NOTES

1 Describing civil wars as 'development in reverse,' Collier lists the costs for the countries in conflict as military and civilian deaths, disease (HIV/AIDS, malaria), physical destruction, population displace­ment, high military expenditures, capital outflows, policy and political breakdown, psychological trauma, and landmines.

2 Estimates have been made of the costs of interventions in recent wars compared with the costs if preventive action had been taken, and of the actual costs of preventive action taken in vulnerable societies that did not break out into wars compared with the estimated costs had war occurred. All showed huge possible savings. Prevention was significantly cheaper in all cases, with the ratios of prevention to war ranging from 1-1.3 to 1-479, an average of 1-59 (Brown and Rosecrance, 1999). In an estimate of Macedonia, the actual cost of UNPREDEP was $255 million, or 0.02% of the estimated cost of $15 billion for a two-year conflict (Thayer: 62). Chalmers finds all 12 of the retrospective and prospective conflict prevention packages that were estimated for the Balkans, Afghanistan past and future, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uzbekistan to be cost­effective (Chalmers, 2005: 6f.).

3 'High fatalities encourage further hostility and contentious behavior, and these diminish the likeli­hood of mediation effectiveness (just as they diminish the chances of an agreement in negotiations) (see Pruitt, 1981).

4 The report claims that 'whatever conflict preven­tion policies were being attempted in this period were a dismal failure...[because] there were twice as many conflict onsets in the 1990s as in the 1980s... the rate of new conflict onsets between 2000 and 2005 has remained higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s' (Human Security Center, 2006: 4). Yet, although each war since the end of the Cold Warcould be considered failed prevention, to reach such a conclusion requires factoring in all the situations with a high risk of conflict that did not break out due to various preventive efforts. This is an especially turbulent period. On the surprisingly low number of ethnic conflicts occurring as the Soviet Union broke apart, see Fearon and Laitin, 1996 who attribute the result to local self­regulating mechanisms (cf. Wallensteen and Moller, 2003: 15f, 19.).

5 One study counts 47 disputes since the end of the Cold Warthat had a history or likelihood of conflict but where third parties took action and no armed conflicts ensued in the following year (Wallensteen and Moller, 2003: 27).

6 In contrast, governments and institutes devote immense resources to learning how to avoid relapse into war in post-conflict situations (e.g., Stedman, 1995; Dobbins, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Yet all that work could be characterized as glorified ambulance-chasing, for it comes into play only after wars have wreaked great damage. The imbalanced attention to post-conflict situations has been fed by the widely cited belief that the existence of future conflicts is one of the strongest predictors of future wars.

7 Though some insights here may apply to potential inter-state conflicts, the chapter focuses on intra-state wars such as civil wars, insurgencies, uprisings, major inter-communal conflicts, genocides, politicides, and revolutions, and indirectly to fragile and failing states. Intra-state conflict may cause state failure (e.g., Somalia) or be caused by it (e.g., Zaire), and either phenomenon mayoccurwithouttheother, (e.g., Colombia, Zimbabwe).

8 'Violence prevention' may be more apt, but that evokes trying to break up a gang rumble, nasty fight on the playground, or spousal dispute. For less harmful conflicts below the threshold of collective violence, 'dispute resolution' may be more fitting. The Carnegie Commission adopted 'preventing deadly conflict' (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), which helpfully implies that the con­flicts of concern might cause widespread bodily harm. This chapter does not cover the growing research on violent localized conflicts, such as pastoralist massacres and ethnic riots (see e.g., Horowitz, 1985).

9 'Conflict prevention' isactuallya misnomer, for it implies avoidance of all conflict. If the classic definition of conflict is any real or perceived incompatibility between interests, not all conflicts are harmful and should be prevented. Conflict is normal in social and international relations and, as in the competition in politics, business, science, and the arts, is encouraged for society's benefit (cf. Kriesberg, 2003). What is to be prevented is not any conflict, but destructive and violent forms: wars between and within countries, oppression, inter-communal bloody quarrels - where few redeeming consequences can be imagined and productive alternatives exist.

10 We use 'engagement' to not conjure up the military connotations of 'intervention,' although military activities may be one method used (see below).

11 There was also concern about Boutros-Ghali's peculiar implication that disputes could or should be prevented from arising, for some can be constructive as long as they are conducted non-violently.

12 Some conflict theory makes room for address­ing latent conflicts, and thus not restricting conflict to observable groups that are conscious of mutual incompatibilities (cf. Dahrendorf, 1959).

