A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIZING ABOUT CONFLICT

This section of the Introduction is an overview of the progress made during the past one hundred years or so in the social psychological study of conflict. The writings of three intellectual giants—Darwin, Marx, and Freud—dominated the intellectual atmosphere during social psychology’s infancy.

Darwin stressed “the competitive struggle for existence” and “the survival of the fittest.” He wrote that “all nature is at war, one organism with another, or with external nature. Seeing the contented face of nature, this may at first be well doubted; but reflection will inevitably prove it is too true” (quoted in Hyman, 1966, p. 29).

Marx emphasized class struggle, and as the struggle proceeds, “the whole society breaks up more and more into two great hostile camps, two great, directly antagonistic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat.” He and Engels end their Communist Manifesto with a ringing call to class struggle: “The proletari­ans have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite.”

Freud’s view of psychosexual development was largely that of constant struggle between the biologically rooted infantile id and the socially deter­mined, internalized parental surrogate, the superego. As Schachtel (1959) has noted, “The concepts and language used by Freud to describe the great meta­morphosis from life in the womb to life in the world abound with images of war, coercion, reluctant compromise, unwelcome necessity, imposed sacri­fices, uneasy truce under pressure, enforced detours and roundabout ways to return to the original peaceful state of absence of consciousness and stimula­tion” (p.

Thus, the intellectual atmosphere prevalent during the period when social psychology began to emerge contributed to viewing conflict from the perspective of “competitive struggle.” Social conditions too—the intense competition among businesses and among nations, the devastation of World War I, the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the rise of Nazism and other totalitarian systems—reinforced this perspective.

The vulgarization of Darwin’s ideas in the form of “social Darwinism” pro­vided an intellectual rationale for racism, sexism, class superiority, and war. Such ideas as “survival of the fittest,” “hereditary determinism,” and “stages of evolution” were eagerly misapplied to the relations between human social groups—classes and nations, as well as social races—to rationalize imperialist policies. The influence of pseudo-evolutionary thinking was so strong that, as a critic suggested, it gave rise to a new imperialist beatitude: “Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey upon the weak” (Banton, 1967, p. 48). The rich and powerful were biologically superior; they had achieved their positions as a result of natural selection. It would be against nature to interfere with the inequality and suffering of the poor and weak.

Social Darwinism and the mode of explaining behavior in terms of innate, evolutionary, derived instincts were in retreat by the mid-1920s. The prestige of the empirical methods in the physical sciences, the point of view of social deter­minism advanced by Karl Marx and various sociological theorists, and the find­ings of cultural anthropologists all contributed to their decline. With the waning of the instinctual mode of explaining such conflict phenomena as war, inter­group hostility, and human exploitation, two others have become dominant: the psychological and the social-political-economic.

The psychological mode attempts to explain such phenomena in terms of “what goes on in the minds of men” (Klineberg, 1964) or “tensions that cause war” (Cantril, 1950).

Although the two modes of explanation are not mutually exclusive, there is a tendency for partisans of the psychological mode to consider that the causal arrow points from psychological conditions to social-political-economic con­ditions and for partisans of the latter to believe the reverse is true. In any case, much of the social psychological writing in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s on the topics of war, intergroup conflict, and industrial strife was largely non-empirical, and in one vein or the other. The psychologically trained social psychologist tended to favor the psychological mode; the Marx­ist-oriented or sociologically trained social psychologist more often favored the other.

The decline of social Darwinism and the instinctivist doctrines was hastened by the development and employment of empirical methods in social psychol­ogy. This early empirical orientation to social psychology focused on the social­ization of the individual; in part as a reaction to the instinctivist doctrine. It led to a great variety of studies, including a number investigating cooperation and competition. These latter studies are, in my view, the precursors to the empiri­cal, social psychological study of conflict.

Field Theory, Conflict, and Cooperation-Competition

During the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, quite independently of the work being con­ducted in the United States on cooperation-competition, Kurt Lewin and his stu­dents were theorizing and conducting research that profoundly affected later work in many areas of social psychology.

As early as 1931, employing his analysis of force fields, Lewin (1931, 1935) presented a penetrating theoretical discussion of three basic types of psycho­logical conflict: approach-approach, in which the individual stands between two positive valences of approximately equal strength; avoidance-avoidance, where the individual stands between two negative valences of approximately equal strength; and approach-avoidance, meaning the individual is exposed to oppos­ing forces deriving from positive and negative valences. Hull (1938) translated Lewin’s analysis into the terminology of the goal gradient, and Miller (1937, 1944) elaborated and did research on it. Numerous experimental studies sup­ported the theoretical analysis.

