218—20, 296—8, 308, 331—2 and Imber, ‘Government, Administration and Law’, pp. 205—22.

8 For this and the following, see Blockmans, ‘The Low Countries in the Middle Ages’ and ‘t Hart, ‘The United Provinces 1579-1806’.

9 t’Hart, ‘The United Provinces’, p. 311.

10 Ibid., p. 309.

11 For the following, see Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 285-91 and de Vries and van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, pp. 113-29.

12 De Vries and van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, pp. 673-87.

13 Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches, pp. 260, 407-12.

14 Burke, Venice and Amsterdam, pp. 113-24.

15 For this and the following, see Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches, pp. 375-86; Burke, Venice and Amsterdam, pp. 89-90 and Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 329.

16 Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution, pp. 125-37.

17 For the following, see ibid., pp. 39-113.

18 For this and the following, see Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 351-60 and de Vries and van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, pp. 561-71.

19 Ferguson, Empire, pp. 17-25.

20 Piketty, Le capital au XXI siecle, pp. 206-14.

21 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, pp. 182-212.

22 For this and the following, see Smith, The Emergence of a Nation State, pp. 169-71 and Hoppit, A Land of Liberty, pp. 352-65.

23 Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory, pp. 93-5.

24 Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit and Banking Systems’, pp. 378-80; Collins, From Tribes, pp. 454-5; Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, pp. 139-58.

25 Dunbabin, ‘Government’, p. 508.

26 Given, State and Society, pp. 42—52.

27 Vauchez, La saintete, pp.

28 Durand et al., Des Etats dans l'Etat.

29 Strayer, Philip the Fair, p. 286.

30 Aylmer, The Struggle, p. 55.

31 Collins, The State, pp. 24—5, 93.

32 Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution, pp. 144—8.

33 Ardant, ‘Financial Policy’, p. 194.

34 Ladurie, The French Peasantry, p. 19.

35 Bonney, ‘France 1494—1815’, pp. 142—3; Collins, From Tribes to Nation, pp. 404—5.

36 Beik, ‘Absolutism’.

37 Bluche, Louis XIV, pp. 144—6, 202—4, 432—6, 499—506.

38 Ibid., pp. 129—31; Collins, From Tribes to Nation, pp. 409—10. For an example of these limits, see e.g. Pitts, Embezzlement and High Treason in Louis XIV's France, on the process against Nicholas Fouquet.

39 For this and the following, see Maddicott, The Origins, pp. 1—105.

40 Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought, pp. 108—62.

41 Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, pp. 108—9, 254—69, 510—15.

42 Harriss, Shaping the Nation, pp. 66—74, 437—501, 650—3.

43 Finer, ‘State and Nation Building’, pp. 117—21.

44 For an overview of the discussion, see Coward, The Stuart Age, pp. 500—8.

45 Ibid., pp. 172-8, for the following. Cf. also Monod, The Power of Kings, pp. 103-10.

46 Trevor-Roper, ‘Cromwell and his Parliaments’.

47 Coward, The Stuart Age, p. 296.

48 Vallance, The Glorious Revolution, pp. 1-20.

49 Ferguson, Empire, pp. 22-4.

50 Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, pp. 209-22.

51 Cf. Goldstone, ‘Europe’s Peculiar Path’, on the possible consequences for science if James II had succeeded.

52 Sowerby, Making Toleration; cf. also Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution.

53 Tilly, Coercion, p. 155.

54 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). On the popular support, see Valente, The Theory and Practice, pp. 90-9.

55 Documents, no. 37-8, pp. 252-89; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, p. 295. On Louis’ atti­tude as the expression of the traditional concept of monarchy, see also Le Goff, Saint Louis, pp. 264-7.

56 Ardant, ‘Financial Policy’, p. 200.

57 For the following, see MacKay, Spain and Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms.

58 MacKay, Spain, pp. 136-42.

59 Monod, The Power of Kings, p. 43; Erkens, ‘Thronfolge und Herrschersakralität’, pp. 363-4.

60 Thus, Acemoglou and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, p. 105.

61 Elliott, Imperial Spain, index; Muto, ‘The Spanish System’, p. 258.

62 Monod, The Power of Kings, p. 129, with reference to Elliott, ‘Self-Perception and Decline’ and Kamen, ‘The Decline of Spain’.

63 For a recent account in English of these countries in the period, see Jespersen, ‘The Military Imperative’, ‘Fiscal and Military Developments’, ‘From Aristocratic Regime to Absolutism’, and ‘The Consolidation of the Nordic States’, Rian, ‘Centre and Periph­ery’, and Grell, ‘Religious and Social Regimentation’.

64 For the following, see Jespersen, Danmarks historie, vol. III, pp. 70-92, 181-211.

65 Gamrath and Ladewig Petersen, Danmarks historie, vol. II, p. 419.

66 For the following, see Jespersen, Danmarks historie* vol. III, pp. 212-37 and Lind, ‘Den heroiske tid?’.

67 For the following, see Lind, Hwren og magten, pp. 383-401 and Konger og krige, pp. 429-67.

68 Lindegren, ‘Men, Money and Means’, pp. 150-5.

Roberts, The Swedish Imperial Experience, pp. 44—5, 56.

Ibid., pp. 123-43.

Lindegren, ‘Men, Money and Means’, p. 140.

Schück, Riksdagen, pp. 32-53.

For the following, see Gustafsson, Political Integration, particularly pp. 154-72.

Blanning, Culture of Power, p. 70.

Clark, Iron Kingdom, p. 26.

For the following, see ibid., p. 78-114.

Finer, ‘State and Nation-Building’, pp. 134-44; Clark, Iron Kingdom, pp. 53-64. Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution, pp. 85-92.

Rady, ‘Rethinking Jagiello Hungary’; Watts, The Making of Polities, p. 360. Thanks to Martyn Rady for drawing my attention to this. For the older interpretation, see Engel, The Realm of St Stephen, pp. 345-71 and Fukuyama, The Origins, pp. 378-85.

For the following, see Zamorsky, Poland: A History, particularly pp. 125-88 and Davies, God's Playground, vol. I, pp. 125-385.

Nevertheless, the links between the two countries were stronger than most earlier scholars have assumed; see Frost, The Oxford History of Poland-Lithuania.

Weinberg, To Explain the World, p. 147.

For this and the following, see Frost, The Northern Wars.

Recent discussions of the Empire include Schmidt, Geschichte and Schmidt, ‘Das früh­neuzeitliche Reich’; Schilling, ‘Reich-Staat und frühneuzeitliche Nation der Deut­schen’; Wilson, ‘Still a Monstrosity?’ and Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire, pp. 655-86. The tension between the imperial power and the independence of the princes in the ritual field is explored elegantly in Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor's Old Clothes.

Ertman, Leviathan, pp. 28-34 distinguishes between a bureaucratic and a patrimonial version of each. Cf. also Fukuyama, The Origins, pp. 373-85.