Public Hearings

Ideally, public hearings should provide opportunities for people to work together to solve problems. In practice, however, they rarely achieve this ideal. Ahteensuu and Sippi (2009) found that public consultation on the deliberate release and marketing of GMOs (genetically modified organisms) in the European Union, for example, did not serve democracy, increase consensus, enable better decisions, or establish trust.

The typical public meeting involves a tech­nical presentation by agency officials, limited opportunity for the members of the public to ask questions for clarification, and then a formal comment period. During the formal comment period, members of the public are given a certain amount of time to present their comments and concerns. Their comments and concerns are recorded so that agency officials may formally respond. A fundamental prob­lem with the use of public hearings is that agency officials and citizen stakeholders often bring conflicting goals to the meetings and use different forms of discourse to present their ideas and concerns—thus often exacerbating rather than ameliorating conflicts.

Broad goals shared by most stakeholders include improvement of government, sharing power among relevant stakeholders, enhanced public policy, and incorporation of multi­ple perspectives into environmental policy decisions. Community-based goals include empowering the citizenry to take action and have a voice in public policy, strengthen­ing community relationships, and fostering local leadership in environmental issues. Stakeholders also may attempt to persuade decision makers to adopt their perspective toward issues. Government decision makers enter this process with mandated goals to improve the decision-making processes, share information with stakeholders, reach diverse communities, respond to public concerns, and lobby for public acceptance of their deci­sions.

Researchers have suggested multiple demo­cratic principles as the best criteria for evalu­ating public participation processes (T. R. Peterson & Franks, 2006). Even when a pub­lic meeting appears to have been conducted fairly, many stakeholders remain dissatisfied with public meetings if the outcome (or final decision) fails to protect their individual inter­ests or is incompatible with personal values. McComas et al. (2007) found that, while people were not enthusiastic about participat­ing in public hearings, having a voice in the process, being treated fairly, and facing equal risk of loss favorably influenced satisfac­tion, community connectedness, willingness to accept meeting outcomes, willingness to attend future meetings, and concern about the potential health risk. Dispute resolution pro­fessionals are challenged to find a process that will create a sense of legitimacy for the process and the outcome—so that a broad range of outcomes will be acceptable—even when the decision fails to satisfy all interests.

Given the research indicating that pub­lic hearings rarely accomplish their public involvement goals, and often create further conflict, it is puzzling that they remain the most widely used method of public par­ticipation in environmental decision making. T. R. Peterson, Peterson, Peterson, Allison, and Gore (2006) suggested that this occurs because public meetings satisfy the minimum legal requirements for public participation, without focusing on the process or out­comes of that participation. Public meetings often are sites for persuasive communication designed to influence the public to support the plan recommended by the agency and industries that stand to benefit from the pre­ferred alternative. M. N. Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson (2006) cautioned that “the social preference for agreement and modera­tion enables powerful sectors within society to co-opt public participation for further consolidation of their influence” (p.

Though public hearings may be referenced as opportunities for dialogue between agency officials and members of the public, empirical research indicates that they typically inhibit dialogue and reinforce existing positions and competition among stakeholders. Citizens per­ceive a significant power imbalance between agency personnel and expert consultants, on the one hand, and members of the public, on the other. This is evidenced by the scientific language and other jargon used by agency personnel and their expert consultants, agency control over the agenda—including definition of relevant issues, and the retention by the convening agency of sole determination of the final decision or outcome.

Scientific Knowledge and Language. In the case of public meetings, two forms of dis­course typically occur: (1) technical/scientific discourse and (2) emotional/personal rights discourse. Agency officials and expert consul­tants open the meeting with a formal presen­tation about the environmental issue couched in a barrage of technical language, including scientific facts, chemical names, and statistics, that can overwhelm the public. Members of the public often speak a discourse of rights, emotions, concerns, and personal interests. Because the language of scientific discourse does not leave room for the language of emo­tions, members of the public are unable to express themselves fully in public hearings, resulting in frustration and anger.

In environmental conflicts, science is often portrayed as the neutral authority within the political fray. Because of the authority given to the scientific method, scientific results are typi­cally characterized as having been discovered in a manner free from bias (M. N. Peterson, Peterson, & Peterson, 2007). This leads to the presumption that decision makers are able to step out of the political milieu and render value-free judgments. Because Western culture tends to accept scientific fact as immutable, the fact that science also is used as a tool of persuasion to support and attack positions is masked. The use of complex, technical, and scientific language by convening agencies and their consultants effectively discourages participants from asking apparently naive questions.