My own initial theorizing on cooperation-competition (Deutsch, 1949b) was influenced by Lewinian thinking on tension systems, which was reflected in a series of brilliant experiments on the recall of interrupted activities (Zeigarnik), the resumption of interrupted activities (Ovsiankina), substitutability (Mahler), and the role of ego in cooperative work (Lewis and Franklin). But even more of my thinking was indebted to the ideas that were in the air at the MIT Research Center for Group Dynamics. Ways of characterizing and explaining group processes and group functioning, employing the language of Lewinian theoriz­ing, were under constant discussion there among the students and faculty. Thus, it was quite natural that when I settled on cooperation-competition as the topic of my doctoral dissertation, I employed the Lewinian dynamic emphasis on goals and how they are interrelated as my key theoretical wedge into this topic.

Even more important, the preoccupation at the MIT center with understand­ing group processes pressed me to formulate my ideas about cooperation and competition so that they would be relevant to the psychological and interpersonal processes occurring within and between groups.

Game Theory and Games

In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern published their now-classic work, The­ory of Games and Economic Behavior. Game theory has made a major contri­bution to the work of social scientists by formulating in mathematical terms the problem of conflict of interest. However, it is neither the mathematics nor the normative prescriptions for minimizing losses when facing an intelligent adver­sary that have made game theory of considerable value to social psychologists. Rather, it is the core emphasis on the parties in conflict having interdependent interests; their fates are woven together. Although the mathematical and nor­mative development of game theory has been most successful in connection with pure competitive conflict (zero-sum games), game theory also recognizes that cooperative as well as competitive interests may be intertwined in conflict (as in coalition games or non-zero-sum games).

Game theory’s recognition of the intertwining of cooperative and competi­tive interests in situations of conflict (or, in Schelling’s useful term, the mixed- motive nature of conflict; Schelling, 1960) has had a productive impact on the social psychological study of conflict, theoretically as well as methodologically. Theoretically, at least for me, it helped buttress a viewpoint that I had devel­oped prior to my acquaintance with game theory, namely, that conflicts were typically mixtures of cooperative and competitive processes and that the course of conflict would be determined by the nature of the mixture.

Methodologically, game theory had an impact on an even larger group of psy­chologists. The mathematical formulations of game theory had the indirect but extremely valuable consequence of laying bare some fascinating paradoxical sit­uations in such a way that they were highly suggestive of experimental work. Game matrices as an experimental device were popular because they facilitated precise definition of the reward structure encountered by the subjects, and hence of the way they depend on one another. Partly stimulated by and partly in reaction to the research using game matrices, other research games for the study of conflict were also developed. Well over one thousand studies based on exper­imental games had been published by 1985. Much of this research, as is true in other areas of science, was mindless—being done because a convenient experimental format was readily available. But some of it has, I believe, helped to develop systematic understanding of conflict processes and conflict resolu­tion. Fortunately, in recent years, experimental gaming has been supplemented by other experimental procedures and by field studies that overcome some of the inherent limitations of experimental gaming.

Themes in Contemporary Social Psychological Research on Conflicts

Social psychological research and theorizing on conflict during the past forty years have primarily addressed thirteen major questions (see Deutsch, 1990 for more detail about the first five):

1. What conditions give rise to a constructive or destructive process of con­flict resolution? In terms of bargaining and negotiation, the emphasis here is on determining the circumstances that allow the conflicting par­ties to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement that maximizes their joint outcomes. In a sense, this first question arises from focusing on the cooperative potential inherent in conflict. In social psychology, this question has been most directly addressed in the work of my students and myself and summarized in my 1973 book, The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes. All of the chapters in this handbook are relevant; the chapters focusing on constructive controversy and cooperation-competition are most relevant.

2. What circumstances, strategies, and tactics lead one party to do better than another in a conflict situation? The stress here is on how one can wage conflict, or bargain, so as to win or at least do better than one’s adversary. This second question emerges from focusing on the compet­itive features of a conflict situation. It has been mainly addressed by economists and political scientists (for example, Schelling, 1960). In social psychology, research related to this question focuses on bargain­ing tactics such as “being ignorant,” “being tough,” “being belligerent,” “the effects of threats,” and how to increase one’s bargaining

power. This question is treated only indirectly in this handbook, by inference, because of the book’s emphasis on constructive conflict resolution.

