FROM CONSTRUCTIVE TO DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT

Thus far we have focused on intrastate ethnic conflicts, in which largely reasonable demands are channeled to state leaders according to the rules of the game. In fact, most of Africa's ethnic conflicts began as reasonable demands from an aggrieved group.

Ethnic-related conflicts gain in intensity and become less negotiable, however, as the state weakens, exclusionary ideologies gain widespread public support, and competition over scarce resources (land, commercial opportunities, state distributions, government positions) increases. As groups feel threat­ened physically, culturally, or economically, and as political elites engage in danger­ous “outbidding” tactics, intergroup relations become polarized, and bargaining becomes more problematic.

Thus, the nature of constructive and destructive ethnic transactions is largely explained by the strategic interactions of elites and their perceptions of their interests, not the existence of ethnic pluralism as such or the presence of ancient hatreds. When ethnic elites place general interests above the particular interests of their own and those of their group, disputes remain negotiable; however, when political leaders manipulate the ambitions and uncertainties of their followers regarding their safety and well­being, then they create apolitical environment in which suspicion and fear promote zero­sum thinking and efforts, whether nonviolent or violent, to promote special group interests. The descent into parochialism becomes espe­cially dangerous when the state is marked by a low level of legitimacy or a single ethnic group gains dominance over the state and pursues discriminatory policies. Jack A. Goldstone and his associates (2000, ix) find that in multiethnic countries “where certain ethnic minorities are subjected to significant political or economic discrimination, the odds of a new ethnic war were more than ten times as high” as the norm.

It is important to stress that strategic interactions among group leaders are not static in nature but can be affected by changes in the balance of power and the way that ambitious or insecure politicians respond to these shifts. They can be particularly dangerous in soft state situations, where elites feel excluded from power and threatened by the ruling state elite, causing them to withdraw from the bargaining process and to seek protection by building up their military capacity. Such a pullback entails a weakening or breaking of linkages and, with it, an isolation that prevents leaders from obtaining reliable information about the intentions of adversaries. The result can be further polarization and distrust that complicates credible commitment to agree­ments. If polarization deepens and the middle ground disappears (Kuper 1977), the ethnic strongmen may come to see negotiations as doomed to failure and pursue other means— repression or violent action—to achieve their objectives. In that case, sporadic violence gives way to organized collective violence. In the worst cases, the conflict can escalate into genocide or prolonged war.