Summary and Future Directions

The Dalai Lama spearheaded nonviolence and MWAs to resolve Sino-Tibetan intergroup conflicts. This chapter discussed briefly the concepts of nonviolence, Nagarjuna’s MWA- P, and MWA to resolve Sino-Tibetan issues.

This chapter has argued that MWA-D repre­sents a social creative strategy. It is a pragmatic approach based on mutual respect and pro­vides superordinate goals that require the PRC and Tibetans working together based on recat­egorization. However, the PRC flatly rejected both the MWA-M for genuine autonomy and the “Clarification Note” on it. Intercultural and intergroup insights can shine light on the status of MWA and Sino-Tibetan talks.

Culturally stated, both Tibetans and Chinese share collectivistic cultural orientation that emphasizes other- and mutual-face concerns. However, politically, the PRC adopted rigid institutional ethnocentrism and high status quo maintenance strategies such as social com­petition and even social creativity. It is char­acterized by power imbalance, aggressiveness, and win-lose orientation outcome. In con­trast, Tibetans adopted high mutual-face con­cerns as well as compromising and integrating approaches. There is a mismatch of expression of face concerns and conflict management strategies in Sino-Tibetan relations.

Three evidences would suffice to support this claim. First, the PRC has granted auton­omy to Hong Kong based on intragroup identification and approach (Yep, 2010), but not Tibet. The PRC has adopted integrative approach to Macau and Taiwan, but not Tibet. All of these indicate that the PRC treats Tibetans as out-group members. Second, the PRC does not seem to show genuine interest in settling conflicts. There are parallel stories between Sino-Tibetan dialogues and Sino- Indian border talks. As with Tibet, China claims Arunachal Pradesh, a northeastern Indian state, as an inalienable part of China because of its historic relationship with Tibet and call it South Tibet. Forget about the Tibetan envoys, India with all her power and status comparable to China, has not been able to secure any meaningful outcome engaging with China in border talks. The 15 rounds of Sino-Indian border talks have yielded no substantive outcome just like the 9 rounds of Sino-Tibetan talks. Recently, India’s Defense Minister visited the north­eastern Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh to which the PRC made a serious objection (see report on www.phayul.com).

Last, the PRC crammed down hard on peaceful Tibetan protests, but similar protests in certain parts of China were dealt with more leniently. Very recently, when Chinese resi­dents in the Village of Wukan in Guangdong Province protested against corruption and ousted local officials and sought ballot for electing their local leaders, senior Communist Party officials from the provincial capital reached an agreement with Wukan’s self­appointed leaders and even promised them free election and investigation into the corrup­tion matters.

Concerning the MWA-D, it has produced mixed outcomes. From a diplomatic per­spective, intergroup conflict management involves two tracks: Track One Diplomacy and Track Two Diplomacy (e.g., Cuhadar & Dayton, 2011; Fisher, 2005; Montville, 1987; Montville & Davidson, 1981). Track One is a formal and official peace-building initiative, whereas Track Two is an informal and unofficial peace-building initiative. As noted above, MWA-D has not yielded positive outcomes at Track One. Despite his best inten­tion and effort to extend the olive branch, the PRC leadership has blamed things going wrong inside Tibet on the Dalai Lama and even labeled him a “wolf in a monk’s robe” and a “devil,” and the monks inside Tibet were forced into patriotic education primar­ily focused on two objectives: (1) love China and (2) hate the Dalai Lama. The PRC’s main strategy is to do nothing and simply wait for the Dalai Lama’s demise. The Dalai Lama has publicly stated that his faith in the PRC leader­ship to resolve Sino-Tibetan issues has thinned out. Tibetans have made their ultimate sac- rifice—Tibetan independence. Tibetans are frustrated by the PRC’s hard-line policy.

Notably, MWA-D has produced some posi­tive outcomes at Track Two level. Affirming his faith in the Chinese people, during his travels abroad, the Dalai Lama regularly meets with Chinese people, especially Chinese intel­lectuals and students, to discuss Sino-Tibetan issue. For example, in July 2011, during his Kalachakra (Wheel of Time) Teaching event in Washington, D.C., he discussed Sino-Tibetan issue with a large group of Chinese intellec­tuals. He feels encouraged that hundreds of Chinese intellectuals, including Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Laureate still captive in the PRC prison, and Wang Lixiong, sup­port his MWA. Over a thousand articles were written in Chinese by them supporting his approach while criticizing the PRC’s policies (e.g., Charter 08 manifesto) and harsh treat­ment of Tibetans.

