PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE CONCEPT
Besides its theoretical volatility, the concept of reconciliation has practical shortcomings. In the field, this notion arouses a variety of reactions, from enthusiasm to irony and scorn.
A first group of actors, mainly involved in NGOs, explicitly calls for reconciliation. In their view, reconciliation is much more than a concept: it is one of their goals. Still, the notion provokes strong resistances as well. Two types of rejection can be observed. The first one results from the attitude of many victims of past violations. The fear of being manipulated by the power and the call for justice explain their hostility against what they perceive as a new type of injunction. A second kind of resistance is expressed by those, especially within the diplomatic and political sphere, who consider this idea as naive. Irritated by its spiritual connotation, they regard it as useless and even sometimes counterproductive. To sum up, we could assume that reconciliation fails to promote the transformation of the conflict when it reveals itself to be a sparkling political program (1) or a miraculous formula (2).Reconciliation as a political slogan
In the immediate aftermath of a violent conflict, victims or relatives of dead victims distrust the notion of reconciliation, especially if it is proclaimed as official policy. The gap between individual and political processes is obvious in the case of the mothers of the disappeared group in Argentina, Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), who still refuse compensation. At the official level, the need to reconcile is presented as a way to look forward. However, for victims, this “politics of reconciliation” is often perceived as a rhetorical argument that despises the sufferings endured in the past. In Rwanda, for instance, voices coming from all communities denounce what they call as the “ideology of reconciliation”.
Among them, Immaculee Mukarwego argues: “Reconciliation. This word became unbearable to me and to most of the survivors who I know. To me, it is even perfectly indecent after a genocide. [...] ‘To reconcile', as it is written in the dictionary, consists in making people at odds agree again. [.] Do I have to consider that what happened in Rwanda between April and July 1994 is the product of a dispute, a quarrel, a disagreement and therefore that it would not be understandable not to reconcile? Do the people who use this word all the time realize that its meaning is fundamentally simplistic?” (Le Soir, 7 April 2004).The resentment of a population deeply affected by a conflict seems inevitable. From a psychotherapeutic approach, resentment is seen as legitimate and even necessary to express self-respect (Murphy and Hampton, 1988; Montville, 1993: 120). One Rwandan survivor eager to let bygones be bygones and involved in reconciliation processes explained: “I took the time to hate everybody. It took me ten years. I needed this time for hatred. NowI can think about reconciliation”. Though, such evolution does not constitute a rule in that matter. In other cases, those who suffered in the flesh or who lost their family circle keep the stigmata of the past tragedy during their whole life (Edkins, 2003: 230-232). The record of another Rwandan survivor manifests it: “This is not the end of the genocide that really stops a genocide, because inwardly genocide never stops” (Mujawayo and Belhaddad, 2004: 197). There is the same echo in the words of Speciosa Mukayiranga: “The survivor remains inconsolable. He resigns himself but he remains in revolt and powerless. He does not know what to do, the social environment does not understand him, and he does not understand himself either” (Mukayiranga, 2004: 777). This feeling is also emphasized by Jean Amery (who was subject to torture during World War II). To him, “what happened really happened” and “the fact that this happened cannot be taken thoughtlessly”; “nothing is cicatrised, and the wound that was almost healed always reopens and suppurates” (1995: 17-20).
These sentences indicate a tension that cannot be avoided when speaking about reconciliation: the legitimate need to look forward always has the risk of denying people damaged by life (Brudholm, 2008).Reconciliation as a miraculous formula
Social resistances do not only limit the ambitions of official authorities. They also put into question the moralistic and somehow euphoric view adopted by some scholars and practitioners.
As has been underlined, reconciliation involves prolonged, deep and multifaceted processes. To be fruitful, these processes require the management of expectations in at least three different ways. First, a call for the restoration of a supposed “harmony” between former adversaries is doubtful. Reconciliation tends to create an environment in which differences, misunderstandings and conflicts can be negotiated and not purely eliminated (Schaap, 2005: 21; Gardner-Feldman, 2006). In the same sense, references to “healing” are understandable in a metaphorical sense, but the passage from an individual to a social group remains questionable anyway. How do you heal the wound of a society? Such an idealized and therapeutic conception obviously fails to be a realistic model of reconciliation (Hazan, 2006).
