NOTES

1 The author wishes to thank the donors who made this project possible: The Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, the Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland.

2 Ury and his colleagues refer to the use of these approaches by the parties themselves but in this chapter, they are used to refer to third-party approaches.

3 The Security Council is composed of five perma­nent members who have the power of the veto (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and ten non-permanent members who are elected for two-year terms.

4 Readers who wish for more information can consult the Department of Peacekeeping Operations website which is: un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko.

5 I. William Zartman was the first to discuss the concept of “ripeness” in his book Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (1985). He has since expanded the concept further in his chapter 'Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond' (2000).

6 Stephen John Stedman first discussed the problem of 'spoilers' in his article 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes' published in International Security (1997). It has been further elaborated in his book with Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (2002).

7 Bargaining behaviors were operationalized by Charles E. Walcott and P. Terrence Hopmann in a coding system called Bargaining Process Analysis in their chapter 'Interaction Analysis and Bargaining Behavior' in the book by Robert T.

8 The concept of interests was first articulated by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their book, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (1981) where they define interests as “each side's needs, desires, concerns and fears” (see page 42). They have been further elaborated in Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin's book Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (1986). See also I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, PowerandNegotiation (2002).

9Paul George Swingle discusses power asymmetry in his book, The Management of Power (1976). Habeeb also discusses this in his book Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations (1988).

10Roger Fisher and William Ury discuss the use of objective criteria as an important tool in negotiation in their book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (1981). As well, the importance of drawing upon norms is discussed by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore in their book Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (2004), as well as by Martha Finnemore in National Interests in International Society (1996) and Audie Klotz in Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (1996).

11 The use of a single negotiating text is mentioned by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In (1981) and its practical use explored by James K. Sebenius in Negotiating the Law of the Sea (1984) and by William B. Quandt in Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (1986).

12 Roger Fisher and William Ury discuss the importance of “option generation” and new ideas in negotiation and ChristopherW. Moore discusses the importance of the mediator offering new ideas in the mediation process in his book, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (1996).

13 For a discussion of deadlines in mediation processes, see Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (1996).

14 James K. Sebenius discusses issues related to packaging and separating issues in his article “Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties” which appeared in International Organization (1983).