Agenda Setting and Definitional Hegemony. Public meetings reinforce power imbalances between agency officials and members of the public in that the public has minimal influence over the agenda or struc­ture of participation. Participants in public meetings are often required to register their request to comment prior to the beginning of the meeting and are given a preset amount of time (e.g., 3 minutes) for comments. Often, agency officials retain the right to change the structure of the meeting or the agenda at any point. In addition to structural control, agency officials control the scope of pertinent issues for discussion and how those issues are defined. Agency officials limit the scope of discussion in public meetings so that non­technical topics, including social issues and concerns, are outside the scope of discussion and, therefore, do not warrant response from agency officials. Agencies seem to operate from the notion that to avoid conflict, they must avoid discussing controversial issues with the public. Suppressing environmental conflict through avoidance strategies, how­ever, tends to produce deeper intractability (M. N. Peterson, Peterson, Peterson, Lopez, & Silvy, 2002).

Final Determination. Regardless of the opin­ions expressed by the public in a hearing, the agency retains the right and responsibility to make the final decision. Numerous cases exist where natural resource management agencies appear to have ignored public preferences, simply continuing with the plans they had in place prior to public comment. Ignoring public opinion that has been clearly expressed in hearings perpetuates the notion that public participation is futile and that agencies con­duct public hearings simply to avoid lawsuits, to gauge public support for predetermined projects, or to legitimate previously made decisions (M. N. Peterson et al., 2006; T. R. Peterson et al., 2006). The perception of fair process is severely compromised if the outcome of the public participation process appears to ignore the public interest.

Summary. These characteristics of pub­lic hearings (emphasis on scientific jargon, agency control of the agenda and scope of issues, and agency authority to determine out­comes without attending to public opinion) all combine to discourage effective dialogue. Littlejohn and Domenici (2001) laid out the requirements for creating dialogue as con­structive conversation. They asserted that dia­logue does not occur without “treating people like people” (p. 33) or taking their concerns seriously. Even though agency officials may treat members of the public with formalized respect, failing to address their concerns, ignoring their opinions, and bombarding them with technical jargon do not constitute treat­ing them “like people” (p. 33). Instead, this behavior objectifies the public and reinforces conflict. The question-and-answer format of the public meeting, rigid scheduling of the public comment period, and control over the scope of the issues to be discussed all work against meaningful opportunities for dialogue to occur within the traditional public hearing format.

Public meetings generally treat commu­nication as a mere conduit through which discrete packets of preexisting information flow—technical information from experts to members of the public and opinions from members of the public to the experts. Public hearings occur within a system that com­bines severe power imbalances among par­ties, a constrained environment for dialogue, and a strong likelihood that interdependence among parties will be ignored. All these factors combine to yield a public participa­tion process that fails to realize significant dialogic potential. Still, public hearings remain a common means for managing environmen­tal conflict.

Consensus Processes

Rationale for Consensus Building. Consensus­based processes have emerged as an alternative to the acrimonious exchanges constructed with zero-sum outcomes that have led increasingly to gridlock and citizen outrage. Consensus processes emphasize facilitation of diverse sets of individuals to establish mutually agreed on goals and seek solutions to complex prob­lems. These approaches promise to enrich the overall quality of democracy by endowing governments and their regulatory agencies with additional legitimacy and providing com­munication channels for generating agreement on environmental policies.

Consensus building is especially important in today’s complex environmental conflicts, which require sharing of information across time, space, and institutional jurisdictions. Appelstrand (2002) argued that the funda­mental purpose of public participation is to build consensus, and by engaging in consen­sus-building processes, agencies responsible for managing natural resources should pro­duce more sustainable environmental policy. Singleton (2002) examined several commu­nity-level consensus-building processes and concluded that they led to increased regulatory flexibility, accountability, and opportunities to enhance democratic practice as well as to improve the quality of environmental decision making.

The shift to consensus-based models as a foundation for environmental decision making gained rapid momentum during the late 1980s (M. N. Peterson et al., 2005). Consensus models are usually linked to some type of community building. Although the process often inspires initial conflict involving the diverse interests that make up a com­munity, it can lead to greater support for environmental policies (M. N. Peterson, Allison, Peterson, Peterson, & Lopez, 2004). Greater support within the local commu­nity carries benefits, including lower enforce­ment costs, higher compliance rates, less conflict, and higher community satisfaction. Consensus-based approaches to environmen­tal conflict promise to reduce implementation costs through the creation and use of social capital and more efficient use of natural and human capital (T. R. Peterson et al., 2006). Consensus-based approaches promise to reduce administrative costs by paying for management at least in part with social capi­tal (Ostrom, 1990).

