Pathways to Youth Support of Violence and Participation in Conflict

In the Philippines, the armed resistance movements, both ideological (e.g., Com­munist Party of the Philippines) and ethno-religious (e.g., Muslim liberation move­ments), have broad mass base support.

Various scholars have looked at the objective features of the children and youth’s preconflict and conflict-related experiences as a factor for their support for and participation in violence and conflict. Political minorization and economic margin­alization play a key role. Equally important are perceptions of discrimination and negative stereotypes among children and youth. In this context, children grow up needing to assert their identities in ethnic and religious terms. Personal experiences of violence further trigger involvement in conflict and may lead children and youth to participate in private armed groups.

3.1 Political Minorization and Economic Marginalization of Muslims

The Mindanao conflict, expressed in Muslim armed resistance against the Philippine state, was deemed difficult to resolve not only because of its deep historical roots but also because of the competing goals of the two groups each with their own narrative of the conflict - the struggle for self-determination rights of the Moro separatist movement versus the defense of Philippine nation-state’s sovereign right to territo­rial integrity (Buendia 2005).

Not only do the Bangsamoros claim that they have been deprived of their homeland, they also argue that they have been systematically dispossessed of their land and reduced to a minority in their own homeland. Government resettlement programs, particularly under the American rule (1890-1946) which continued after independence (1946), facilitated the large-scale migration of Christian settlers from the northern islands of Luzon and the Visayas to Mindanao which resulted to the dispossession of large areas of land that were communally owned by the Muslims and indigenous peoples. With continuing migration and rapid population growth, land became increasingly scarce and this led to escalation of tensions between communities of Muslims and Christian settlers which undeniably was also fuelled by centuries of distrust between the two groups.

Although the region is agriculturally fertile and resourceful, decades of conflict have left the area among the most impoverished in the Philippines. The ARMM fares especially poorly on national economic indicators, with a poverty incidence among families of 48.7% (against 19.7% in the Philippines and 2.3% in the National Capital Region). Ofthe 16 poorest provinces in the country, 10 are from Mindanao. Ofthese, two provinces are from the ARMM: Lanao del Sur, the province with the highest poverty incidence at 68.9%, and Maguindanao, which ranked fourth with a poverty incidence of 57.8% (PSA/NSCB 2012 figures). In 2012, the average yearly family income in the Philippines was PHP 235,000 with big regional differences between the National Capital Region (PHP 379,000) and the ARMM (PHP 130,000) (PSA/NCSB 2012 figures).

The interplay of political marginalization and poverty provides a sure pathway to youth support and participation for the avowed goals of Muslim resistance groups (Cagoco-Guiam 2002). The six young members from the MILF and Abu Sayyaf Group interviewed for the UNICEF (2002) case study on child soldiers have varied reasons for joining, but their environment was a cauldron ready to produce child soldiers. The six boys were from the provinces of Maguindanao and Basilan, two of the poorest provinces in the country. To this day, the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao have the highest poverty levels and, at the same time, the lowest levels of human development indicators in the Philippines (Adriano and Parks 2013).

When Philippine local government leadership is not felt and basic social services are wanting, the armed group leadership becomes the de facto governing officials providing education, health, livelihood, and other services. In many Moro areas, people rely on the armed group or their local leaders for protection, social services and livelihood, provisions that the government fails to deliver. This accounts for the reciprocity and conciliation in the relationship between community members and the local leadership which are often extended families. It is not unusual for families to support local leadership and its armed groups as an obligation to the clan and to ensure their members’ survival.

In MILF camps, community members, including children and young people, are provided basic military training. MILF camps are described as self-contained and self-sustainable communities. As any other community member, children and young people help out around the camp, do chores, and give other types of support for the armed group. Daughters and sons of MILF fighters spend their everyday lives in the camp, thus rendering insignificant the element of coercion prevalent in the literature on child recruitment to armed groups (Camacho 2004; Ozerdem et al. 2010). Sup­port, participation, and eventual membership to the armed group are considered as part of the natural order of things, accepted, and even encouraged by their families (Cagoco-Guiam 2002; Camacho et al.

As can be explained by the realistic group conflict theory, intergroup conflicts arise due to incompatible goals and competing claims to scarce resources. The competition over scarce resources is likely to take place along lines of group identification (Coser 1956; Sherif 1966, LeVine and Campbell 1972). As argued by the ethnic group conflict theory, competition over scarce resources will trigger intergroup conflict if this competition is interpreted or perceived along the lines of the groups involved (Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Scheepers et al. 2002). In addition, youth bulge theory (Wells 2015) clarifies relevance of the population pyramid for tensions between social groups. Societies with rapidly growing young populations are likely to have high unemployment rates and disaffected youths who are more susceptible to recruitment into violent groups. Socioeconomic deprivation herewith mediates the relationship between an expansive population pyramid and (participation in) conflict between groups. However, empirical data suggest that youth bulge only affects the onset of conflict when there is no further involvement of substantial (ethnic or religious) identifications (Yair and Midownik 2016).

