If John Darwin is right to claim that empire is the default mode of politics in the history of the world, then the task given to me is well nigh impossible.1
I begin by stressing the sheer variety of imperial experience that makes it so, in order to acknowledge that there have been particular endings for particular empires. Nonetheless, I then suggest that certain patterns are often present in imperial decline.
The section that then follows derives from the simplest of observations, namely that history does not stand still, with huge increases in human powers presenting new challenges to rule in the modern era. Hence we must ask if such novel conditions and circumstances will send empires into final decline. I will argue that there is a great deal of truth to this, but will resist complete endorsement of this generally accepted view.It may be as well to note the definition of empire used in this chapter. Empires have usefully been seen in terms of a rimless bicycle wheel: a metropole stands at the center with powers of coercion in part based on the simple fact that the separate societies with which it is in contact do not easily communicate with each other.2 Very much the same idea is present in Ernest Gellner's famous diagram of an agroliterate polity—in which a thin military, ideological, and political elite sits on top of a series of laterally insulated societies, with its own distinct cultural identity.3 These models have the advantage of making us realize that central power is likely to be curtailed by the lack of social mobilization. This is not just a matter of pre-modern logistical circumstances. The powers of empires in modern times are best seen as varying from direct control in core territories to indirect rule through local elites, and then from coercive demonstrations through gunboats and punitive expeditions to the informal control exercised by the manipulation of terms of trade.
All this suggests that empire is a system of rule. Self-definition as an empire may mean little.
Great Britain in large part and the United States at all times have refused to admit that they are empires. Equally, Bokassa was no emperor despite his claim to be such, nor really was Henry VIII—although there is a little sense in this latter case, given the earlier conquests of Wales and the lowlands of Scotland. But later developments in Britain lead to a further consideration. Ireland and Scotland, at1 Darwin 2007, 491.
2 Motyl 1999, part 3.
3 Gellner 1983, ch. 2.
John A. Hall, The End of Empires In: The Oxford World History of Empire. Edited by: Peter Fibiger Bang, C.A. Bayly, Walter Scheidel, Oxford University Press (2021). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199772360.003.0016. least for some periods, had their own assemblies, while Scotland retained its own legal system with the link between the two territories being that of a union of crowns. This is to say that the state was composite. So too was the Habsburg “empire,” as the different regions that comprised it held their own “liberties” to which the ruler acceded. It may be as well to cite another example at some length, not least as the nature of its demise will concern our attention later. The Helstaten ruled by Danish kings has at various times included control of southern Sweden and part of the Baltic coast, Norway, Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands, a trading post in West Africa and two in India, colonies in the West Indies (St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas), and Schleswig and Holstein. This list makes it clear that the Oldenburg dynasty was at once imperial and royal, possessed of an empire overseas but having within Europe the character of a classic composite monarchy within which different types of rule were exercised. The personal union with Norway in 1380 changed markedly in 1536 when Norway's status as a separate state was abolished, leading some thereafter to speak of the United Monarchy. Still more complex were relations to Holstein.
The Oldenburgs were Dukes of Holstein, thereby owing loyalty to the Holy Roman Emperor because Holstein was part of that strange entity. But there was change here, too, notably in 1773 when a dispute with the Russian ruling dynasty was solved by allowing for complete control over Holstein—although this did not lead to uniform central rule in Copenhagen, as Holstein was administered by a separate unit, the Deutsche Kanzlei. Further complexity followed in 1806 when the Holy Roman Empire collapsed, allowing for its complete annexation—albeit this move was reversed in 1814 when it became an independent duchy in the German Confederation. If such a list, incomplete though it is, leaves one a little breathless, then a purpose has been served. Imperial rule can be messy, and any pretense to the contrary misleads (further Bang, Chapter 1 in this volume).All these comments suggest that there never can be any “closed” or final definition of empire. Still, a particular text stands at the back of this chapter. John Hobson's Imperialism: A Study (1902) is best known as the precursor to Lenin's view of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. In one sense this is a terrible mistake, for the book argued the case opposite to that of Lenin's, namely that imperialism was neither necessary nor profitable, its incidence instead being explained by the predatory behavior of the few. But what is of interest here is not the general thesis of the book but the opening pages on nationalism and imperialism.
The novelty of the recent Imperialism regarded as a policy consists chiefly in its adoption by several nations. The notion of a number of competing empires is essentially modern. The root idea of empire in the ancient and medieval world was that of a federation of States, under a hegemony, covering in general terms the entire or recognized world, such as was held by Rome... Thus empire was identified with internationalism, though not always based on a conception of equality of nations...
the triumph of nationalism seems to have crushed the rising hope of internationalism. Yet it would appear that there is no essential antagonism between them. A true strong internationalism in form or spirit would rather imply the existence of powerful self-respecting nationalities which seek union on the basis of common national needs and interests... Nationalism is a plain highway to internationalism, and if it manifests divergence we may well suspect a perversion of its nature and its purpose. Such a perversion is Imperialism, in which nations trespassing beyond the limits of facile assimilation transform the wholesome stimulative rivalry of varied national types into the cut-throat struggle of competing empires.[1344]There is much to praise here. The ideal typical empire of the pre- modern era sought to create a world all of its own, free from competitors. Such empires claimed to be universal, and so were something more than agro-literate polities, greater than composite monarchies. Of course, they were “multicultural” to a fault, bound to diversity by weakness, lacking means to indoctrinate and to homogenize into a single mold. Nationalism and imperialism were indeed separated from each other, making any notion of intimacy between them ridiculous. Hobson continues this passage by claiming that “imperialism is an artificial stimulation of nationalism in peoples too foreign to be absorbed and too compact to be crushed.”[1345] His reference point here seems to have been peoples overseas; we will see that his concern applies equally to core areas of the world polity. But let us put Hobson's concerns to one side for a moment so as to concentrate first on variability and typicality within the great imperial eras.