CONCLUSION: PREVENTING BARGAINING FAILURE
By now, it should be apparent that when a number of conditions are present—pragmatic perceptions, high information, an ability on the part of elites to hold their ethnic coalition together and deliver on their commitments, and a relatively strong state—the context may be favorable for managing conflict through interethnic bargaining and cooperation.
However, the best-case scenario does not always exist, and private interest, uncertainty, hostile memories and perceptions, and elite manipulation can work at cross-purposes with effective bargaining. As Horowitz (1985: 565) observes, “Although some form of regularized interethnic bargaining may be essential, this may require precisely the kind of pragmatism that is lacking among ethnic groups that see their vital interests threatened by other groups.” Such ethnic pragmatism is not only essential between groups but also within groups and requires a precarious process whereby ethnic negotiators bargain simultaneously at these two levels (Putnam 1988).In these circumstances, what steps can state or international actors take to reduce the intensity of conflict and to maintain regularized patterns of intergroup relations? It seems too optimistic to expect magnanimity (although it was evident in Nigeria after the civil war), and to remain neutral and let the ethnic fires burn themselves out (as in Rwanda) seems cynical, even irresponsible. It is essential in these situations to take preventive action, encouraging the building of effective institutions, interceding diplomatically by structuring incentives to promote intergroup reciprocity and political exchange, and, at times, intervening with military force. Institutions, Douglass North (1990, 3) writes, “Are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction?” Institutions, which largely reflect the values, social history, and political culture of a society, cannot be viewed as a panacea for deeply divided states.
The Weimar constitution, in many respects a liberal and well-conceived basic law, did not prove sufficiently durable to survive the Nazi onslaught. However, when institutions gain legitimacy in the eyes of the community at large, they can then encourage joint problem solving and a sense of interdependence.Within the state, various rules and regulations have been put into effect that, if implemented impartially, can build minority confidence in the intentions of the state by ensuring protection or restructuring political or economic opportunities. Interethnic negotiations, whether direct or indirect, may have important implications for reducing ethnic fears about the future by producing agreements on such issues as inclusive recruitment, proportional subregional allocations, affirmative action programs, ethnic balance in university scholarships, group protection, the location of industries on a countrywide basis, and election procedures that promote ethnic coalitions. However, because many of these measures represent concessions by the majority to the minority, they may not survive a change of leadership or a grave economic downturn in the country at large. The commitment problem still has not been resolved. One set of rulers may not regard themselves as bound by the arrangements negotiated at an earlier time; they may therefore take advantage of their majority position to reinterpret or dismantle the tenuous protections of the past (as happened in Kenya and South Africa).
What, then, can the main institutional arrangements highly prized by vulnerable minorities—reserved seats in the legislature, proportional representation, transethnic electoral requirements in presidential elections, ethnic federalism, and inclusive power-sharing arrangements—be expected to achieve with respect to protecting vulnerable peoples? Representatives of weaker groups may view these arrangements as structuring relations to put their representatives at the center of the decision-making process.
Where polyarchical regimes exist and majorities acquiesce, reserved seats and electoral requirements can offer a basis for a limited inclusion. Furthermore, their numbers often allow the representatives of weaker parties only a limited influence in political process, and less powerful groups can be compromised by the selection of spokespeople who lack authentic group credentials.With respect to proportional representation, it may have little cross-ethnic impact where populations are territorially concentrated. In Namibia, where the South-West Africa People's Organization won over two-thirds of the seats in the first two parliamentary elections, proportional representation failed, according to Joel Barkan (1998, 61), “to provide sufficient minority representation to block constitutional changes that could be injurious to minority interests.... Rather, it is the self-restraint of the majority government of President Sam Nujoma, along with international pressure, that has been responsible for the protection of minority interests.”
Instead of relying on proportional representation, weaker parties often focus on the institutions of federalism and executive power sharing as the primary protections of their security and well-being over time. They do so precisely because these institutions are firmly embedded in the constitution and represent guarantees of partitioned or inclusive participation in the decision-making process (Roeder and Rothchild 2005: 31-34). In principle, federalism spreads state power between the central governments and the subregions, each being guaranteed separate responsibilities in its own right. As a consequence, the basic law often gives local elites an important say over social and cultural matters affecting minority ethnic communities. In practice, however, central authorities remain in a strong position to influence the decisions made at the subregional level, mainly because of the political center's fiscal dominance. Federal practices in such African states as Nigeria and Ethiopia clearly reflect this central fiscal dominance, resulting in a political system that is more politically decentralized in principle than in practice (Lake and Rothchild 2005). As Rotimi Suberu (2001: 76) puts it, “The [Nigerian] federal government controls a disproportionate share of federally collected revenues to the chagrin of the states and localities whose independent revenue sources have remained grossly inadequate.”