3.2 Discrimination and Negative Stereotypes

The Moros consider their poverty as a result of centuries of political neglect that reduced them to being a minority in their own homeland and rendered them marginalized in the economic and political spheres. This sense of injustice is aggravated by their perceptions of discrimination coming from the Christian major­ity towards their ethno-religious identity. Perceptions of discrimination by Muslims are not without basis. Filipinas Foundation (1975) found Muslim Filipinos as the least likable among nine ethnic groups in the selection, with a majority of the negative traits attributed to Muslim Filipinos such as being hostile, unreliable, and proud, despite the finding that only 21% of the total respondents had Muslim acquaintances.

Moros likewise harbor a negative image of Christians: “the Christian is a coward, a cheat, a bully, a land-grabber who, if he could, would destroy Islam” (Gowing 1969, p. 85). “Bisaya” is a generic term Moros use to designate the Christian Filipinos in a derogatory way. It refers to the large-scale migration of Christian settlers to Mindanao particularly from the Visayas (central Philippines) during the period of American rule. They were accused of conspiring with the Christian government of dispossessing them of their ancestral domain. Kaufman (2011, p. 948) asserts that this perception of Christians as land-grabbers who are out to destroy Islam is not inaccurate given the Spanish colonizers’ explicit goal of subjugating the Moros and the implicit goal behind the integration and resettlement policies of the American colonial government and which was continued by post­independence Philippine governments.

One explanation for the continuing hostilities that characterize Christian-Muslim relations can be found in how the hostile image of a Moro has been consistently propagated in media and reinforced in schools through time. A thematic content analysis of the image portrayal of Muslims by the Bulletin Today in the years 1971, 1976, and 1981 revealed the paper’s persistence in portraying Muslims as “rebel,” “terrorist,” “killer,” or “outlaw” (Cafe 1985). The discrimination of Muslims in local and national media continued unabated and even intensified in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.

As to the complicity of the education system, an analysis of the representation of Muslims in two officially prescribed history textbooks, one used in high school and the other at the tertiary level, found that Filipino Muslims are portrayed as “other” and their contributions to national history misrepresented, downplayed, or even at some points denigrated (Reilley 2011). The continuing problematic representation of Filipino Muslims in Philippine history just serves to perpetuate the cultural mis­understandings that have characterized Christian-Muslim relations through time. Among primary school students in Metro Manila, the Muslim pupils are already well aware of the common cultural stereotypes associated with Muslims in the wider culture outside the school: Muslims are “‘traydor’ (treacherous), ‘bully,’ ‘fearless,’ “fierce’ and ‘bloodthirsty,’ and ‘they gang up against their common enemies’” (Lanuza and Gonzales 2010, p. 55). Because of this, Muslim pupils become excluded and feared by their Christian classmates, thus preventing the formation of intimate social contacts between Muslims and Christian students or a relationship that is based not on fear but on mutual respect.

It should be noted that there have been headways towards accommodation and close integration between Muslims and the Catholic majority in the country. The International Religious Freedom Report notes that in general, amicable ties among and between religious communities are common (US Department of State 2012, p. 6). However, there is reason to believe that this accommodation is based on fear and exclusion (Lanuza and Gonzales 2010). Latent anti-Muslim biases of Christians can easily manifest when a threat of a “Muslim take-over” becomes real or immi­nent, such as the construction of a mosque in a predominantly Christian neighbor­hood in Metro Manila and this often leads to hostile attitudes and exclusionary actions (GRP/HOR 2004).

In conflict-affected areas in Mindanao, the once harmonious relations among residents of mixed religious communities can easily be disturbed and feelings of fear and distrust can affect intracommunity relations. In a study on children in conflicts in the Philippines (Risser 2007; De Castro et al. 2013), the children in Cotabato and Basilan shared that their relationships with their Muslim or Christian friends became strained as a result of the recurring military operations and rebel attacks. The Christian children expressed that after the conflict, they became wary of striking new and meaningful friendships with Muslim children, and vice versa. They called each other names, with Muslims calling Christian children as baboy (pigs), and Christians calling Muslim children as muklo (a derogatory term for Muslims). The Christian children shared that they do not want to build their houses next to Muslims nor marry one. The Muslim children felt the same way.