The transition to consensus-based reso­lution of environmental conflict has been facilitated in the United States by Community­Based Conservation Planning (CBCP) for the purpose of developing Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs). Communities sharing space with endangered species have recognized that community-based HCPs can benefit the entire community by pooling resources, including money, land, scientific informa­tion, and time. As a result, CBCP has become increasingly popular (M. N. Peterson et al., 2004). Although CBCP often encounters initial resistance, it increases the chances that the final management decision will be accepted by those involved in the process and the rest of the community because pro­grams that develop local consensus gain broad support and, therefore, result in more effective conservation plans. The possible creation of economic and social capital by CBCP “engaged the attention of adminis­trators and managers—extending to U.S. presidents—who sought less costly alterna­tives to traditional privatization, command and control, and subsidy-based approaches to” environmental conflicts (M. N. Peterson et al., 2004, p. 744).

Gwartney, Fessenden, and Landt (2002) found that the positive relationships devel­oped through a consensus-building process used to resolve a dispute over human popula­tion growth and sustainable development in an Oregon community disseminated beyond actual participants and remained in existence over time. They concluded that the enhanced working relationships among previous adver­saries were largely the result of the consensus­building process. Laessoe (2007) noted that consensus-based citizen participation is crucial to successful environmental management in Denmark. In Peru, which became a medium­range gas exporting country in 2000, energy policy now relies on consensus processes that ensure increased horizontal and decentralized decision making. Fontaine (2010) found that this shift contributed to environmental and economic sustainability, as well as to posi­tive working relationships between the state, energy companies, NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and indigenous communities.

Consensus-building approaches to environ­mental conservation also have become more common in developing countries known for their biodiversity and unique landscapes. Case studies suggest that community-based attempts to build consensus have led to relatively more effective environmental conservation policies than those dictated by either national or international bodies. Fabricius, Koch, and Magome (2001) found that the increase in locally based environmental decision making was especially pronounced in southern Africa following a wave of democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Working relation­ships between national governments, industry, and local communities improved; participants identified common goals; and conflict man­agement tactics became less violent.

As is typical for fashionable notions expe­riencing a collective surge, consensus models are loosely defined. They generally purport to engender win-win outcomes, educate participants, and foster a sense of community. They also have a variety of labels, including community-based conservation, comanagement, collaborative resource management, and com­munity-based initiatives. Although each consen­sus model defines success somewhat differently, all share varying degrees of commitment to mutual agreement as an end goal (for more details, see T. R. Peterson & Franks, 2006).

Challenges to Consensus Building. Ironically, about the time consensus was gaining momen­tum among environmental practitioners, its theoretical weaknesses were being thoroughly deconstructed by social theorists (M. N. Peterson et al., 2005). The theoretical debate over consensus theory and its philosophi­cal antecedents is by no means over, but its implications are decidedly unfavorable for environmental conservation. Communication theorists have argued that communication is most productive when it enables humans to respect others without reducing them to ourselves and that political conflict is vital to strong democracy. Analyses of political rhetoric have demonstrated how the absence of argument allows elites to control delibera­tive processes, leading to Ivie’s (2002) claim that the existence of vociferous debate is a sign of a healthy, pluralistic democracy, rather than a “sign of hostility, alienation, misbe­havior, inefficiency, or even impending chaos and ruin” (p. 278). This theoretical frame­work suggests that environmental conflict should celebrate the diversity of participants, languages, types of reasoning, and evidence involved in public debate, and is particularly relevant to those seeking to change, rather than perpetuate, existing patterns of develop­ment (Enck-Wanzer, 2006; Low, 2008).

Toker (2004) argued that the pursuit of a public sphere grounded in consensus has encouraged naive acceptance of models that promise open and free public deliberation under conditions of equality. In these forums, stakeholders from all walks of life theoreti­cally come together and engage in open and free deliberation. Critics of consensus-based processes claim that management by con­sensus is dangerous because the attempt to placate everyone risks the attenuation of any impetus for change and reifies the status quo (M. N. Peterson et al., 2005, 2006). Furthermore, although many consensus con­veners and facilitators affirmatively attempt to expand the diversity of people involved in public processes and create an atmosphere that promotes egalitarian participation, such processes necessarily occur within existing political structures where political elites have the advantage in shaping group consensus (Ivie, 2004; Robbins, 2010). The emphasis on civility and reason in consensus-based models is problematic in part because the illusion of objectivity and universal reason requires bracketing deep conflicts and treating as truth that which could just as easily be understood as hegemony.