13 Of course, wars not prevented but ending can break out again. Though mid-conflict stages might be relegated to other terms, the violence pre­emption in prevention logically also entails keeping recently terminated wars from re-erupting (although Boutros-Ghali had designated this phase 'post-conflict peacebuilding'). Thus, prevention also is applied to avoiding post-conflict relapse. Because action at such a moment would come only after many lives have been lost, it is a fall-back option when earlier 'primary prevention' has failed. Such 'secondary prevention' in post-conflict countries has a vast literature and is addressed in several other chapters.

14 This focus still allows for deterrent or contain­ment actions to protect a country that is threatened by the spillover of an already violent conflict in a neighboring country, as well as the cordoning off of localities within a country where war rages elsewhere within its borders.

15 Analysts since have demarcated several basic entry points for engagement in conflicts that are virtually parallel: lack of resources, lack of protection from violence, lack of solutions, lack of a process, and lack of trust (Lund, 1996: 140-43), conflicting actors' behaviors; the relationships between conflicting actors; the capacities of peaceful actorsand processes; and the social and economic environment that affects conflicting actors and peace processes (Uvin, 2002); structural transformation; change in the players or personnel who have influence; issue transformation, or personal transformations of leading figures (cf.

16 Clearly, prevention cannot ignore 'the crys­tallizing agent...the personally motivated political actor who sees a described situation as vulnerable to his blandishments and ready for conflict.loose tinder lying around only excites pyromaniacs, it does not create them; they must pass by and see the opportunity' (Zartman, 1998: 1f).

17 Actually, Dag Hammerskjold had mentioned economic development programs as among possible tools for 'preventive diplomacy.' Such instruments of structural prevention could also be called pre­ventive peacebuilding. This facet of prevention can address either manifest or latent incompatibility of interests.

18 Whetherthese various measures and actors are actually effective is a separate issue, however. That depends on their timing, design, targeting and other factors, discussed in a subsequent section.

19 Systemic and targeted measures may be combined in the same institutions, such as seen in the efforts of the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities to assist particular countries to meet the OSCE's general standards for human rights and governance, and in the OAS's automatic mechanism for dispatching an emissary to member countries where democratic institutions appear to be under threat.

20 This descriptive taxonomy draws from Nicolaides (1996), Lund (1996), and Rubin (2004). As seen, these forms may convey various degrees of positive incentives and negative disincentives, such as coercion, persuasion, support (e.g., Ball, 1992; Rothchild, 2002; Moller et al.).

21 Some argue that trying to trace the effects on conflicts of systemic and structural instruments is causally too indirect (e.g., Ottaway). But this ignores the extensive conflict research on their indirect sources and narrows the goals of prevention to negative peace.Tofocusonlyon highly time-sensitive measures also would narrow prevention to the acts of outside third-party intervenors and divert it from examining the benefits or harms that flow from many current international policies at the global level, such as trade policies.

22 Differing stagesof conflict, such as emergence, escalation, de-escalation, (re)construction, and recon­ciliation, have since been adopted as an organizing framework by more recent conflict textbooks (e.g., Kriesberg, 2003; Miall et al., 1999; 2004).

23 An illustration of unacknowledged preventive action is found in a prestigious journal in which leading American scholars of ethics and international relations discussed howto deal with violations of human rights. While the articles mainly deal with the mid-conflict option of military interventions to save people from imminent slaughter and the largely ex post facto option of war crimes tribunals, a few passages imply that pro-active responses try to prevent gross human rights violations and conflicts such as genocide before they occur. Yet these passages never use the term conflict prevention or a synonym, treating the idea under rubrics such as the OSCE, democratization, a NGO culture of human rights, and transnational networks (Daedalus, Winter 2003).

24 The NGO, International Alert, had called attention to the need for conflict prevention in the 1980s and early 1990s, but the first post-Cold War project exclusively focused on it may have been the Preventive Diplomacy Initiative at the US Institute of Peace (USIP) in 1994-95, which grew out of a USIP/US State Department Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy in 1993-94. The subject was subsequently taken up by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict until 1999, the Centerfor Preventive Action at the Council of Foreign Relations from about 1995, the EU's Conflict Prevention Network of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik from 1996 to 2001, and since then, the International Peace Academy, the Woodrow Wilson International Center, and the Center for International Cooperation at New York University.

25 An earlier World Federalist project sought to generate broad-based interest in prevention through its grass-roots members.

26 There are often good reasons not to label such activities as conflict prevention, for that can cause alarm, and instead, to use euphemisms such as national reconciliation and social cohesion.

27 Even ASEAN has addressed conflict prevention informally through the Asian Regional Forum, though under the rubric of inter-state military confidence building measures.

28 Week-long training workshops by the UN Staff College since 1998 have 'graduated' over 1800 staff from all major UN agencies, each of whom have been introduced to early warning, conflict, and preventive responses.