The line of theorizing on ‘realistic’ conflicts based on political and economic competition described in the previous section, started from the bedrock assumption, explicated by Bobo (1988, 1999) that dominant group members affectively distin­guish themselves as group members from other subordinate out-groups. This dis­tinction is linked with presumed traits of both the in-group and the out-groups. Here discrimination and stereotypes come into play. This proposition has been substanti­ated by social identity theory (Tajfel 1982), according to which individuals have the fundamental need to achieve a positive social identity which induces them to perceive their in-group as superior to out-groups. Subsequently, they apply favorable characteristics that they perceive among members of the in-group to themselves via mental processes labeled as social identification, and they value out-groups nega­tively via mechanisms of social contra-identification. Social identity theory doubts, in general, the assumption of realistic conflict theory that competitive intergroup relations are a necessary condition for intergroup conflicts. Tajfel (1982) proved with his ‘minimal group experiments’ (called ‘minimal’ because there was neither a conflict of interest nor a history of hostility between the groups) that mere group identification is sufficient to induce in-group favoritism and out-group discrimina­tion. Tajfel (1982, pp. 2 and 21) defined a group on the basis of both internal and external criteria. Internal criteria refer to an individual’s identification with the group, while external criteria refer to the fact that others perceive individuals as members of a common group on the basis of characteristics they do not possess themselves. Both internal and external criteria are necessary for group identification. Social identity processes interact as well as supplement the motivations postulated by realistic conflict theory. There has, in other words, always been some overlap and mutual influence between realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory. Never­theless the complementarities of aforementioned theories become clearer in ethnic group conflict theory (Scheepers et al. 2002; Brown and Hewstone 2005). We know from ethnic group conflict theory that intergroup competition and conflict reinforces the mechanisms for group identification, the eventual outcome of which are exclu­sionary attitudes, intolerance, and other forms of latent conflicts such as prejudice, discrimination, contact avoidance, and support of violence (Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Abanes 2014; Sterkens et al. 2014; Pamungkas 2015; Subagya 2015).

3.3 Assertion and in Defense of the Moro Identity

Ethno-religious groups facing difficult social and material realities are likely to emphasize those elements within its cultural repository to promote group cohesion toward the improvement of the group’s condition (Seul 1999). Religion and ethnicity foster stronger loyalty and commitment than other identities in the sense that these traditional forms of social identity provide stability, continuity, and belonging or a sense of “solid ground” especially in times when an individual’s or community’s sense of safety, security, and identity has been undermined or threatened (Juergensmeyer 1993; Ysseldyk et al. 2010). In the context of the Bangsamoro people’s collective experience of persecution and marginalization, Islam offered a definite sociocultural marker of difference and became the unifying force and a point of mobilization for resistance and support. From being an ethnic slur, the label “Moro” was appropriated to represent the politicized collective identity of the 13 disparate ethnolinguistic groups as Muslims, proud and assertive of their religious and ethnic identities, and unified in their resistance against the Christian-dominated Philippine state (Brazal 2004).

Moro children grow up needing to assert their identities both in ethnic and religious terms. As a consequence of their marginalization and minoritization, they accept it as part of their religious and moral obligations to defend their faith, clan, and homeland. This could explain the steady stream of support families and com­munities offer to armed groups such as the MILF. The children associated with the MILF, labeled as child soldiers in international human rights discourse, were found to strongly identify with the Bangsamoro cause, rationalizing that it is part of their religious and moral obligation to do “jihad” in defense of their way of life and in order to attain liberation for their fellow Muslims who they perceive are oppressed by the dominant government in Metro Manila. More often than not, their parents or relatives are themselves part of the armed group. These factors make support and participation in the armed group activities unproblematic for the children who are found to move seamlessly between life with MILF and their home life given that there are no sharp distinctions between these two contexts in the first place (Cagoco- Guiam 2002; Ozerdem et al. 2010).

Muslim Filipino parents feel proud of their sons and daughters who are contrib­uting to the Bangsamoro cause. Parents who send their children to military training in MILF camps feel confident that their children are in “good” hands because they will not become influenced by the excesses of western, “Christian” ways such as drug or alcohol addiction, gambling, and free sex (Cagoco-Guiam 2002; Camacho 2004; Ozerdem et al. 2010).

In the same vein, Muslim parents used to hesitate to send their children to public schools for fear that they will lose the purity of being Muslims. Nowadays however, Muslim children attend public schools and at the same time are sent to madaris where the curriculum focuses on Arabic literacy, Islamic values, and Islamic reli­gion. Muslim parents believe that by sending their children to madaris, their children are able to sustain their identity as Muslims while not foregoing their chances for social and economic mobility that the public school system could offer. Though these two systems of education offer different value systems, most Muslim Filipino families believe that they must negotiate through these to sustain both their religious and civic identities (Milligan 2004).

