World Government and Peacekeeping

Threats to the peace such as ethnic and religious wars, terrorism, human rights abuses, and the breakdown of civil society may be beyond the capability of the traditional Westphalian state system (Lederach 1997).

· No treaty of peace shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war.

· No independent states shall come under the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation

· Standing armies shall in time be totally abolished.

· National debts shall not be contracted with a view to the external friction of states.

· No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state.

· No state shall, during war, permit such acts of hostility which would make mutual confidence in the subsequent peace impossible, such as the employment of assassins, poisoners, breach of capitulation, and incitement to treason in the opposing state.

· The civil constitution of every state should be republican.

· The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states.

· The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.

The first significant effort to implement Kant’s vision emerged from World War I. The resulting League of Nations failed partly because the United States was not a member and partly because the Euro-centric League would not apply its own principles to condemn Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia.

The UN replaced the League after World War II. It has defused many disputes.¹² Its peacekeeping forces have reduced the violence in others. Theory in the form of a three-phase analytical process has guided UN officials in deciding whether, when, and how to intervene in a conflict.¹³ The first phase involves early warning analysis aimed at understanding the background, situation, causes, extent, and dynamics of a conflict.

The second phase focuses on UN capabilities to carry out proposed actions, probable positive and negative consequences of each, and development of assessment criteria. Tasks such as caring for and repatriating refugees, clearing mines, conducting elections, disarming and demobilizing combatants, humanitarian relief, maintaining public order, patrolling cease-fire lines, and rebuilding economies and civil society may be required. Finally, the UN identifies the political, human, and financial resources needed to carry out the preferred strategy and spells out coordination, timing, and sequencing requirements.

The third phase is implementation planning. UN departments and agencies work together to select lead departments, draw up a mandate for action, and obtain clearances and other operational requirements. Local actors, regional organizations, contact groups, and NGOs form working partnerships. Evaluation and exit criteria are established and data collection mechanisms arranged to measure progress. Plans for transition to local authorities are developed.

Despite what is supposed to happen, each time the UN authorizes a new peacekeeping mission, its officials must scramble to find governments willing to commit equipment, money, and personnel. Apart from the time-consuming three-phase process outlined above, this alone has proven to be an agonizingly slow process at a time when speed can make all the difference between success and failure. Often, poorly trained and equipped troops are sent. Once on scene, national contingents of peacekeeping missions all too often refuse or second-guess orders from the mission commander. Commanders often are under pressure to avoid casualties so appease the strongest local force, tolerating its abuses. As the strongest local force often varies from place to place within each country, a coherent policy may prove impossible. The relief agencies often perpetuate the refugee camps that preserve the resentments across generations (Renner 2000).

Historically, UN peacekeeping divides naturally into two phases. During the Cold War, the largest concern was prevention of escalation and confrontation that might lead to global nuclear war between the US and USSR. Eighteen UN operations began during this 41-year period, of which eight ended during and five ended after the Cold War. The remaining five continue to this day.¹⁴

With the likelihood of nuclear war reduced by the end of the Cold War, major powers were less concerned with restraining their allies and many long-simmering disputes boiled over. Forty-eight UN operations began in the fourteen-year period following 1989, of which eight continue.¹⁵ The goal gradually shifted from peacekeeping to peace building under the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War world. Peacekeeping gradually became less strategic and more humanitarian. The Helsinki Accords provided some justification for selective intervention in the internal affairs of states that violate the rights of their own citizens.¹⁶ Finally, the shift reflected the study of past successes and failures by governments, NGOs, think tanks, and universities that led to new ideas as to what was possible and desirable.

Among peacekeeping successes, El Salvador ended with free and fair elections after UN implementation of a peace accord following 12 years of civil war. Cambodia saw the establishment of a new constitution and government after destruction of weapons and mines, provision of human rights training, and repatriation of 370,000 refugees. In Mozambique, the UN demobilized local troops, monitored withdrawal of foreign ones, destroyed weapons, facilitated the return of 1.5 million refugees, and organized and monitored free elections. A ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign troops followed by repeal of repressive legislation and creation of a new government stabilized Namibia. In West New Guinea, the UN oversaw the successful transfer of powers from the Netherlands to Indonesia, maintained order, and improved economic, health, and education services.

There have been failures too, most prominently in Lebanon, Rwanda, and Somalia. Finally, there are cases unresolved for decades. The failures along with cases where no intervention has been possible have led to the suggestion that peacekeeping is fundamentally flawed. UN intervention protects the weaker side from the consequences of defeat that lead to peace. Knowing there would be no intervention could dissuade the weaker side from risking war. Where wars do break out, letting them run their course could lead to relatively rapid and realistic resolution through surrender and negotiation (Luttwak 1999). The UN itself has no ability to intervene, but must rely on member countries, making actual interventions unpredictable.

Peacekeeping assumes governance will devolve upon local inhabitants once the situation is stable. But this might never happen, leading to essentially permanent peace missions (e.g., Cyprus, Israel). Theoreticians differ as to how to interpret this result, the two main camps being those who see peacekeeping as a duty and those who see it as “neo-imperialism.”

There are two problems with the critique. First, the critics have provided no evidence that the underlying UN assumptions actually are wrong. They speak in generalities and possibilities rather than specifics and probabilities. Which people do not want one of democracy’s many forms (Chapter 11) and what do they want instead? Second, the alternative to peacekeeping is war. Luttwak may be right that letting people fight it out is the quickest and cheapest route to peace in both money and lives lost. It might also lead to expanded or extended war. Predictors to distinguish the two might be useful, leading to better decisions on whether or not to intervene.

The UN was unable to enforce its own resolutions in Iraq. Instead, the US formed a coalition in what critics termed a “unilateral” intervention to overthrow Saddam Hussein although to repeat it had twice as many countries as are represented in the Security Council and as many members as the alliance against the Axis in World War II.

Because every country gets its turn on every UN commission, we have had absurdities such as Libya, Sudan, and Cuba on its Human Rights Commission and Iran and Iraq on its Disarmament Commission. It is as if the NAACP was required to extend membership to the KKK and to give it a chance in the rotation as chairman. UN members bring their own agendas to every vote—which should be no surprise, as that is what nations do. For example, China’s votes often have little to do with justice or facts and everything to do with avoiding precedents that might affect its control of Tibet or its claims to Taiwan.

Focusing on the UN’s failures has led to proposals for reform as well as proposals for an alternative international organization limited to democratic states that adhere to the rule of law. The rewards of membership, both financial and defensive, could motivate non-members to become more democratic, assumed, probably correctly, to be a good thing. Setting up criteria for membership poses some practical difficulties given the practice of modern dictators running rigged elections. Setting up a mechanism to eject or suspend governments that regress poses an even greater difficulty. Serious negotiations directed at creating such an institution might even motivate reform of the UN, making the new one unnecessary.