29 Other donor agencies (UNDP; DFID; USAID; SIDA; CIDA; the Dutch Cooperation Ministryand most other major multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies) have also carried out country conflict assessments through conflict offices that provide technical assistance to country missions. Trends are surveyed by Leonhardt (2000a, 2000b). Early examples of such an analytical tool are Lund et al. (1997) prepared for USAID; Lund (1999) for country desk officers of the European Commission, and Lund (2000) for the UN Framework Team. For a recent example and overview, see Clingendael (2005).

30 The UNSG 2000 report on prevention of armed conflict argued that the first responsibility for preventing conflict lies with the country itself. Similarly, analysts have proposed the concept of 'responsible sovereignty,' which implies state obliga­tion and accountability to its own citizens in a way that is potentially enforceable by the international community. In this view, states have the right to sovereignty only in so far as they are willing and able to fulfill their responsibility to their own citizens by upholding their human rights and fulfill other basic needs.

31 Leaving the door open to possible intervention does not justify intervention by a state into another using just any altruistic rationale, such as loose claims that a regime has oppressed its people and they deserve democracy.

32 If R2P gains more acceptance, it would reinforce the shift occurring in the balance between the rights of sovereign states and the human rights of individuals. Article 2(4) in the UN Charter upholding non-intervention was intended mainly to protect states from military aggression by other states. But subsequent to the Charter, international conventions such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights estab­lished rights for individuals such as against torture and suppression of free speech their governments. The tension between these principles also occurs when large numbers of people are threatened by massive suffering, yet their own governments are unable to either prevent it or protect them from it. Since a responsibility thus exists for the international community to uphold individual human rights, the two sets of rights clash if sovereign governments are directly responsible for creating conflicts by carrying out massacres or oppressing their own people. In fact, many more people have been killed in recent decades by their own governments than by other governments.

33 Another unheralded example is the OAS Secretary-General's recent efforts to mediate dis­putes between the government and opposition in Venezuela. Not simply an ad hoc discretionary mission, his action was required by a procedure the OAS adopted in 1991 that automatically activates a diplomatic response to possible threats to democracy in member states. In June, 1991, the OAS General Assembly adopted Resolution 1080, which bound the Secretary General and Permanent Council to immediate action in the event of a 'sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government' of any of the OAS member states (OAS, 1991). Such threats trigger the agency's automatic and immediate response. The following year, the OAS was allowed to suspend a member state should its democratic government be overthrown by force (OAS, 1992). In 1995, Executive Order 95-6 created more specialized agencies to support democratic institutions, oversee elections, and promote dialogue (OAS, 1995). The mechanism also has been used to address attempted executive coups in Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela.

34 In this light, the conclusion that 'conflict prevention is still more an aspiration rather than an established practice' (Human Security Report, 16) is glib and likely uninformed by how much preventive action actually has occurred.

35 Notwithstanding that the attacks on 9/11 provided a rationale for military actions against Afghanistan and Iraq, the extent to which the US public has accepted the lost lives and other sacrifices of the Iraq war, even under the subsequent rationale of establishing democracy, suggests that the power of the presidential 'bully pulpit' for promoting foreign engagement was previously underestimated or underutilized.

36 An illuminating discussion of how such con­tending approaches lead to different action prescrip­tions is found in Rubin, 2002, pp. 161-166. The tension between conflict resolution and human rights reflects a classic value conflict between peace, in the sense of avoiding violence, and justice (USIP, 2006). This antinomy is usually discussed in connection with mid- or post-conflict situations. As seen recently in northern Uganda, seeking to bring perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice might prolong a war if the violators can only avoid prosecution by continuing to fight. Where perpetrators have already committed egregious human rights violations, insist­ing they be brought to justice could be incompatible with conflict termination, because doing the first may delay or block the second. The pursuit of justice by enforcing human rights can often conflict with peace (in the sense of cessation of violence) where powerful parties have to be accommodated if they are to be induced to desist from further human rights violations. A similar value conflict can arise between stability and political justice, in the sense of democracy, where authoritarian regimes face possible rapid transitions to more liberal systems and thus violent conflict is a risk (Lund, 2006). In essence, these are conflicts between negative and positive peace, the present and the future. The challenge is to understand how power is distributed and find an appropriate balance between staying engaged with offenders in an effort to transform them, while not enabling further oppression.

37 Precedents for closer consultations across development sectors exist in the aforementioned UN's Common Country Assessments (CCA) and Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP). But so far, these latter rarely build in as explicit criteria for the reduction of a country's conflict sources and strengthening of its peace capacities.

38 This research concerns the strategic question of which basic types of actions have what effects, not how to implement a particular tool. We also set aside which actors use which tools where (see Moller et al., 2007). The focus here is also more substantive than the widespread truisms that urge certain general attitudes and practices in preventive planning and implementation, such as: do an analysis of the situation; be flexible, engender local ownership; develop clear, comprehensive, and coherent policies; and involve women and youth (e.g., OECD-DAC, 2001). These generic reminders to practitioners are applicable to almost any international conflict or development activity, but offer nothing specific about what types of activities have what effects in what circumstances.