Second, practitioners involved in conflict transformation risk facing major difficulties if they present reconciliation as a “kit for stabilizing peace”. Reconciliation as such
does not constitute a normative model or a magical solution that can be applied to any conflict. Its scope, as well as its chances of success, depend on at least two main elements: the generation effect and the context of each specific case. Therefore, it would be vain and possibly detrimental to formulate general considerations without taking into account the potential perils of context-insensitive reconciliation attempts (Hermann, 2004:49). From a philosophical point of view, one could even question the fact that reconciliation as such is to be sought.
Once again, more research on cases where there is no formal reconciliation and more broadly, on potential negative consequences of reconciliation projects, could be highly valuable.A third element can be stressed regarding outsiders such as international organizations or mediators: the essence of reconciliation is the voluntary initiative of the parties. The rapprochement between former enemies depends on the extent to which the international community facilitates the process and provides concrete assistance for pursuing it. Yet, the forces for change are primarily internal and cannot be coerced. In Kosovo, for instance, reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians is a key objective for the United Nations peace-consolidation mission which based its approach on the promotion of multiethnicity. However, the impossibility of reaching a negotiated agreement about the status of Kosovo shows that the reconciliation process can only be an endogenous one (Duclos, 2003). In Rwanda, the same comment can be made to European - and especially Belgian - officials. The notion of reconciliation seems to be unacceptable when it sounds like advice given by the former colonial authorities: “Coming from Europeans, this word [reconciliation] has incontestably a paternalist and contemptuous connotation since ‘the Blacks' are perceived as children who are invited to make peace after a struggle” (Mugarwego, Le Soir, 7 April 2004). These remarks favour a “modest” picture of reconciliation (Dwyer, 1999). Rather than expecting a process that entails justice, forgiveness and harmony, it is critical to adopt an opinion that is reasonable in terms of aims and in terms of timing.
In 2004, Hermann asserted that “at least for now the notion of reconciliation cannot serve as the key concept for cracking the enigma of peacemaking and peace stabilizing” (p. 40). It is indeed difficult to deny the ambiguity and shortcomings of reconciliation in the field of international relations. Numerous difficulties have been highlighted in this study.
On the theoretical level, the lack of consensus about the meaning of reconciliation is a major challenge for scholars and practitioners. The variety of conceptions analyzed above is quite puzzling: seen as synonymous with peaceful coexistence for some, it appears as thepanacea for others. At the practical level, there are two main ways to conceive of the notion of reconciliation: as a goal or as a process. As a goal, it often sounds like a rhetorical argument. It may even become a slogan or a kind of label (“politics of reconciliation”) that is implicitly required by international donors. As a process, reconciliation reveals itself to be more effective. Rather than being a static endstate, it refers to a continuously evolving and developing quality of relationship. However, there is no consensus on the specific conditions, timing and sequences of reconciliation. So how do we conclude then?This reflection focused on the following hypothesis: solving conflicts in a durable manner implies a gradual change of the representations that parties have about the other, about their past and about themselves - this means a crucial change in their identities. Such an evolution is likely to be a never-ending journey that involves both governments and civil society, marked by progress and setbacks. The development of trust after violent conflicts cannot be reduced to a rational choice in favour of the best option. It is not so much a question of method and technique as a way to articulate politics and emotions, interests and human relations (Saunders, 1999: 4-5). At the end of the day, the rehearsal of clashing past experiences depends on each person's ability to risk (see Harold Saunders' chapter on dialogue in this book). Speaking of individual attitudes, let us conclude with the opinion of Robert Antelme just after his return from the camp of Dachau, in 1945: “The same indignation that was expressed by Frenchmen against Nazi barbarity must now be expressed against the attitude of some Frenchmen. [...]. Far from taking revenge on us, the man who shoots down or hits a German prisoner actually insults us”. “To think that a deportee could be delighted that some Germans in France are becoming themselves ‘deportees', or even simply tolerate it, means that one did not understand anything of what has been lived over there” (2005: 10 and 17). One single opinion will clearly not “crack the enigma of peace stabilizing” but it can be an invitation to go on investigating. Although current lacunae in the literature can be seen as real brakes, they also provide a fascinating challenge.