3. What determines the nature of the agreement between conflicting parties if they are able to reach an agreement? Here, the concern is with the cognitive and normative factors that lead people to conceive a pos­sible agreement and to perceive it as a salient possibility for reaching a stable agreement—one that each of the conflicting parties sees as “just” under the circumstances. This third question is a recent one and has been addressed under the heading of research on the social psychology of equity and justice. Chapter Two, on social justice and conflict, is most directly relevant to this question, but other chapters bear on it as well.

4. How can third parties be used to prevent conflicts from becoming destructive or to help deadlocked or embittered negotiators move toward constructive management of their conflicts? This fourth question has been reflected in studies of mediation and in strategies for de­escalating conflict. Chapter Thirty-Two, on mediation, pertains most directly, but all of the chapters have some relevance.

5. How can people be educated to manage their conflicts constructively? This has been a concern of consultants working with leaders in indus­try and government and also with those who have responsibility for educating children in our schools. All the chapters bear on this question.

During the past fifteen years, many additional questions have emerged as foci of work in the field of conflict resolution:

6. How and when should one intervene in prolonged, intractable conflicts? Much of the literature in conflict resolution has been preventive rather than remedial in its emphasis. It is concerned with understanding the conditions that foster productive rather than destructive conflict (as in question 1) or developing knowledge about the circumstances that lead to intractable, destructive conflict, in the hope of preventing such conflict. More recently, the reality that many protracted, destruc­tive conflicts exist in the world has induced some scholars to focus their attention on this problem. In this book, the discussions of intractable conflicts (Chapter Twenty-Four), mediation (Chapter Thirty- Two), and intergroup conflict (Chapter Eight) are particularly relevant.

7. How are we to understand why ethnic, religious, and identity conflicts frequently take an intractable, destructive course? With the end of the Cold War, there appears to be a proliferation of such conflicts. In the past ten years, interest in such conflicts has been renewed. The chap­ters most directly pertaining to this question are those dealing with intergroup and cultural conflict, but almost all are relevant.

8. How applicable in other cultural contexts are the theories related to con­flict that have largely been developed in the United States and Western Europe? In recent years, there has been much discussion in the litera­ture of the differences that exist in how people from varying cultural backgrounds deal with negotiations and, more generally, manage con­flict. We have not attempted to summarize the cultural differences that exist with regard to conflict management. However, in discussing culture and conflict (Chapters Twenty-Eight and Twenty-Nine), on applying conflict theory in China, there is discussion of the issue of cross-cultural generalizability.

9. How do we foster reconciliation between parties who have been in a bit­ter, deadly, destructive conflict? Since the work of the Truth and Recon­ciliation Commission in South Africa, there has been considerable interest and some research related to this question. Although no chap­ter has its sole focus on this topic, various chapters have very relevant discussions—for example, the chapters on justice, trust, change, intractable conflict, and intergroup conflict.

10. How do we help people “negotiate the nonnegotiable,” as in conflicts over identity, basic values, or religious conflict? In its more extreme form, this question can be expressed as, how does one understand and deal with fundamentalism, terrorism, and suicide bombers? While many chapters have relevance to this question (in its less extreme form), the chapters dealing with moral and religious conflicts are focused on this issue (as is the first case in this Introduction).

11. How do we understand the often implicit, theoretical presuppositions and framework about the conflict that affect one’s orientation to and behaviors during conflict? These presuppositions often reflect personal­ity disposition, cultural influences, and life experiences. The chapters on implicit theories and conflict and personality and conflict, and the chapters concerned with culture and conflict, are directly relevant; many other chapters have indirect relevance.

12. How do we identify “ripeness,” “critical moments,” or “turningpoints” in a conflict? Often, these crucial periods provide an opportunity to change the direction of a conflict from a destructive process to a con­structive one. No chapter focuses on this but there are relevant discus­sions in the chapters dealing with trust, intractable conflict, and mediation.

13. What are the constructive and destructive effects of emotions during conflict? The important role of emotions during conflict has been much neglected until recently. The chapter on emotions and conflict focuses on this question and many other chapters have some relevant discussion.

Although various chapters of this book have direct relevance to the questions listed here, the aim of the Handbook of Conflict Resolution is not to summarize the work done so far in the field of conflict resolution. Rather, its aim is to enrich the field by presenting the theoretical underpinnings that throw light on the fundamental social psychological processes involved in all levels of conflict. None of the theories is adequate to deal by itself with the complexities involved in any specific conflict or any type of conflict. As indicated earlier in this chap­ter, each theory is a component of the particular mosaic that needs to be cre­ated to understand and manage a unique conflict constructively.