39 For example, in Estonia's 'success' story, where many of the international ingredients above were present, several local and regional factors also help to explain why the language and citizenship disputes between its Russian speaking population and ethnic Estonians did not escalate to violence. Russian identity never solidified despite conditions of exclusion. Russian elites were accommodated by the electoral system and the formation of ethnically polarized parties inhibited extremism. Electoral data show that Russian-speakers supported a range of Estonian parties, especially left-wing parties and the Centre Party, which showed willingness to cooperate with Russian speakers. Many Russians weren't registered to vote in the 1992 elections and after the 1995 elections, internal problems between Russian party leaders made them ineffective for a few years. This system tended to discourage politicians from resorting to ethnic stereotyping and public denigration of other groups. Meanwhile, political volatility in Russia distracted Moscow's attention from the 'near abroad' (Khrychikovand Miall, 1992: 204).

40 The most useful findings would be conditional generalizations in the form: 'If A (action), then B (impact), under x, y, and z (limiting conditions)' (cf. George, 1993: 120-125; Molleretal., 17f).

41 Some conflict-sensitive evaluations of individ­ual programsand projects can also be useful as proxies for generic types of instruments (e.g., Lund, 2004, 2006).

42 Also useful for producing testable hypotheses would be generic theory in inter-group and interna­tional conflict, such as on the social psychology of conflict, techniques such as GRIT, escalation dynamics, the logic of collective action (mobilization), and cooperation theory. See Miall, 2007: 19-84.

43 The notion that conflicts go through certain stages and reflect overall cycles has been questioned (e.g., Berghof, 2006; Leatherman et al., 2000). True, like the shaded hues on a color wheel, distinctions among stages are not sharp. Nor are the phases completely objective. Movement through them is neither deterministic nor always uni-directional (e.g., Lund, 1996; Miall, 2007; Kriesberg, 2003: 370), and conflict indicators are not one-dimensional and uni-layered. Nevertheless, most analysts agree that conflicts reflect great variations in intensity and 'have a beginning, middle, and end' (Kriesberg, 2003: 22). While some conflicts are the unfinished business or re-configurations of previous conflicts, and so- called 'intractable' conflicts rise and fall over long periods of time, all conflicts are not simply episodes of previous conflicts. Where long periods with peaceful equilibriums set in, the subsequent conflicts are new. Thus, the notion of a life-cycle and phases is very useful.

44 As discussed above, conflict prevention includes efforts to address the underlying sources of latent conflicts. One of the most critical focuses for inquiry is how formal or implicit social contracts that have achieved some stabilizing equilibrium begin to unravel due to internal and external pressures. In particular, the post-independence years of new nations involve severe pressures and constraints that test their elites' political skills for establishing legitimate and effective states (e.g., Ayoob). It is also useful to put the recent intra-state conflicts into a historical perspective by recognizing that they thus existing formal or implicit social contracts are unraveling equilibrium.

45 In return for compliance, concrete benefits may be offered such as membership and aid and trade favors. Violations are subject to sanction such as exclusion from privileges or the organization (KN 48). Thus, countries need to be monitored to detect discrepancies so potential violations can be forestalled or penalties imposed for violations. Countries are periodically assessed for their progress in qualifying, and provisional arrangements mark their status and establish schedules for conformance (Nicolaides, 47).

46 Exits from such organizations or their disinte­gration have been followed by use of force, even among former alliance members. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Taiwan entering international organizations have been seen as threats by rival states (Russia, the ROC, and PRC respectively), thus possibly increasing the risk of conflicts. This may abate to the extent that 'outs' are brought into the organization (Shambaugh, 1996).

47 See Sambanis (2003), Lund (2006) and Uvin (2005).

48 These different conclusions have to do in part with differing research methods, country contexts, varied degrees of adjustment policy, difficulties in obtaining data on impacts, and other factors (Cramer and Weeks, 2002: 44f).

49 Structural adjustment and stabilization policies may elicit conflict depending on whether govern­ments are sufficiently inclusive and accommodative such as by allowing political activity, the extent they are done, whetherthey are transparent, the sharpness of divisions in society, and other policies (cf. Cramer and Weeks, 2002: 41f). For example, exporting of agricultural goods is more conducive to poverty and inequality and thus potential political instability, than is exporting manufacturing goods (Gissinger and Gleditsch, 1999; Collier, 126). In Yugoslavia, the debt crisis, decline in terms of trade, and global credit tightening in the 1980s, forced austerity and low living standards, but instead of adjusting, its leaders fell back onto ethnic nationalist appeals that weakened state authority and invited inter-republic conflict (Nafziger, 2002: 14, drawing on Woodward, 1995).

