INTERGROUP CONFLICT: SOURCES AND DYNAMICS

The essence of intergroup conflict lies in three elements: incompatibilities, behaviors, and sentiments. A broad definition of destructive conflict sees it as a social situation in which there are perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two (or more) parties, attempts by the parties to control one another, and antagonistic feelings toward each other (Fisher, 1990).

Sources of Intergroup Conflict

What are some areas of incompatibilities that can give rise to destructive inter­group conflict? One useful typology proposed by Daniel Katz identifies eco­nomic, value, and power differences as primary drivers.

Value conflicts involve differences in what groups believe in, from minor vari­ances in preferences or principles to major cleavages in ideologies or ways of life. Conflict can arise over valued means or valued ends, that is, over how goals are achieved or what their nature or priorities are. Organizations often comprise groups in conflict over how decisions should be made (such as autocratically or democratically) and over the outcomes to be prized (such as the best-quality service or highest return on investment). Societies and the world at large are composed of different cultural and religious groups, who have myriad variations in their preferences, practices, and priorities that can place them in situations of incompatibility. Again, the question is how the groups, particularly the dom­inant group(s) choose to deal with these differences, for example, by forcing their cultural norms on other groups or by supporting intercultural respect and harmony.

Power conflict occurs when each group wishes to maximize its influence and control in the relationship with the other. At base, this is a struggle for domi­nance, whether in a corporate office or a region of the globe, and is not resolv­able in the first instance, often resulting in a victory and a defeat or a tense stalemate and deadlock. Power conflict often recycles through various substan­tive issues, and over time the dynamic of a mutual win-lose orientation becomes apparent.

To this typology can be added the more contemporary concern with needs conflict, that is, differences around the degree to which the basic human needs of groups, and the individuals within them, are being frustrated or satisfied. This line of theorizing comes partly from the work of psychologist Abraham Maslow and sociologist Paul Sites and has been brought into the conflict domain by international relations specialists John Burton, Edward Azar, and others. Basic needs are seen as the fundamental requirements for human development, and proposed lists include those for security, identity, recognition of identity, free­dom, distributive justice, and participation. Identity groups are seen as the pri­mary vehicle through which these necessities are expressed and satisfied, thus leading to intergroup conflict when one group’s basic needs are frustrated or denied. It is proposed that the most destructive and intractable conflicts on the world scene between identity groups, that is, racial, religious, ethnic or cultural groups, are due to need frustration. However, identity groups also exist in orga­nizations and communities, wherever groups form around a common social identity, and if needs for recognition of that identity or for dignity, safety, or control are denied, then conflict is similarly predicted (Rothman, 1997).

An important qualification is that many conflicts are mixtures of the preced­ing sources rather than pure types. This can be true in the initial causation, as when power and economic competition are simultaneously expressed, or over time, as when value differences or need frustrations are addressed through the increasing use of negative power.

Perceptual and Cognitive Factors

Regardless of the source, conflict between groups often engages perceptual, cog­nitive, emotional, and behavioral mechanisms at both the individual and group levels, which exacerbate the initial incompatibilities. Social identity theory tells us that the simple perceptual act of group categorization in a minimally com­petitive context will set in motion a process of group differentiation with result­ing in-group favoritism. This is apparently due to the need of individuals to attain and maintain a positive social identity, which they do by first engaging in the social categorization of groups, and then by making favorable social comparisons of their own group in relation to other groups. Thus, there is pres­sure to gain distinctiveness for one’s own group and to evaluate it positively in comparison with other groups, thereby leading to discrimination against other groups.

The concept of “ethnocentrism” captures how identity groups tend to be ethnically centered, to accept and even glorify those who are alike (the in-group), and to denigrate, discriminate against, and reject those who are unlike (out­groups). Realistic group conflict theory sees ethnocentrism as an outcome of objective conflicts of interest and competitive interactions by groups to obtain their goals, a process in which a perception of threat plays a key role by height­ening in-group solidarity and engendering hostility toward the threatening out­group, especially if there is a history of antagonism between the groups (Levine and Campbell, 1972).

Groups in conflict tend to develop negative stereotypes of each other- oversimplified, inaccurate, rigid, and derogatory beliefs about the characteris­tics of the other group that are applied indiscriminately to all the individuals in that group. These come about partly through the processes of group catego­rization, which exaggerate the differences between groups and the homogeneity of the out-group. However, they also come about through selective perception and memory retrieval, by which qualities and behaviors that fit the stereotype are accepted and retained, while those that do not are rejected. Mutual stereo­typing leads in part to a “mirror image” in which each group sees the other neg­atively, as aggressive, untrustworthy, manipulative, and itself positively, as peaceful, trustworthy, and cooperative. Through the process of socialization, these simplified pictures are passed on to new group members (children, recruits, new employees) so that they can take their rightful place in defending the interests of their in-group against out-group enemies.