While Moro and Muslim identity are inseparable, nurtured by centuries-old resentment about stolen sovereignty and collective experiences of subjugation and marginalization, traditional identity construction along clan and ethnic lines strongly persist beneath the overarching Moro identity. Although Muslims are united in belief in Islam and can be mobilized as a unified group to advance the Bangsamoro cause, they differ in terms of norms, values, and traditions according to their clan and ethnic groups. Understanding these overlapping layers of identities helps explain conflict dynamics across Mindanao where inter-elite and communal (horizontal) conflicts may be closely linked or may even escalate into (vertical) state-minority conflicts (Guilal 1998; Kreuzer 2005; Adriano and Parks 2013).

3.4 Personal Experience of Violence as Trigger Factors

Armed conflicts in Mindanao are not only brought about by military campaigns against rebel forces. It is also brought about by land disputes, family feuds (rido), and political rivalries between Christian and Muslim residents and even among Moros themselves. This is another facet in the militarized life of a Moro youth. In a society where the formal justice system is faulty, people are left with hardly any option but to settle perceived affront or grievances themselves. This sparks a series of retaliatory acts of violence between families and kinship groups.

In stories shared by children for the study on children in conflicts in the Philip­pines, the children expressed anger and hatred towards the perceived instigator of conflict or violence (Risser 2007; De Castro et al. 2013). They themselves are victims of violence or are witnesses to violence inflicted on their relatives or friends. It is not uncommon for children to express desires to become a soldier so they could go after the “bad people.” Children’s plays depict the image of one group as the cultural “enemy” reinforcing fears that children may increasingly see violence as a legitimate means for managing disputes. When revenge and retaliation is the main form of justice to protect family honor, gun training for children starts at home at an early age. Personal experience of atrocities and injustice fuels a desire for revenge in children, and this serves as a pathway for their support for and participation in violence (Cagoco-Guiam 2002; Camacho et al. 2005).

3.5 Case in Point - Children and Youth in Private Armed Groups in Maguindanao

The armed violence in Mindanao take on many forms with actors in the vertical conflict between the Philippine government and its Christian majority and the Muslim minority intertwined with actors in intra-elite competition, and intergroup communal rivalries (Camacho et al. 2005; Adriano and Parks 2013). In places where resources and governance is under the control of the local elite clan, and where the incumbent’s control is continually being contested by other dominant local elites, the children and youth inevitably interact with the structures of dominance and control, becoming involved in the activities of the local elites’ private armed groups.

In Maguindanao, the private armed groups were transformed into Civilian Vol­unteer Organisations (CVO) when private armies were declared illegal in the 1987 Philippine Constitution (section 24, art. xviii). Some members of the private armed groups are former members of MILF and MNLF or are linked to these groups through kinship or ethnic ties. In other areas, some active members of MILF or MNLF likewise serve in the security detail of the local ruling elite, paid as members of CVOs which are sometimes mobilized by the government’s armed forces to fight Muslim or communist insurgents. In this complex map of actors in conflict, children and young people inevitably find themselves expressing support or association with one or more groups, and even in the frontline of hostilities (Camacho et al. 2005).

Maguindanao is a primarily agricultural province with a predominantly Muslim population. It is one of the ten poorest provinces of the Philippines. Maguindanao figured in the headlines worldwide with the massacre of 58 men and women by the private army of the Ampatuans, a political warlord clan allied to then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Children and young people were documented to be part of the private army used by the Ampatuans to keep itself in power (Camacho et al. 2005).

Being members of the community, with kinship ties or ethno-religious ties to the ruling clan, their pathways to participation in organized armed violence often goes through a gradual progression of involvement. It often starts through tagging along with family or friends who are members of the private army, doing small errands and various chores for the armed group. Through time, they are asked to do “major jobs” for the group until they are eventually hired as a CVO member. For some, the process of acquiring membership is expedited when they are taken in as replacement for their fathers who were killed in action. In a few cases, a son is compelled to join the private army due to the family’s indebtedness to the local politician.

Poverty is an inescapable way of life for the children and youth in Ampatuan’s private army. Their families rely on the ruling elite for livelihood and protection; hence families offer its support to the local elite and its private army as a means to ensure the family’s survival. However, it should be mentioned that the ruling elite commands fear more than respect such that to say that the relationship is based on reciprocity and conciliation may be arguable. For those whose families experienced atrocities in the hands of their enemies, revenge is a source of motivation for joining the private army. For some children and young people, the mere fact of being associated with an influential family with many resources is motivation enough to tag along, support, and be involved in the armed group’s activities.

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