50 Social safety nets in Zambia and Chile were found not only to reduce poverty and increase political support for economic adjustment programs (Graham). In that way, they may help as well to maintain governmental legitimacy and political stability.

51Among the recommendations to the World Bank, IMF, and WTO are less dependence of the poorest countries on them and their rules rather than other sources; and special policies regarding bi-lateral and multi-lateral transfers and agreements affecting trade, banking services, currency rates, and aid, such as for agriculture. These would cushion external price shocks and improve foreign investment, debt rescheduling, and capital movements (Nafziger, 2002: 5). There should be less concern about inflation rates and budget deficits, and more about building regulatory systems and economic institutions (Nafziger, 2002:15). Domesticgrowth strategies need to stabilize prices and exchange rates and spending, create appropriate economic institutions, improving the ability of the state to collect taxes and provide basic services, agrarian reform and land redistribution, and securing property rights. Due attention is also needed to their effects on the poor, minorities, rural and working people, and women and children (Nafziger, 2002: 5).

52 Compliance to structural adjustment policies were often presented as a condition for budget support.

53 Aid allocations in Kenya and Sri Lanka from the 1970s to the 1990s reveal strong evidence that donor toleration of or participation in the practice of allocating benefits according to ethnic, tribal, and regional criteria helped to fuel later inter-communal conflict (Cohen 1999, Herring).

54 Donors may go along with such practices to soften the blow of economic adjustment, keep a working relationship with governments, or show results (Herring), but thus perpetuating group compe­tition can fuel hostilities, especially when the economy declines. Aid in Kenya after President Moi's governing coalition came to power in 1978 shows how the geographic allocation of local development projects and monies as well as implementation choices such as awarding consulting and construction contracts, were largely shaped by the government's desire to expand and buttress the emerging Kalenjin-led coalition by rewarding past supporters and recruiting new members (Cohen). Because program aid was grafted onto a largely unreformed one-party state, it became subject to inter-ethnic patronage politics, and as multi-party political competition intensified, it indirectly contributed to the tribal strife later in the Rift Valley.

55 Although it deals with a mid-conflict situation, an illuminating example was established in Sri Lanka, where a donor financed irrigation project deliberately delegated to both Tamil and Singhalese farmers allocation decisions and encouraged selection of their leaders on non-political grounds. Apparently, this kept the ethnic strife that was waging more widely in that country from spilling over into at least that project area (Uphoff).

56 However, the widely used terms such as 'governance,' 'democracy,' 'rule of law' and, more recently, 'state-building,' are such broad rubrics, they are not concrete enough to delineate specific institutionsand alternative choices that might produce differing results. 'Demand-side' democracy promotion programs, for example, seek to make governments more accessible and accountable to their citizens. Thus, development programs may aid representative processes like elections and parties to expand access to government decision-making by the people, as well as help finance executive and judicial service functions that governments perform through public administration, courts and other regulatory functions, and security forces, to improve government services for the people.

57 Full-fledged democracies and autocracies are both the most politically stable. But partial democra­cies, and weak full democracies, are the most unstable systems, even more so than strong quasi-democracies (Goldstone et al., 2003). They have an irregular, non­institutionalized pattern of political competition that tends to cause executive leaders to be constantly imperiled by rival leaders, and encourage elites to maintain themselves in power despite the existence of democratic procedures. One growing form in the developing world are 'anocracies.' If autocracy and democracy are placed at the opposite ends of a continuum, an anocratic regime possesses a mixture of democratic and autocratic features in the middle of that continuum. Anocracy may apply to an autocracy where electoral and competitive features are in place and to a democracy where existing procedural democraticfeaturesare undermined (Gurr, 1974: 487; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995: 9).

58 The pace of overall change in many post­Soviet states toward consolidating democracy had slowed significantly by 1998, prompting questions whether they were in transition at all but instead

represent relatively stable new political and economic arrangements that are neither free market nor socialist' (Karatnycky: 2-4) - notwithstanding the fact that a few years later, three on the post- Soviet list - Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, and Ukraine in 2005 - experienced non-violent transitions from their first post-Cold War regimes to more liberal governments. Patrimonial, corporatist regimes can survive for long periods through currency stability, restraining the growth of the state sector, maintaining balanced budgets, and allowing export-drive growth (Karatnycky: 7,9) Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, and Ukraine in 2005 - experienced non-violent transitions from their first post-Cold War regimes to more liberal governments.

