STRATEGIC CHOICE
Strategic choice theory (De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) holds that parties in conflict must choose among four strategies: contending, problem solving, yielding, and inaction.
The first two are the most interesting. Contending, which involves such tactics as threats and coalition building, is aimed at defeating the other party. Because contending tends to elicit a comparable response from the other party, it often leads to failure to settle a conflict or to an impoverished solution that satisfies neither parties’ needs. Furthermore, contending may produce a conflict spiral, leading to escalation that hurts both parties’ interests—what Deutsch (2000) calls a “destructive process.” Problem solving, which is aimed at finding a solution that satisfies both parties’ needs, is in sharp contrast to contending. Problem solving encourages lasting settlements and improved future relationships between the parties.There are many research findings on the antecedents of contending and problem solving (see Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993, pp. 60-61, 104-117; Pruitt and Kim, 2004, pp. 42-60), most from the subfield of negotiation research. But some of the field’s assumptions about this matter are based on theoretical reasoning or on inferences from research on related phenomena. For example, Pruitt and Kim hypothesize that problem solving is fostered by faith in one’s own problem-solving ability, positive-sum (as opposed to zero-sum) thinking, momentum from prior agreement with the other party, and a belief that both parties are to blame for the conflict. Hypotheses such as these need to be tested.
Social psychological research suggests opposing hypotheses with respect to the impact of positive mood on strategic choice. The finding that positive mood encourages helping behavior (Isen and Levin, 1972) implies that it should also encourage problem solving, but the finding that positive mood encourages blame of the adversary (Forgas, 1994) implies just the opposite.
This contradiction needs to be sorted out empirically.Many conflict theorists believe that heavy contentious behavior, such as violence, is encouraged by moral exclusion of the other party, that is, by viewing the other as “outside the community in which norms apply, and therefore as expendable (and) undeserving” (Opotow, 2000, p. 417). Moral exclusion removes some of the main inhibitions that protect other people from one’s aggression. This body of theory is challenging but quite underresearched. Data need to be gathered on the psychological nature of moral exclusion, its precise impact on behavior, the conditions that foster it, and the conditions that encourage expansion of one’s moral community to include one’s adversaries.
Strategic choice theory has been criticized as an oversimplification, in that combinations of the four basic strategies are often found (Van de Vliert, 1997). Combinations of problem solving and contending are particularly common and are often quite beneficial. This is because problem solving requires that one be firm about one’s basic needs (while flexible about the means for achieving them), and contentious tactics are sometimes required to underline this firmness (Druckman, 2003). Furthermore, a vigorous defense of one’s position on certain issues, in contrast to others, may help the other party understand one’s priorities and thus locate an acceptable exchange of concessions. The basic research question here is what sorts of contentious tactics, employed in what ways, complement a problem-solving approach without courting escalation?
In partial answer to this question, Pruitt and Kim (2004) have put forward some testable hypotheses about how to make threats that do not provoke escalation: (1) combine threats with promises, employing both the carrot and the stick; (2) employ legitimate threats, such as those from a judge; (3) employ deterrent, rather than compellent threats. “Deterrent threats request that Other not take a particular action, while compellent threats request that Other take a particular action (p. 75).” Two other hypotheses might also be tested: (4) if compel- lent threats must be employed, give the other party a choice of possible actions, so as to avoid the appearance of pushing the other around; (5) employ threats that do not humiliate the other party or challenge his or her personal adequacy.