Cognitive biases also enter into intergroup conflict in the attributions that individuals make about the behavior of others, such as, how they make judgments about the causes of behaviors or events. In intergroup relations, there is a tendency to see outgroup members as personally responsible for negative behavior (“He is sadistic”), rather than this being due to situational factors (“He was ordered to do it”). In addition, the personal characteristics that are the focus of attribution tend to be group qualities that are embodied in the neg­ative stereotype (“They are all monsters”). In contrast, undesirable behaviors by in-group members tend to be attributed to external conditions for which the mem­ber is not responsible (“What else could the poor man do?”). Thus, attributions perpetuate and strengthen stereotypes and mirror images and also fuel hostility between conflicting groups as each holds the other largely responsible for the shared mess they are in.

Group-Level Factors

The individual processes of perception and cognition make important contri­butions to understanding intergroup conflict, but its complexity and intractabil­ity are also due to group-level forces. Social groups, like individuals, do not usually respond in a constructive manner to differences that appear to threaten the identity or well-being of the group. The functioning of each group, in terms of identity, cohesiveness, conformity pressures, and decision making, has a sig­nificant impact on how conflict is played out and ultimately resolved or termi­nated. In addition, the structure and culture of the organization, community, or society in which intergroup conflict occurs will influence both its expression and its management. Unfortunately, these latter areas are not as well explored as they should be, and space limitations here preclude a consideration of these higher-level influences.

All individuals are members of social groups, either by birth or by choice, and the group identifications that one carries form the central element of one’s social identity. Many theorists, including those who developed social iden­tity theory, believe that an individual’s self-esteem is linked to group mem­bership, in that a positive self-concept requires favorable evaluations of one’s group(s) and invidious comparisons with other groups. Thus, the seeds are sown for ethnic groups to display ethnocentrism and national groups to exhibit nationalism—pride and loyalty to one’s nation and denigration of other nations. However, we do not need to be at the level of large collectivities to see the functioning of group identity. Professional groups, scientific disciplines, polit­ical parties, government departments, lobby groups, businesses, sports teams, street gangs—all have their sense of group identity that affects their relations with other groups. The dark side of social identity is that in expressing com­mitment and affection to in-groups, there is a tendency to devalue and disre­spect out-groups, thus contributing to intergroup conflict in situations involving incompatibilities.

Along with identity, groups tend to develop cohesiveness, essentially a shared sense of attraction to the group and motivation to remain in it. In addition to increasing satisfaction and productivity, cohesiveness is a very powerful force in fostering conformity to the group and thus has important implications for intergroup conflict. Not only are cohesive groups more effective in striving toward their goals, but it is also generally accepted that intergroup conflict increases cohesiveness within the competing groups, primarily through the effects of threat. Thus, the interplay between group cohesiveness and competi­tion is a significant factor in sustaining intergroup conflict.

Groups in conflict are notorious for the conformity pressures that they place on members to toe the line and support the cause. Group norms (standards of acceptable behavior) and related social influence processes dictate both the stereotypes and the discriminatory behavior that are appropriate with respect to out-groups. Members who deviate from these norms are called to task and may be ridiculed, punished, ostracized, or eliminated, depending on the sever­ity of the conflict and the deviant behavior. Polarized opinions are a character­istic of cohesive groups under threat, and insidious and powerful influences are brought to bear on members who voice disagreement with the majority.

Cohesiveness is the main factor behind the phenomenon of “groupthink” as articulated by Irving Janis (1982), by which an insulated group of deci­sion makers under stress pushes concurrence seeking to the point that it over­rides the realistic and moral appraisal of alternatives. Janis identifies a number of U.S. foreign policy fiascos (the Bay of Pigs invasion, the bombing of Cambodia) as examples in which independent critical thinking was replaced by decisions to engage in irrational and dehumanizing actions toward out-groups. Groupthink is characterized by symptoms showing over­estimation of the group’s power and morality, closed-mindedness, and severe pressures toward uniformity. This is compatible with a large body of theory and research that demonstrates that decision making in general is not a ratio­nal, orderly process but indeed involves cognitive biases, group liabilities, and organizational constraints that produce less than optimal outcomes. (Also see Chapter Nine of this book). The sobering thought with regard to inter­group conflict is that groups on both sides may be making faulty decisions that exacerbate rather than alleviate the situation.