59 Although oligarchical regimes may tend to adopt policies that favor their bases of support, not all elite-dominated regimes have opposed reforms and thus encouraged conflict, and fuller democracies are not always more inclusive. In Malaysia and Mauritius, governments led by political elites have made explicit decisions to work together in policy coalitions that addressed potential imbalances among ethnic groups, deliberately enacting redistributive policies that ameliorated inequities and pre-empted the emergence of inter-group resentments. A crucial question seems to be whether 'crony capitalism, monopolism, and corruption within such systems' as in the former Soviet Union will thwart sustained growth and provoke economic crises, and even then, whether they will open up to emerging interests that bring democracy peacefully, or instead, repressive measures will restrict human rights and democracy and plunge them into instability and civil conflict (Karatnycky).

60 At the local level, development tools such as participatory community development projects, which are ostensibly aimed at producing useful material benefits such as improved local infrastructure, are increasingly being used by donor agencies as ways to create social capital and capacities for conflict management. Through creating capable local civil society leaders and organizations, they are thought to provide a yeast that over time may produce a middle class and professional ranks that help to develop a country and transform authoritarian societies. These programs may operate under the radar of a government or be tolerated as long as they do not stimulate activities that are seen by elites to threaten the status quo. But as such, they can be effective in regard to localized conflicts, such as over water or ethnic tensions, and thus as possible safety­valves, but not as leverage directly or in the short term on the national-level conflicts that have been typical of the post-Cold War period (Lund and Wanchek, 2004).

61 'An effective and legitimate state is essential not only to promote economic development but also for democratic governance' (De Zeeuw and Kumar, 2006). Before moving toward mass democratic participation, strong political institutions are necessary (Mansfield and Snyder, Zakaria).

62 This argument resonates with Fukuyama's helpful distinction between the scope of the state, or the extent it plays roles in the society and the economy, and its strength in carrying out whatever broad or limited roles it has (Fukuyama).

63 Security sector reform includes national or local bodies mandated to use deadly force; adjudica­tory institutions, civilian management and oversight bodies.

64 While economic growth encourages the emer­gence of democratic institutions, the specific mech­anism through which this occurs is not clear. Democratic politics do not spring spontaneously from creating opportunities for markets to operate, or if established, these institutions will not last without laws protecting individual rights. This is because most of the developing societies into which markets are introduced are governed by ethnic, clan, or other group loyalties that determine how public as well as private goods are distributed.

65 It remains unclear whether the object of such strengthening of the rule of law is institutional attributes or cultural values, how change toward the rule of law occurs, the effects of the changes, and what forms of assistance are most effective (Carothers, 2006).

66 Similarly: '...rather than a one-size fits all approach in foreign policies and aid strategies that presses for the same liberalizing reforms everywhere, individual countries need to be differentiated accord­ing to their capacity to absorb disruptive shifts in unregulated power and consequent instability without violent conflict. A more balanced, holistic, contextualized approach to fostering desirable change needs to be applied. Clearly, moves toward democra­tization and other reforms can themselves often be among the adaptive mechanisms that help ensure a peaceful transition in particular settings. But the overarching and overriding policy goal perhaps should not be simply democracy or human rights or markets, at any cost. It should rather be peaceful transition toward, ultimately, more democratic, or at least legitimate and effective governments, increasingly more productive economies, and more humane societies' (Lund, 2001).

67 Anotherstructural approach to domestic insta­bility, not taken up here, works through ideological campaigns and other programs to engender social solidarity and cohesion by eroding the bases for divisive group identities (e.g., Byman, 2002: 100—25). Similarly, the concept of social capital has been advocated as a useful focus for conflict prevention and resolution (Morfitt, 2002). Instruments such as truth and reconciliation commissions, for example, are promoted as ways to prevent future conflict by balancing the yearning for justice with the need of societies to move on. But.'while socialization can be a powerful tool when used in combination with appropriate resources and coercive incentives, socialization alone is a weak reed' (Leatherman: 188). Little rigorous research has been done on whether such instruments actually achieve reconciliation.

68 What applies to implementing development also applies to prevention: '.political will and indigenous leadership are essential for sustainable policy reform and implementation. No amount of external donor pressures or resources, by themselves, can produce sustained reform. It takes ownership, both of the policy change to be implemented and of any capacity building efforts intended to enhance implementation. Unless someone or some group in the country where policy reform is being pursued feels that the changes are something that it wants to see happen, externally initiated change efforts.are likely to fail. Such individual or groups serve as “policy champions” or “policy entrepreneurs”' (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 6).

69 'Preventive mediation is more effective when it is initiated early, but not before the parties' positions and interests have crystallized. It is impossible to guide the parties toward a settlement, facilitate discussion of issues, or structure the interactions until the full implications of a conflict, and the options related to it, are well understood by those involved. Early intervention should never become premature intervention' Bercovitch (1996).