Singleton (2002) argued that consensus­building processes fail to confront core con­flicts over equity, distribution, and valuation of nature. This difficulty is further exacer­bated because natural resources such as air, land, and water do not start and stop at political boundaries, whether those boundar­ies surround a private residence or a nation. Because environmental disputes rarely sort out according to political boundaries, it is diffi­cult to procure sufficient institutional support to stabilize consensus-based environmental agreements.

A failed natural resource management pro­gram in California illustrates political tech­niques used by powerful interest groups to contain, capture, and derail consensus pro­cesses (P. A. Walker & Hurley, 2004). In that case, powerful social groups subverted the con­sensus process to achieve previously determined political goals, demonstrating that the political environment exerts strong influence over both process and outcomes. Kallis, Kiparsky, and Norgaars (2009) found that, while a strong consensus process enhances mutual under­standings and can be a source of innovation, it appears ill suited to resolve the distributive dilemmas at the core of many complex envi­ronmental conflicts. Toker (2004) documented a consensus process that held members of the public hostage while powerful institutions used legal and legislative channels with little disruption. She argued that environmental conflict would be better managed through an exploration of rhetorical strategies that disen­franchised groups can use to redefine situa­tions, disassociate dysfunctional relationships, and introduce new perspectives.

Gregory, McDaniels, and Fields (2001) argued that the focus on consensus build­ing impedes critical thinking and leads to the development of inferior policy. Poncelet (2001), who studied environmental consensus processes in Europe and the United States, found that all were characterized by conflict avoidance and diffusion of difference. His analysis indicated that this proclivity grew out of a prominent cultural model that con­ceptualizes the partnership process as fun­damentally consensual. He concluded that consensus-based environmental partnerships inadvertently engender a retreat from radical thinking and innovative environmental solu­tions.

When scientific information regarding an environmental issue has high predictive power, and infrastructure needed for implementa­tion is well developed and thoroughly inte­grated into the community, consensus-based approaches may be appropriate. These con­ditions rarely exist in environmental con­flicts, however, and acting as though they do increases apathy and cynicism among the public. Stakeholders who enter a public par­ticipation process believing that consensus will emerge generally come away disenchanted by the inexplicably contrary behavior of those with opposing views. This leads to increased cynicism regarding participation in efforts designed to improve the quality of environ­mental decisions and further minimizes pos­sibilities for progressive environmental policy (M. N. Peterson et al., 2005, 2006). Within democratic political contexts, approaches to conservation planning that encourage vig­orous debate are more likely to produce sustainable environmental policy than are consensus-building approaches.

Fabricius et al. (2001) cautioned that con­sensus-based processes are not a panacea for environmental conflict in developing nations. Political instability in these locations means it is difficult to predict changes in political regimes, which can spawn new power strug­gles, many of which threaten the stability of environmental agreements reached through consensus. They noted that citizens who had participated in these consensus-building pro­cesses in southern African nations during the early 1990s became deeply invested in the resulting environmental policies and felt betrayed by political changes. The expectation that consensus-based approaches will yield significant community benefits is a further cause for concern. The conventional wisdom that devolution of power to the smallest local group will inevitably result in good gover­nance and sustainable resource management is flawed. To be effective, devolution of power must be accompanied by appropriate strate­gies such as mediation services at the local level, the creation of locally developed and enforced rules, and training in monitoring environmental outcomes.

Summary. Environmental managers and dis­pute resolution professionals have embraced consensus in an attempt to facilitate the poten­tially incompatible goals of environmental protection and economic growth. Although such approaches may produce positive results in immediate spatial and temporal contexts and under some forms of governance, con­sensus often is purchased at the cost of legiti­mizing current power hegemonies rooted in unsustainable social constructions of reality. Despite increased awareness of the direct link between human society and nature, envi­ronmental policymakers appear curiously unaware of the uneasy political atmosphere within which their decisions are accepted or rejected, implemented or ignored. A model for managing environmental conflict rooted in debate rather than consensus may facili­tate both positive working relationships and progressive environmental policy by placing the environmental agenda on firmer epistemo­logical ground and legitimizing challenges to current power hegemonies.

Overreliance on consensus processes jeop­ardizes both democracy and conservation by legitimizing existing hegemonic configurations of power and precluding resistance against dominant elites. It artificially reduces power relationships to conflicts of interest, presum­ably reconcilable through mutual goodwill. Public cynicism increases when expectations created through consensus-building processes are not met. Precipitous reliance on consen­sus naturalizes existing hierarchies as uncon­tested reality, closing off consideration of their implications for political and environmental sustainability.