Initiatives at the Track Two Diplomacy facil­itate development of people to people empathy, understanding, and trust that could augment conflict resolution at the Track One Level (see Cuhadar & Dayton, 2011). Following the Dalai Lama’s lead, Tibetan diasporas have also formed Sino-Tibetan Friendship Associations in the United States and Europe to promote intergroup understanding, collaboration, and harmony. These initiatives accord with the principles of MWA that Chinese and Tibetans can work together for common goals. Future researchers can investigate the efficacy of MWA and such initiatives at Track Two level for resolving Sino-Tibetan issues as well as similar interethnic conflicts.

Two particular areas of future research that can draw insights from Buddhism are emo­tions and forgiveness in intergroup conflicts. The Dalai Lama divides Buddhism into three parts: (1) Science of Mind, (2) Philosophy, and (3) Buddhist Practice. Of these, he said, while the last part is Buddhist religious domain, the other two could be adopted universally as any academic field of study. The Science of Mind (Lo Rig), in Buddhism, extensively describes positive/constructive emotions such as com­passion and altruism and negative emotions such as anger and hatred. Metaphorically stated, negative emotions are the fuel to the fire of intergroup conflicts, but positive emotions can be used as fire prevention and extinguisher. In this regard, Buddhism may be referred to as Science of Mind, not religion. Mapping of emotions in Buddhism, according to the Dalai Lama, is an insightful and useful humanistic spiritual tool for bringing peace of mind, happiness, and harmony. The Dalai Lama argues that the basic human nature is peace loving, and he thinks we are biologi­cally wired to receive and give warmth to each other (Lama, 2011). Scientific investigations into human emotions based on the Science of Mind (Lo Rzg; e.g., Rinbochay & Napper, 1981) and Mind Training (Lo Jong; Jinpa, 2006) in the Nalanda Tradition of Buddhism can further intergroup peace and harmony.

The Dalai Lama has often stated that Tibetan culture, largely constituted by Buddhism, is a culture of peace, nonviolence, and com­passion. Buddhism has inspired Tibetans to establish institutions of peace (e.g., monaster­ies, nunneries, schools, and hermitages) and peace-loving communities inside and outside Tibet. These have made significant contribu­tions to building culture of peace (Rivera, 2009). MWA-D, extensively discussed in this chapter, is grounded in the Tibetan culture of peace and forgiveness. Forgiveness, accord­ing to Buddhism, is not seeking revenge but accepting others with the heart of compas­sion. MWA-D does not seek revenge of any kind against the PRC for all of its oppression, injustice, and human rights violation in Tibet. Tibetans are not speaking from the stance of victims in intergroup conflict but as agents of change. They are seeking to stay within the PRC parameter provided that they can enjoy a

genuine autonomy to practice their culture of peace along with modern advancement. They are willing to accept the PRC into their culture of peace and justice. This does not mean that Tibetans should or can forget all the injustices done to them. Bishop Desmond Tutu said, “To be able to forgive one needs to know whom one is forgiving and why. That is why the truth is so central to this whole exercise” (Cose, 2004, p. 182). The Dalai Lama also said that forgiveness does not mean forgetting because there would be nothing to forgive then.

Integrating mind training (Jinpa, 2006) and MWA-P from the Nalanda Tradition of Tibetan Buddhism can further deeper understanding of forgiveness as both process and outcome. According to Shantideva (1979), the process of forgiveness involves separating injustice from the doer of injustice and understanding that the doer has done injustice influenced by deluded thoughts. While the injustice should be con­demned, the doer should be accepted with the heart of compassion in understanding his or her predicament. Altruistically stated, the doer deserves compassionate help to overcome his or her delusion. From a classical example point of view, a sensible adolescent would not be reac­tive to her mother’s crazy behavior. Rather, she would be proactive to help her mother get well given their relational interdependence. From an intergroup perspective, conflict partners should accept the interdependence of each other and work to resolve their issues through dialogue. Intergroup forgiveness can promote empathetic listening, truth telling, open discussion, collabo­ration, and sincere apology and liberate conflict partners from a vicious cycle of negativity. MWA-D is a mutually beneficial, hopeful, and pragmatic approach to address Sino-Tibetan conflict and other similar intergroup conflicts.