70 Official forms include conciliation, good offices, mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and adju­dication. Non-official forms are facilitation, dialogue, track-two diplomacy, pre-negotiations, problem­solving workshops, and leadership training. Subse­quent chapters reflect the extensive study of these well-known methods, but mainly when applied at mid- or post-conflict stages as in official peace processes. Little explicit attention has been paid to which intercessory methods may apply best at incipient stages of conflicts (e.g., see Greenberg; Zartman). 'The question that scholars need to ask is the extent to which mediation practice and negotiations theory need to be adapted when the ultimate goal is preventing deadly conflict inside states...' (Nicolaides, 49-50).

71 It was deemed effective to a great extent because almost one-third of its 1100 troops were American.

72 Similarly, analysts have argued that small military protective corps can help to prevent escalation of violent conflict by protecting multi-ethnic govern­ments that are under threat, as was needed in Burundi in 1993 and 1994, thus enabling them to function so as to prove their utility and legitimacy (Lund et al., 1997).

73 A critique frequently raised against the idea that prevention effectiveness can ever be demon­strated appears to pertain mainly to this stage of late and direct prevention. Despite the claimed successes, a widely uttered conventional wisdom claims it is not possible epistemologically to assess whether preventive action has made a difference. The argument is that there is no way to tell whether such efforts are effective because one cannot know whether the conflict in question would have otherwise escalated without them and so did not because of them. Since no violent conflict erupted, it cannot be assumed that it would have occurred if the preventive action was not applied. But combining conflict research, evaluation methods, and process-tracing can increase the plausibility of such arguments.

The critique is more telling when it comes to knowing whether specific violent acts would have occurred at a given moment if a given action of direct prevention was not taken. Analysts would not even try to claim success except where typical warning signs of violent conflicts are not actually present that have been gathered from extensive conflict research. Still, in such contexts, specific violent acts cannot be precisely predicted because they could occur or be withheld at the highly uncertain discretion of specific would-be perpetrators of violent acts. Targeted actors need to have intended to take the action that the preventive action identified as unacceptable but then cease doing so, but not for other reasons besides the preventive action, such as running out of resources. To establish that such perpetrators refrained from violence because of a given preventive action requires getting inside their heads to see how they interpreted their immediate circumstances and whether the preventive action or other factors played a part in their decision not to act violently. However, where actual acts of violence have begun to occur, analysis can show through process-tracing plausible causal link between its leading agents and their actions and the measures taken. In cases like Rwanda in May, 1994, the comparison between the capacity of direct military measures applied compared to the efficacy of a killing machine and its forces may not be definitive but it is not impossible to do. If low-level violence broke out, it could be demonstrated how it was actually contained and kept from escalating due to the constraints of a deterrent force. Other plausible linkages can be argued regarding the influence on specific actors of other direct diplomatic or other actions taken toward them.

The objection is less daunting when applied to structural preventive measures because they deal with the proximate processes, behavior-conditioning factors, and deeper societal conditions that indirectly influence the probability of violent acts. Where such signs are present but violent conflict has not broken out, a host of institutions, processes, and incentives and disincentives may also be in place that preserve relationships and communication among disputing parties and otherwise shape the environment of incentives and disincentives in which actors make choices whether they will act in violent or restrained ways. If potentially violent conditions are present, and it can be shown that well-targeted, timed, and proportional preventive actions are directed at them that empirical research suggests have affected these particular conflict factors in like cases, the prima facie evidence makes it possible to infer with greater confidence that the actions are likely to have had some impact in lowering the relative probability of violence, especially if indicators such as level of hostilities or peaceful interaction between protagonists also show change following the intervention.

To expect definitive proof of such impact would be like going to the doctor after signs of possible heart trouble and dismissing his professional recom­mendation thatyou quit smoking, simply because the statistical link between cigarettes and heart disease does not always occur in every individual case, and so might not apply to you. Though technically correct, most prudent people would honor the professional's advice.

74 The notion is analogous to the 'mutual hurting stalemate' noted at levels of armed conflict as conducive to war termination, but this deadlock arises at lower levels of hostility based on a shared sense that a greater harm to them looms. What is at issue is how readily a point of sufficient mutual anxiety is reached even before the parties spill each other's blood. A substantial difference would seem to exist between stalemates after many people have been killed, than in, for example, a stalled but physically benign altercation such as in trade, environmental, boundary, arms control, and labor negotiations (e.g., Zartman, 2001: 4, 202; cf. Heldt, 8). Is some early threshold of bloodshed reached when it becomes qualitatively more difficult to dissuade the parties from avoiding a vortex of violence that becomes significantly harder to halt? Is such a threshold exceeded as well where low- intensity violence, even though it periodically subsides, as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? In any case, to the extent such moments come late in an increasingly violent on and off again conflict, the less the action is preventive, and the more it is management and termination.

