Control and Workgroup Conflict
One active line of research in recent years has focused on control and conflict in workgroups (Sell, Lovaglia, Mannix, Samuelson, & Wilson, 2004; Sewell, 1998). Sell et al. (2004) argued that this topic is one that cuts across a number of disciplines and research traditions.
Traditionally, workgroups have been controlled by management, which sets up the workgroup, establishes its goals, and monitors and evaluates its performance. The agent of management is the appointed team leader, who imports and enforces the motivations of management into the group. Sewell (1998) aptly named this traditional type of arrangement vertical control—that is, control from the top down. A different type of control emerges in newer types of workgroups, such as self-managed teams or quality improvement teams. These teams are typically set up with the nominal goal of empowering members, and they are presented as enabling members of the team to determine their own work arrangements and have freedom to innovate. However, as Barker (1993) noted, far from equalizing power among members, these teams tend to develop systems in which members internalize organizational norms and enforce them on other members. This type of control, which Barker (following Tompkins & Cheney, 1985) termed concertive control and Sewell (1998) named horizontal control, is based on teams first for negotiating arrangements and norms for attaining organizational goals and then translating them into rules and procedures that enforce member behavior. Because the members of the group willingly adopt the norms and procedures, resistance to them is met with the response “you agreed to this,” which effectively short-circuits the resentment and resistance that often comes in response to rules and procedures imposed by management “from above.” That the power structure is set up to reflect managerial interests is hidden by the apparent self-determination of the team members.Barker, Melville, and Packanowsky (1993) described the role of concertive control in a conflict among members of a self-managed team in a team-based organization. One member persistently arrived late to work due to problems with child care, and members perceived this as a breach of team norms and an imposition on them. As they talked among themselves and worked out the nature of the offending member’s transgression, members transformed the general guideline “we all need to be at work at the same time” into a more precise form “if you are more than 5 minutes late you will be docked a week’s pay.” This latter rule is clearer and easier to enforce than the more general guideline. It also reflects a more managerial orientation toward workers than the guideline. When the group confronted the late member, they used the rule to deliver an ultimatum, forestalling her attempts to ask for a reasonable accommodation. The other members confronted the latecomer with a solid front and insisted that she conform to the rule. In this action, the members inadvertently subjected themselves to further control, since they now had to conform to the tighter rule. Barker (1993) noted that in this way teams discipline themselves by replacing informal norms with rationalized behavior that serves the greater goals of the organization and its management. The promulgation of rules contributes to the suppression of conflict and enables the dominant group to prevail because members accept them as reasonable and objective. It also serves the interests of management.
Kirby and Krone’s (2002) study of the enforcement of family leave policies in workgroups shows how those not taking leave developed rationalizations that pressured especially fathers, but also mothers, not to take the leaves or to take much shorter leaves than they desired. An undercurrent of conflict pervades these workplaces—conflict that is mostly hidden and serves as a pressuring mechanism. The resulting reluctance to take advantage of legally mandated leave policies serves managerial interests, but the “enforcers” who help realize managerial interests are for the most part worker proxies who believe they are acting in their own interests.
Scholars studying control and workgroup conflict within the political perspective generally challenge norms regarding authority in workgroups. They seek to uncover how workgroups police themselves and how, in doing so, members legitimize and serve managerial interests.