The role of group leadership in intergroup conflict is also an important element of decision making, given that leaders and other higher-status mem­bers hold more power than the rank and file. A common phenomenon in situ­ations of competition and conflict is that more aggressive leaders tend to come to the fore, while cooperative or accommodating leaders tend to lose power or position. Janis postulated that a lack of impartial leadership was also an impor­tant condition of groupthink, in that directive leadership that was committed to particular directions or decisions tended to influence cohesive groups toward concurrence seeking. In addition, groups in conflict tend to influence leaders in aggressive directions, and this “constituent pressure” supports militant leaders toward the use of “contentious tactics” in interactions with the out-group.

Escalation Dynamics

All of the individual and group factors described so far have one thing in common—they tend to influence conflict interactions in the direction of escala­tion, that is, the process by which conflicts become more intense and more hos­tile. Escalation involves the increasing use of heavier methods of influence, especially coercive or punishing tactics, by each group to reach its goals in oppo­sition to those of the other group. Escalation also typically results in the prolif­eration of issues, not simply basic ones that the conflict is perceived to be about (wages or benefits in union-management conflict), but also process issues that arise from how the two parties treat each other (the use of deception in negoti­ations). Escalation feeds largely on fear and defensiveness, in which threats by one party to gain its objectives are met by counterthreats from the other, and these reciprocal interactions move to a higher level of costs each time around in a climate of increasing mistrust. The “self-fulfilling prophecy” first identified by Robert Merton (1952) comes into play in a specific manner, in that defensive­ness and mistrust motivate cautious or controlling moves, which elicit a defen­sive and hostile counteraction that is then perceived as justifying the initial action. This type of interaction, for example, led Ralph White (1984), to charac­terize the Cold War as partly due to “defensively motivated aggression.”

Our understanding of escalatory processes has been enhanced by the work of Morton Deutsch (see Chapter 2) on the differences between cooperative and competitive interactions. The modal approach that parties take in terms of per­ceptions, attitudes, communication, and task orientation tends to show a con­sistency that is very powerful in determining the nature of their interaction over time. Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations captures a great deal of the real­ity of intergroup conflict—the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship. As Deutsch points out, cooperative processes of problem solving are similar to constructive processes of conflict resolution, while competitive processes are similar to destructive ones in addressing con­flict. The competitive-destructive dynamic has also been captured by Deutsch (1983) in his elucidation of the “malignant social process,” which describes the increasingly dangerous and costly interaction of high-intensity intergroup con­flict. Through a combination of cognitive rigidities and biases, self-fulfilling prophecies, and unwitting commitments to prior beliefs and actions, parties are drawn into escalating spirals wherein past investments justify increasing risks and unacceptable losses foreclose a way out. Thus, it is understandable how groups get locked into destructive conflict, and by themselves appear unable to de-escalate or resolve the situation.

Resistances to Resolution

The downside of escalation is not found only in the pains and costs that the parties endure, but in the resistances to de-escalation and resolution that the neg­ative interactions create. The late Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, Sung Hee Kim, and their colleagues have been at the forefront of studying and theorizing about how parties get locked into their conflicts. At the individual level, they see psycho­logical changes, including hostile attitudes and perceptions, which first encour­age escalation (through the biases noted) but then support the persistence of escalatory interactions (through similar biases). To these they add the processes of “deindividuation” (by which out-group members are not seen as individuals but as members of a category who carry no inhibitions against maltreatment), and “dehumanization” (wherein out-group members are perceived as less than human and thus appropriate for inhumane treatment).

Structural changes at the group level also result from escalation. Hostile per­ceptions of the out-group and destructive motives toward them become cemented in group norms, and pressures are brought to bear for members to accept these as right. As mentioned above, increased cohesiveness and militant leadership tend to support more contentious tactics and aggressive objectives. In addition, militant subgroups, who benefit from the conflict in terms of sta­tus, power, or wealth, develop strong vested interests in its continuation. At the level of the larger social system, the organization, community, or global soci­ety, intense conflict induces “polarization,” by which other players, who are ini­tially outside the conflict, get drawn into coalitions that ultimately fracture the system into two opposing camps. This not only increases the intensity of the conflict, but eliminates neutrals who could serve a useful third-party role in resolution.

The final contributor to de-escalation resistance is the phenomena of over­commitment and entrapment. Psychological and group changes tend to strengthen commitments made to contentious behaviors, such that they become self-reinforcing, partly through the act of rationalization. Whatever was done in the past is seen as necessary, and the barrier to conflict termination is the other party’s intransigence. Commitment to destructive and costly courses of action is increased further by “entrapment,” in which costs already incurred are justi­fied by continuing expenditures in pursuit of victory. Even though irrational by outside judgment, each party pursues its goals, believing that the ultimate reward is just around the corner and that only its attainment will justify what has already been expended. The longer mutual intransigence persists, the more the parties feel compelled to justify their positions through continued intransigence.