Background to the Moro Conflict in the Philippines
The southern Philippines has been contending with the Moro rebellion and the concurrent government’s military offensives, as well as problems of communist insurgency and terrorism, all of which contribute to the volatile security in southern Philippines.
The conflict in Mindanao has resulted in an estimated 120,000 deaths since the 1970s (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005, p. 5) and the displacement of around 3.5 million people since 2000, with at least 123,800 new displacements in 2014 against 70,700 returns (IDMC 2015, p. 86). The military solution favored by the succeeding governments after President Marcos (1965-1986), particularly the all-out war policy of President Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), resulted to the displacement of some 500,000-800,000 Muslim civilians in Central Mindanao in 2000 (Rasul 2009, p. 29). Between 2000 and 2010, over 40% of families in Central Mindanao were displaced at least once, with one in ten displaced five times or more (WFP & WB 2011).The signing of ‘the comprehensive agreement on the Bangsamoro' on 27 March 2014 between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has paved the way for the creation of a new autonomous political entity to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The signing drew positive reactions from government and Moro leaders as well as from peace organizations who all expressed hopes that the agreement would translate to positive changes in the lives of the Bangsamoros and will eventually bring lasting peace in a region beset with conflict for the last 45 years. However, intermittent fighting continues to occur as waged by Moro insurgent groups who feel left out in the comprehensive agreement. There are also those who reject outright a peace agreement and continue with the struggle for complete independence. The vertical manifest conflict between the state and Moro insurgent groups are complicated by struggles at the local level between clans and power holders, hence making the security environment in Mindanao far from secure.
The causes of this conflict are many but should be viewed historically as resulting from the systematic marginalization and minoritization of the Bangsamoros in their homeland in Mindanao, dating from the Spanish colonial times (1521-1898). Without undermining the economic and political grievances that incited the Bangsamoros to wage an armed resistance against the Philippine state, the struggle is equally about safeguarding and preservation of their Islamic identity. The conflict therefore has further accentuated divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ with the resulting threat of violence adding volatility to social interactions across identity boundaries. Tensions between Muslims and Christians are not only prevalent in Mindanao but in the entire country. This has generated public sympathy and support for the avowed goals of the competing armed groups, including support for (the use of) violence.
At the heart of the struggles in Mindanao is the strongly held perception that the Bangsamoros have been persecuted, oppressed, and marginalized since colonization. Their centuries-old struggle took a significant turn in the late sixties with the Jabidah massacre (cf. Aljunied and Curaming 2012) which heightened calls for separatism and independence from the Philippine state. The two major armed groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and, its breakaway group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were founded by Moro youth leaders fired up by ideals critical of the social order. The MNLF was founded by Nur Misuari, a student leader and professor from the University of the Philippines, while the MILF was founded by Salamat Hashim, a graduate student and student leader from Al-Azhar University who believed that the teachings of Islam should be the main thrust of the organization as opposed to the secular-nationalist approach of the MNLF. The formation of both groups was borne out of the grievances, oppressions, and injustices suffered by the Bangsamoros under the Christian-dominated Philippine state.
Through the years, the Bangsamoro struggle has varied in calls, extent, and magnitude, which started in the form of a secessionist or separatist movement that fought for complete separation of a portion of the state territory. This was later abandoned by some groups in favor of an autonomy movement which involved demands for greater control over governance of local affairs. Through it all, the Bangsamoro struggle has been sustained by a broad and popular protest movement composed of groups and individuals who perceive themselves as belonging to, representing, or supporting the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people resisting against state policies or conditions that they consider as unjust and unacceptable.
Defending the interests of the Philippine sovereign state, the Philippine government tried to quell unrest and dissent in southern Philippines with military force which resulted to the displacement of a magnitude of people disproportionately affecting the Muslims (World Bank 2003, p. 12). As a result, life in Muslim Mindanao for children, youth, and their families became a never-ending story of fighting and fleeing (Risser 2007; De Castro et al. 2013). Schools made way for evacuation centers where distressed families and clans stayed for long periods under dismal conditions. The civilians were forced by the protracted armed conflict situation to express support and take sides. “Civilians blame the external big actors as the culprit. A Christian barangay captain argues that, ‘if armed groups from outside don’t come into our community, there would be no trouble. ’ The implication is that the AFP and the MILF have dragged civilians into the conflict, forcing them to take sides, usually along ethnic lines” (Quitoriano and Libre 2001, p. 23).
Children and youth have also taken sides, making up a sizable portion of the Muslim armed groups mass base support. Their support and involvements range from being combatants to taking part in activities in the context of armed conflict such as foot patrol, guard/sentry posts, food preparation for combatants, courier services, and medical team duties. Guided by this definition, an estimated 10-30% of children under 18 years of age in any given community influenced by an armed group can be considered as providing support, if not actively participating in the armed group (Cagoco-Guiam 2002).
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