Efforts to achieve inclusive decisionmaking have been employed widely in Africa, especially during the transition period following civil wars.
In such countries as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, DRC, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Burundi, and Sudan, provision for power-sharing institutions can be reassuring to weaker parties whose spokespersons are therefore included in the inner sanctums of government (Rothchild 2005). Recent statistical evidence indicates that power-sharing institutions do play a role in encouraging adversaries to negotiate agreements after civil wars (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 102-103). In the long-run, however, as the agreement on peace becomes a less urgent matter to the majority party, commitment to the spirit of the powersharing arrangement declines, and cabinet members from the weaker parties often lose positions or receive less critical assignments. Given the insecurities of the post-civil-war political environment, it may prove difficult to maintain a balance of power between ethnic groups, and the opposition parties may lack the capacity to prevent a centralization of power. In such situations, power dividing (or a multiple-majorities strategy), not power sharing, may prove a more effective longterm means of protecting weaker parties. Because power dividing avoids the rigidity of assigning cabinet seats to specific groups and institutionalizes a separation of power among branches of government elected on different, albeit majority, bases, it opens up the possibility that majority and minority factions may join forces by voting together in a particular chamber and protect the society from abuses of civil rights. “In ethnically divided societies,” Philip Roeder (2005, 62) writes, “by dividing any ethnic majority among multiple crosscutting majorities and minorities, the power-dividing strategy seeks to foster through politics the development of dispersed rather than cumulative cleavages.” Unlike the other institutions discussed above, a power-dividing strategy seeks to protect weaker interests by checking power with power. Clearly, there can be no certainty that the cleavages within majorities will develop and provide the necessary protective shield, but it appears the best available mechanism for safeguarding minority groups in an insecure setting.If none of the protections of minority safety can be viewed as reliable guarantees within the state, it becomes necessary, by default, to look to external actors to conciliate and mediate conflict; stabilize peace agreements; provide monitoring, peacekeeping, and oversight services; exert pressures and incentives; and, as a last resort, intervene militarily, alone or as part of a multilateral force. When internal bargaining between the state and insurgents or among ethnic interests within the state leads to frail agreement or proves inconclusive, weaker parties look outside their borders for a rescuer, one that will overcome the dilemmas of information and commitment and, in the worst cases, halt the spiraling into an ethnic security dilemma (Posen 1993; Rothchild 2000). International actors have played useful roles in facilitating the management of conflict in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, and elsewhere (Rothchild 1997b; Zartman 1989; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). At times, however, external interventions have proved too provocative or too limited and slow to have a positive effect. As Romeo Dallaire, the former UN force commander in Rwanda, said about the 6000-strong African Union (AU) force in Darfur, “There is concern among the people around here as to the full effectiveness of the AU. [But] if you do not give them sufficient resources then you are setting them up” (quoted in McDoom 2005). Clearly, if stable relations are to be restored in Darfur in 2006, there is a need for greater logistical and communications support, increased UN military involvement, and a more robust mandate. Unfortunately, this situation is not atypical of possible international initiatives and raises questions about the political will of international actors to make a critical difference in protecting beleaguered minorities.
In sum, ethnic groups do have a common, overarching interest in establishing and maintaining regular and predictable patterns of relationships among themselves.
For the most part, they do, in fact, engage in these ongoing encounters. At times, majorities, seeking to hold their countries together, act with a degree of generosity toward minority citizens around them. Yet as competition and conflict ensue, some political elites may seize the opportunity to manipulate the security concerns of their ethnic followers in part, at least, to advance their private interests. Even then, state institutions may be sufficiently resilient to contain the rising tensions. However, should the balance of power between the groups shift, it may trigger violent encounters, often sporadic but later organized and deadly. By default, it falls to international actors to intercede in the escalating encounter to prevent the point of no return (Deng et al. 1995; Evans & Sahnoun 2001). The problem of our times is that the international community is insufficiently organized and prepared for the trajectory of ethnic conflict to move toward its logical end of mass killing and warfare. In such events, the international community cannot afford to stand aside and be indifferent. Rather, it must globalize its response and develop the necessary procedures for effective conflict prevention and management.