Distributive Versus Integrative Processes
Based on case studies of labor-management negotiations and personal experience,3 Walton and McKersie (1965) proposed a behavioral theory of labor negotiations. They identified four distinct bargaining subprocesses.
The first was distributive bargaining—a set of competitive behaviors intended to influence the division (distribution) of limited resources and attaining a party’s goals, under the assumption that the focal party’s goals conflict with the counterparty’s goals. The second was integrative bargaining—a set of problem-solving behaviors intended to identify, enlarge, and act on shared interests and attain goals believed to be at least somewhat compatible. The third was attitudinal structuring—activities attempting to influence the parties’ attitudes toward each other. The last was intra-organizational bargaining—attempting to achieve consensus within one’s own organization.According to Walton and McKersie (1966), negotiations are often “mixed motive,” as they always include a distributive element and, in many cases, also an integrative element. Such situations require complex strategies because parties must adapt their opening behaviors, subsequent behaviors, and overall sequencing and behavioral intensity to satisfy goals of selfinterest and, potentially, congruent interests. Complicating a party’s strategic choices are the strategic choices of the counterparty. Moreover, Walton and McKersie noted that shifting from an integrative to a distributive approach or vice versa is problematic. Information provided to further integrative goals could give the counterparty a distributive edge, and opening dis- tributively could hamper subsequent integrative outcomes. Walton and McKersie (1965, 1966) concluded that, at least in mixed motive situations, negotiators need to apply both integrative and distributive strategies in various sequences and with varying degrees of intensity.