75 Sixmajorthreatsofthe Useofforcewere issued by the USA and its European allies to try to stop the fighting in Bosnia, but all failed until a bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995.

76 In Bosnia, deadlines were not issued, public controversy arose in the West over the possible use of airstrikes, publics were unwilling to provide ground troops, and the Bosnian Serbs were more motivated to pursue force than the allies (Jakobsen, 1996: 22-3). Because the Western powers did not see Bosnia as in their vital interests, they were not as willing to commit ground troops to stop the killing as the Serbs were willing to suffer the possible conse­quences of what were unconvincing threats of force (p. 25).

77 International actors must be prepared to apply either carrots or sticks to induce desired responses by the parties. The threatened must not be able to use force except at very high cost. Ifthese elements are not present, the best fall-back option is not half-hearted coercion but seeking out opportunities to bring the parties into consultation that rely on persuasion.

78 Kuperman makes a related argument from the cases of Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo that a form of 'moral hazard'occurs when minorities thatare weaker militarily than majorities but seek secession or auton­omy provoke the majorities so that the latter retaliate. This repression prompts the international community to come to the minority's aid, and a local conflict thus becomes internationalized (Kuperman, n.d.; 2008). A similar hypothesis with regard to the possible role of well-intentioned international policies in fostering the onset of some conflicts is that '...a certain pattern has characterized the international responses to pre­genocide Rwanda, 1993-94; Burundi, 1993; Kosovo, 1992-98; and East Timor, 1999, and possibly other cases. The international community's sympathetic political championing of an ethnic minority's rights, such as through honoring unofficial referendums and denouncing the human rights violations of their oppressors, may tend to polarize the local political relations further by demonizing the perpetrators, and thus help to catalyze violence. The forces of violent backlash in those settings may be encouraged to pre-empt militarily the impending threat of political change, but the international community is not prepared to deter that reaction. Ostensible violence prevention can become violence precipitation, if well- intentioned advocacy of human rights promotion, provision of humanitarian aid, or other international measures are advanced on behalf of a vulnerable group, but actually puts them at greater risk by tempting the more powerful and better-armed forces of reaction to strike while they can pre-empt the forces of change, because adequate international provision is not made to protect their victims' (Lund, 1999).

79 Such forces will be more feasible as well as effective to the extent they have the approval of the government of the host country. Introducing such stabilization forces without such acquiesence may provoke violence instead, as was threatened when the OAU discussed sending a multi-lateral force into Burundi in 1998.

80 'The shift that needs to be consolidated is multifold: toward an increasingly insider approach to conflict prevention; toward earlier mediation; and toward bottom-up approaches aimed at societies as a whole.' (Nicolaides 1996: 50).

81 NGOs such as FEWER, International Alert, and the International Projecton Peaceand Prosperity(IPPP) have acted as informal hosts and conveners of multi­actor consultations in countries such as southern Georgia, Kenya and Guinea-Bissau. UNDP country consultation projects are also catalyzing concerted preventive initiatives in threatened countries such as Fiji and Guyana. Given sufficient training over time in conflict assessments and conflict-sensitive programming, these processes might garner more discretion for the country level to decide on appropri­ate prevention decisions and strategies. The stovepipe structure of most development organizations has to be altered by giving more analytical power, policy authority, flexibility, and implementation resources to country missions and cross-agency bodies at regional and country levels, which is where necessary value tradeoffs as well as tactical decisions need to be made.

82 One key research question is how significant such the local and other non-intervention conducive factors must be for prevention to succeed. Many of these factors tend to be present in the more successful cases in Europe. So what is unclear is how effective or limited external intervention can be in the absence of such favorable endogenous environments, such as in Africa and Asia.

83 Such as through the new Uppsala MILC database on direct prevention measures vis-a-vis minor armed conflicts (Moller et al., 2007; Heldt, 2007).

84 These analyses need to be organized around distinct intervention categories and the levels and contexts in which they operate in order to cumulate knowledge and be subject to further testing and refinement. A consistent framework for presenting the lessons is needed to provide comparable profiles of different instruments. The categories most fruitful for comparative policy research should correspond to concrete, observable, alternative activities that corre­spond to choices that policymakers can actually make, and not remain abstractions. But they also cannot be based simply on descriptive, sectoral goals or program labels, which may prove analytically barren. Research designs also need a typology of contexts into which interventions are introduced, such as the level of hostilities, power balances of contending parties (symmetric or asymmetric conflicts), and the degree of support. Although every individual application of a generic instrument encounters a unique combination of circumstances, it is possible to identify types of conditions whose variations seem to be most important in producing differing impacts, so as to apply findings to analogous situations.